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Sub-Saharan Africa Report

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5 February 1986

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

COMMENTARY ON QADHDAFI'S VISIT TO SENEGAL

Paris AFRIQUE NOUVELLE in French 4 Dec 85 p 5

[Editorial: "Face to Face"]

[Text] Col Mu'ammar Qadhafi's travels leave no one indifferent. The guide of the Libyan Revolution is a very controversial person who prevents many of his peers in Africa and elsewhere from retaining their calm and serenity. In the opinion of many people, Tripoli has become the capital of terrorism and destabilization. The leader of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya is therefore not a man to be taken lightly.

His recent official visit to Senegal (3-5 December), which he is discovering for the first time after a great deal of reluctance, must be understood in that context.

Actually, Dakar and Tripoli do not have a lot to say to each other. In fact, the two countries broke off diplomatic relations with each other several years ago. Although some things are working toward a restoration of those relations, the clouds have not totally disappeared. And one would be displaying great naivete if one thought that despite the speeches and the optimism suitable to the occasion, confidence between the two capitals had been restored [sentence as published].

Qadhafi made his visit in particular to meet with the current chairman of the OAU. In that connection, he found in Abdou Diouf an attentive and responsible man--a chief of state concerned to find an African solution to the continent's current problems. One of the most important dossiers discussed was surely that on Chad, where Libya plays a major role by keeping the climate of war and division alive. The strong man of Tripoli holds a key to the fratricidal conflict in Chad: occupation of the Aouzou strip by his troops and his constant support for the factions opposing the N'Djamena regime. It is therefore up to him to assume his responsibilities before history by helping the pan-African organization advance in its search for a solution to the Chadian tragedy. Nothing prevents him from contributing to the unification and reconstruction of a Chad ravaged by so many years of civil war. On condition, of course, that he renounce all hegemonic ambition. Libya certainly needs it, being isolated as it is not only on the Arab but also on

the African stage. It remains to persuade Qadhafi to change the methods and attitudes that have not brought him success so far.

The two chiefs of state also must have talked about Arab-African cooperation, southern Africa, and Western Sahara. One can suggest that their views are close or complement each other on the first point. As for the second, their views are certainly identical. And as for the third, it is obvious that the OAU is becoming increasingly disinterested, a fact that in no way displeases Libya, which is a party to the dispute through Morocco. But if Abdou Diouf succeeds only in persuading Qadhafi to stop interfering in Chadian affairs, that in itself will be a big step on behalf of peace.

11798

CSO: 3419/146

INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

MILITARY, ONE-PARTY RULE IN AFRICA EXAMINED

Bonn AFRIKA-POST in German Sep 85 p 30

[Article by Peer Meinert: ""Black Africa: Military and One-Party Rule: The Continent Is Having No Luck with Western-Style Democracy, and to Suggest the Westminster Model Does Not Take into Account Reality"]

[Text] Nairobi, DPA--Uganda, Sudan, Mauritania, Guinea--after a short respite in the 1970s, coups appear to be coming back into fashion in Africa. Of the 50 countries in black Africa, 19 are presently in hands of the military. The continent appears to be having no luck with Western-style democracy; multiple party systems are become a rarity. There have been over 60 coups between Lagos and Mogadishu since the wave of independence 25 years ago; statistically, the tanks roll every 5 months. Countries like Ghana and Benin have had to undergo five coups.

Add to this the failed coups which the man at the top survives, but during which battles and temporary anarchy often claim more victims than in "clean," professionally planned takeovers by the military. Attempted coups were inflicted on countries such as Kenya (1982) and Tanzania (1983) which had always been considered shining examples of political stability. In the last 18 months alone, five successful and three failed takeovers have been seen (again in Guinea, the Comoros Islands and Cameroon). African experts estimate that for every successful coup there are two to three failed ones. A large number go unreported--after all, Sudanese President Nimeiri, who was deposed in April, alone survived more than 20 acknowledged attempts.

The multiple party systems arranged according to the Western model have fallen by the wayside. Now that Kampala has fallen, there are only four states with parliamentary opposition:

The "model country" Senegal, Gambia, Botswana and Zimbabwe, which has, however, already announced its path towards one-party rule. In all of the other 17 states, one party dominates, usually under the tight control of the head of state. Voluntary resignations, such as that of Senegalese President Leopold Senghor, are scarcely to be found. Mostly, the men stay until their death--so that while they are living the coup remains the only way to achieve a power transition.

The self-proclaimed "saviors of the nation" in generals' uniforms always promise the people the abolition of corruption and poverty, and usually democracy and elections as well. And yet when voting does take place, it involves elections to formal state organs without any real power--as is the case in Somalia, Burundi and Rwanda, for example. The reins remain in the hands of the military.

Those who are familiar with the social and political landscape south of the Sahara doubt whether the European model for democracy is even suitable for overcoming the explosive problems of the young states. "What counts is (economic) development," a Tanzanian journalist thinks. In view of the pressure of poverty, hunger, rising crime and economic crisis, the continent supposedly cannot afford the "luxury" of democratic "frictional loss." Instead of wasting time in factional struggles, everyone should join in lending a hand for economic development.

Political scientists doubt that the continent can be healed by the Western model for democracy. It is precisely the existence of several parties, the argument goes, that strengthens the already acute tribal rivalry instead of alleviating it. In many states, the parties are the exponents of tribal groups, and elections become the victory of one tribe over the others.

Ugandan President Obote fell from power primarily because he was trying to establish the predominance of his own tribe; despite the existence of several parties, terrorism and torture against political opponents reigned in the one-time "pearl of Africa". The head of the Zimbabwean government, Robert Mugabe, is accused of ruthlessly promoting the dominance of his Shona tribe and of having committed campaigns of vengeance against the Ndebele tribe.

Everywhere in black Africa, there is a lack of political participation among broad layers of the population. Government coalitions, a necessity in a system of proportional representation, are in view of the majority voting system just as unusual as a federal collective in the central government. There are no political "equalizing outlets." If dissatisfaction becomes too great, the military grabs its guns. In many countries, the army is the actual "backbone" of the those in power--and their greatest source of danger. The "care" for and appeasement of the officers is for this reason one of the main concerns of the governments.

Many political scientists believe that at least in theory, a one-party system imposes an internal equalization and a balance of power among the various peoples. In addition, a one-party parliament corresponds to the traditional tendency towards "finding a consensus." Parliamentary opposition is not seen in Africa as legitimate opposition, but rather as enmity. In Europe, the development of multiple party democracy took several generations; in the multinational states of Africa it will take longer--much longer.

12271
CSO: 3420/10

CHAD

BET ROLE IN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT DETAILED

Ndjamena AL-WATAN in French 7 Dec 85 pp 12-15

[Text] The trip was both exciting and full of pathos. Kanem disturbed and astonished us at the same time. In Borkou, there was torpor. Ennedi restored hope to us, but a hope disappointed by the way in which our fellow citizens in this area are living. Here and there humanity seems to be an accomplice of inhospitable nature. Right off, that is the impression gained from the 34 day mission we have just carried out from 8 October to 6 November 1985 in Kanem, Borkou, and Ennedi in the company of the BET [Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti] prefect, Youssouf Seid, constituting his first contact with those under his administration, and at the same time a trip to promote awareness and the mobilization of the BET people in conformity with the noble fundamental principles of our avant-garde movement, the National Union for Independence and the Revolution.

Kanem

First stage: Departed N'Djamena on 3 October early in the morning. The delegation, led by the BET prefect, included five journalists representing all the national press. A medical team led by Dr. Helena Tchiouna awaited us at Mao in Kanem, the first stage of the trip. In this prefecture where more than 15,000 BET inhabitants live who have fled before the Libyan invasion, Prefect Youssouf Seid was literally attacked. In Mao as in Nokou, after he had made decisions concerning work methods and a strategy for fruitful collaboration with the local authorities for better integration and the harmonious cohabitation of his own people with the local population, Prefect Youssouf Seid had to hold meetings every day for 2 weeks: canton chiefs, leaders and a large number of inhabitants from his district. Accompanied by the medical team, he took part in the vaccination campaign against measles and tuberculosis in the ferricks where the people displaced from the BET are camping, in makeshift shelters made of matting all around Mao and Nokou.

The prefect was present everywhere beside his people, even for the distribution of food allocated by the WFP for his men, women, old people, and children, visibly tortured by the war, hunger, and natural calamities of all kinds. Kanem, an area threatened by the advance of the desert, has enormous wealth which, if exploited, would contribute to Chad's economic expansion. One finds there verdant wadis favorable to all kinds of crops, and water between 1.5 and 2 meters in depth. In some wadis near Mao, fields of millet are

growing. The Borkou Dourousou (great wadi) orchards, 3 km from Nokou, can only arouse astonishment. There are thousands of these wadis in Kanem, Mao's only subprefecture in census 137. But they have not been developed. The three or four which have been farmed and kept up well, where we were able to enjoy manioc tubers, eat mangoes, drink lemon juice and observe large cotton bushes, have been developed thanks to the food for work program of the organizations, administered by Care-Chad. We were told that interesting experiments in farming these wadis have been undertaken in Chadra. The prefect of Kanem, Mamadou Affonc, told us that the population was caught unprepared by the rains this year. It is true. But farming these wadis no longer requires surface water. All that is necessary is to drill wells of 1 to 2 meters to irrigate the fields. It is the aspect of laziness that disturbs us.

Borkou and Ennedi, for their part, welcomed us with their sandy winds. The wadis here are really only marine graveyards where a few rare parched bushes sway with their roots exposed by the erosion. There are tufts of stunted grass which are also battered by the inclement weather. There are no villages in either area. Only the appearance of two or three thin camels testifies to an invisible human presence.

From Kouba to Todi, for example, i.e., more than 100 km, it is just one sand dune after another. Vegetation is virtually nonexistent, but reappears timidly as one goes back down south of Kouba, i.e., to Batandjane, 80 km away, near the border with Batha. Human activities are so restricted by these sand laden winds which begin early in the morning around 7 am, not ending until about 2 pm, that one mainly lives shut up at home. The local people, their heads swathed in scarves, move calmly to their few occupations: refilling their water supply, and gathering wood for heating. One of Borkou's most important activities seems to be the natron trade, which involves the movement of thousands of camels from the area to Kanem, Batha, and even Ouaddai. Most of the dwellings are mat huts, characteristic of the nomadic way of life. Two wells, one of which produces 15,000 cubic meters of water per hour, supply the approximately 3,000 inhabitants of Kouba Olanga.

In Ennedi, on the other hand, vegetation is fairly abundant because of the area's geography, bordering the mountain masses of the northeast. Whereas Kouba has not benefited from rainfall for approximately 7 years, Kalait received plenty of rain this year. The soil seems favorable for farming but there is no farming anywhere. The phenomenon is perhaps to be explained by its present strategic position. Nevertheless, the inhabitants from Kalait to Tinne and passing through Itou and Berdoba nearly all live in the bush looking for crepes, the seed of wild plants related to sesame, which provide excellent food. By the nature of the case, these crepes become the region's basic food. In Kalait also, two wells supply the civilian and military population. In Kouba and Kalait, the famine is not much felt. The intervention of the World Food Program in providing foodstuffs has helped the situation. It is also true that not all the inhabitants are benefiting from this manna. From Itou, the food situation is fairly catastrophic. In this area (Itou, Berdoba, Bao, Tinne, Andjeresse), the people have deserted the towns and fled to the wadis to look for crepes. The scarcity of water adds to the wretchedness of these people who are virtually cut off from the rest of the country. Yet the road is drivable as far as N'Djamena. A camel there costs 120,000 CFA fr, a skinny

sheep 20,000 CFA fr. We saw only five cows, and that by chance. Despite all these difficulties, the people remain calm, and bear with courage the caprices of nature and Libyan aggression. Nowhere do they give the impression of people in distress. Nevertheless, in Berdoba, the military police commander showed us through a cemetery of people who had died solely from hunger and thirst. Apart from the military, the place numbers only five or six civilians. Thus, the person who is not accustomed to this life has the definite impression of being a prisoner there. For the rest of us, after Prefect Youssouf Seid's meeting, it was apathy, idleness, and boredom. Of course, we went very quickly through the town and the area, and made contact with some people. In general terms, this is the social situation in this area.

As concerns Prefect Youssouf Seid's visit in his district, his stay was no holiday. The prefect was in demand everywhere. Meetings, sessions with the local authorities, with canton chiefs, and with leaders. Everywhere he went, the prefect passed on to those under his administration the message of support for the president of the republic, for the government and the Chadian people as a whole. Describing his first impressions on arrival in his home district, the prefect declared that the BET exists even if its people have been scattered because of Libyan aggression and all kinds of natural calamities. The people suffer, but put up with natural disasters with exceptional courage. My task, he continued, is to organize them. It consists in establishing all the machinery of state in the BET. Except for the Kouba Olanga subprefecture, for example, other structures do not exist. The area must be equipped with schools, dispensaries, post offices, registry offices with records of births, deaths, and marriages, customary courts, collection agencies for collecting taxes. All government structures must be reconstituted because the former infrastructure remains in the occupied zone: Faya, Bardai, Ounianga, Kebir, Gouro etc.

But all this requires a great deal of money. And the state does not have any. To accomplish this, it was necessary to have recourse to a tax on all BET inhabitants. Thus schools will be the responsibility of the student parent association: the construction of school buildings, paying the salaries of teachers, and the purchase of school supplies.

In the area of health, the prefect stressed that the medical team's mission answered to the resolutions of the second ordinary session of the Unir Central Committee, which has the goal of ensuring the health coverage of people displaced from the BET. The mission had three goals: to evaluate health needs by systematic surveys; to treat ailments encountered during itinerant consultations; and to resupply the medical units in Kouba Olanga and Kalait. These units we visited do not meet the needs of the people either in personnel or in medications. According to Dr. Helena Tchiouna, no cases of epidemic were reported as they traveled through the area.

As regards the organization of the people, all the areas we visited had already established the Unir's basic cells. Awareness and mobilization are permanent. In Itou and Berdoba, we did not meet the grassroots activists because the people are in the surrounding wadis looking for food. Despite this

suffering, the people of the BET with whom we came in contact and with whom we shared scant meals are determined to confront the Libyan challenge so that their prefecture may not be left out of the great task of national reconstruction.

9824

CSO: 3419/180

CHAD

NEW SEMINARY FOR CATHOLIC PRIESTS OPENED

Ndjamena INFO TCHAD in French 26 Nov 85 pp 5-6

[Excerpts] The Catholic community of Chad has taken an important step forward, with the founding of a major seminary in Bakara, named the Saint Luc Seminary. A Catholic mission was established in Chad in 1928 at Kou in Doba, in the Moundou diocese. Now, 25 years after independence, Chad finally has its own major seminary. This important achievement was brought about by the combined efforts of the country's four dioceses: the dioceses of Ndjamena, Pala, Moundou, and Sarh, whose efforts merit recognition. The Saint Luc Seminary, which in the recent past was just a dream, has now become a reality since 23 August 1985. Its doors are open, and classes officially began on 23 September 1985.

Its primary purpose is to train future priests for the church of Chad in Chad, so that tomorrow's clergy may draw their unity and solidarity from this authentically Chadian seminary, and so that the future apostle of God may learn from his contact with the daily reality of Chad, and finally so that the entire church of Chad may find a source of spirituality and theology in this school. It is interesting that, with the founding of the Saint Luc Seminary, the number of young Chadians preparing for the priesthood rose from seven in 1975 to 57 in 1985.

There is a total of 17 students in the first class of the Saint Luc de Bakara Seminary. These students come from the following dioceses: nine from the Moundou diocese, three from Pala, three from Sarh, and two from Ndjamena. This proportion reflects the distribution of Christians in Chad. At present there are over 300,000 baptized and instructed Catholics in Chad, out of a population of over 4 million inhabitants. Since the establishment of the Catholic Church in Chad, 14 Chadian priests have been graduated from seminaries in Africa, and over 50 seminarians are now preparing for ordination. In the past, our priests were trained in Yaounde and in Burkina Faso. Even today, some are still receiving their training in Maroua in northern Cameroon and in Burkina Faso.

The curriculum of the Saint Luc Seminary includes 3 years of philosophy, the first of which is devoted to the initiation of the future priest. This is followed by 4 years of theology.

A staff of eight people teach in this school. The professors come from the various dioceses of Chad. Abbot Edmond Djitangar Guetbe is from the Sarh diocese; Father Louis Forobet is from Ndjamen; Father Camille Artel is the former director of the minor seminary in Donia. Father Fedry is the head of the Saint Luc de Bakara Major Seminary. Administration is handled by Farther Darde, who is an accountant; Father Vernet handles equipment and supplies for the seminary; and Brother Couselo is responsible for maintenance, equipment, and the orchard. In addition to this full-time staff, there are also visiting professors who teach for short sessions, ranging from 1 to 2 weeks. Most of these professors come from Europe and Africa.

The head of the Saint Luc de Bakara Major Seminary, Father Fedry, with whom we discussed at some length the founding of this school, uttered the following hope: "That we may be able to train true servants of Jesus Christ who will work in the service of their brothers."

The establishment of the Saint Luc de Bakara Major Seminary is an important milestone for the church of Chad and for its solid implantation here. The Saint Luc de Bakara Major Seminary will be solemnly inaugurated on 15 December 1985.

7679
CSO: 3419/160

CHAD

UTA OFFICIAL VISITS, GIVES PRESS CONFERENCE

Ndjamena INFO TCHAD in French 27 Nov 85 pp 1-5

[Interview with Mr Lapautre, head of UTA; date and place not given]

[Text] The PDG [CEO--Chief Executive Officer] of UTA [Air Transport Union], Mr Lapautre, arrived in our capital city last Monday, and has had several working meetings with Chadian officials, particularly with the Ministry of Transportation staff. When he arrived, the head of UTA met with Mr Baniara Yoyana, minister of transportation, before attending a working session with Mr Djibangar, director general at the ministry, and several members of the ministry's technical staff.

The high point of Mr Lapautre's visit to Chad was his audience with the president of the republic, His Excellency El-Hadj Hissein Habre. After his meeting with the chief of state, the UTA official presided at the official opening of the new UTA office in Ndjamena.

During a toast on this occasion, the minister of transportation, Mr Baniara Yoyana, indicated that the presence of UTA's head at this ceremony provides evidence of the company's interest in our country, which has grown through its air service to our continent. "The happy occasion bringing us together today," said the minister of transportation, "may appear modest, but it is full of meaning in its context and in its scope. For the opening of this office," emphasized the minister, "undeniably marks a step forward in your company's commitment to resume fully all its commercial and representative activities in Chad, thus contributing to the effort for a socio-economic recovery in Chad. This is a cooperative and highly praiseworthy commitment, for we know how much the international airlines, even the largest, have been hurt during this period of widespread crisis by problems that have had a negative impact on their financial equilibrium, thus inevitably blocking both their interest in and their potential for investment."

"The use of UTA's new offices, which will certainly have to be expanded in the future, will bring a new dynamism to your company's activities" stated Baniara Yoyana. The minister of transportation, who is well aware of UTA's efforts to bring Chad out of isolation, assured Mr Lapautre of the readiness

of the government of the third republic to do everything in its power to assure the smooth operation of UTA's services, within the norms required by international air navigation and air transportation regulations.

The Chadian government has followed with special attention the project to bring the N'djamena runway up to Boeing 747 standards, and thinks that this project will be completed within the near future, so that Chad will not be deprived of international heavy carrier, long-distance aircraft service. In conclusion, the minister of transportation expressed his hopes that this spirit of constructive activity which is guiding both parties will grow even stronger, and be expressed in any form of understanding and cooperation beneficial to both Chad and UTA.

Responding to the minister of transportation, the head of UTA, Mr Lapaute, thanked the minister for the very warm and friendly words addressed both to him and his delegation. "Yes, I did want to open this agency personally. I feel this is an important occasion, and I want to reiterate the confidence which UTA has in the Chadian government, and to express our confidence in the future. The marks of fidelity and friendship expressed by my presence at this solemn inauguration reflect our feeling that Chad, after its reconstruction, is going to develop, and UTA will support Chad to the extent possible. We want," noted the UTA head, "to do everything to bring Chad out of its isolation by providing air service through France and Europe, by increasing the number of flights, and by using modern facilities, so that Boeing 747s will be able to carry freight to Chad." Then Mr Lapaute expressed his appreciation to the Chadian authorities, the UTA staff--both Chadian and French, to the ASECNA [Agency for Air Navigation Safety in Africa and Madagascar] and Air Afrique staffs, and above all, his gratitude for the support of top officials, starting with the president, El-Hadj Hissein Habre, to whom he addressed his gratitude.

Before this, Mr Lapaute, who was received by the president, His Excellency El-Hadj Hissein Habre, was interviewed by the Chadian press, and gave a broad overview of UTA's activities, covering particularly the development of air transportation and the growth of UTA's activities in Chad. This interview follows:

Question: Sir, you were received by President El-Hadj Hissein Habre. What did you discuss with him?

Answer: We essentially discussed two issues: first of all, the development of air transportation in Chad, for that is a very important matter for Chad, which will determine the course of its economic development. Of course, we are here to help, as I confirmed to the president. Furthermore, we spoke of UTA's very old ties with Chad; UTA was the first company to come to Chad. UTA has remained loyal to Chad, for we have many ties of friendship with your country. That is why I am here today to open this agency. This is

proof that we continue to be interested in the development of air traffic with Chad, that we have confidence in the future, since we have opened an office here, and we have decided to devote to the expansion of air traffic in your country all the resources it will take so that this traffic will grow in the future, and so that we will carry more passengers and more freight.

Question: After the resumption of your activities, do you think UTA's activities in Chad will increase?

Answer: Of course. Just recently, traffic has grown a good deal. It is going to continue to expand--and you are right about this--it is essential that large carriers come here. But before they come, the runway has to be capable of handling them. I think that ASECNA is now making all the necessary technical and financial arrangements, so that the work can start soon, and as soon as it is completed, there will be large carriers landing here.

Question: UTA has a shortage of Chadian managerial-level staff. Do you think you will one day raise Chadians to positions of responsibility?

Answer: Why not? This is one thing that is generally misunderstood. In the countries where we fly, more than 85 percent of our employees are hired from the countries we serve. That is an average which naturally covers a certain number of countries. And I must say that UTA's contribution over the years to the training of African personnel is much larger, for naturally we have trained people who later left to work elsewhere with the skills they acquired through our training. Some of these people went to work in a travel agency, some in a large company, some in France or elsewhere in Europe, and some in their country of origin. Consequently, our contribution to the training of African personnel considerably exceeds the simple numbers of people we now employ. But as you see, in the African countries where we fly, already the majority of our employees are African.

Question: After the war in Chad, and since the resumption of your activities here, do you think you will be hiring new staff?

Answer: The UTA office in Ndjamenya will hire people as it grows. We can't anticipate; we can't hire people until we have more air traffic to handle. Our first goal is to carry more freight and more passengers, and then, as our business grows, at that time we will hire new employees. Concerning the evaluation of the services provided by the Chadians, I first of all thank you for your comments, which go straight to the heart, for they respond to an effort we have deliberately been making to improve the quality of our service and to keep it at a high level. We think that we can not sacrifice service, even if we cut our fares, as we do for some categories of passengers. These customers must continue to receive good service, appropriate

for each category of customer, and each passenger must feel that he has gotten his money's worth, and that he has been well treated, like a good customer, like a friend.

Question: Has UTA had to deal with some problems in Chad, particularly with Air Afrique?

Answer: We have just mentioned some of the problems we have in Chad--the problem of the runway and large carriers. There are technical problems, as there are in all countries from time to time. In Chad, one problem for the future is to find within our fleet and our network the resources we need to handle the expansion in traffic with your country. We don't have any problems with Air Afrique; if you mean by problems, difficulties, well, we don't have any difficulties. We are two independent companies now, and since you have given me an opportunity to bring this matter up, I would like to make this point very clear. There were ties of association and cooperation which in the past were very close between Air Afrique and UTA, because that was a time when we [word illegible--were helping?] Air Afrique. We gave it help and personnel, which enabled the company to get established and to grow. When this cooperation had fulfilled its aim, it disappeared. I mean that after a certain amount of time, when the company was big enough to "fly on its own wings," it didn't need our help any more, except for certain technical points, naturally. That happens with all companies, even the largest. And we have now reached that stage with Air Afrique. The two companies are totally independent. But there is still close coordination between them in a certain number of areas, particularly in scheduling. We work out our schedules together, to decide that one airline will fly to a particular city on specific days at certain times, or we share service to a city. This is very important, for it is a way of working together to become more efficient. Otherwise, we might double up on flights at the same time, creating chaos. That is an important factor in our productivity.

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CSO: 3419/160

CHAD

BRIEFS

MAO WADIS DEVELOPED--Tomorrow, Thursday [5 Dec], the coordinator for presidential development projects, Mr Abakar Assidick, will officially turn over agricultural equipment to be used for the development of 15 wadis in this prefecture. Prior to the ceremony, a working session was held by members of the management board for these projects, including the prefect of Kanem, Mr Mamadou Affono; Mr Ali Kedelaye Goukouni, national councillor of Kanem; and officials of the city of Kanem. Emphasis was placed on the efforts to be undertaken to ensure the success of these projects, which will involve an area of 197 hectares. The financing has been fully guaranteed by the president of the republic, His Excellency El-Hadj Hissein Habre. The cost of this project is estimated at over 41 million CFA [African Financial Community] francs. The crops to be grown will include wheat, corn, and sorghum. The development of these wadis will enable the people of Kanem to grow enough food to feed themselves, as they told the president they would like to do, during his visit to this part of the country. This specific action on the part of the chief of state follows another one already carried out in "Casier C" of Nya in the Eastern Logone area. [Text] [Ndjamena INFO TCHAD in French 4 Dec 85 p 2] 7679

CSO: 3419/160

LESOTHO

JONATHAN SAYS 'LARGE NUMBER' OF REFUGEES ARRIVING

MB301616 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1620 GMT 29 Dec 85

[Text] Maseru, Dec 29, SAPA--The Prime Minister of Lesotho, Chief Leabua Jonathan, says there has been a steady flow of South African political refugees into Lesotho and that large number of refugees entered the country daily.

Chief Jonathan was addressing the funeral service for six South African political refugees who are members of the banned ANC in Maseru today.

He said he cannot stop South African refugees or return them to South Africa in terms of his government's policy to grant political asylum to refugees.

The prime minister denied accusations by the South African Government that Lesotho allowed the ANC to establish military bases in Lesotho. He said he had agreed with the ANC leader, Mr Oliver Tambo, that refugees entering Lesotho should enter the country in transit to other African countries to the north.

Chief Jonathan said he had received a telex message from the South African Government requesting talks on the refugee situation in Lesotho, but he was of the opinion that South Africa should meet the ANC leaders and other leaders of liberation movements in South Africa.

The funeral service was also addressed by King Moshoeshoe II who called for the release of the jailed political leaders in South Africa and for the return of all political exiles to discuss the future of South Africa. Zambia's Foreign Minister, Prof Lamech Goma, and a delegation of the Zambian Government attended the funeral on behalf of President Kenneth Kaunda. A leader of the ANC from Lusaka, Mr Thomas Nkobi, also addressed the funeral service.

Among the six ANC members killed was a white woman from Natal, Miss Jacqueline Quin. Her parents, Mr Philip Quin, his wife and three daughters attended the funeral.

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CSO: 3400/807

NAMIBIA

ARTICLE ANALYZES IMPACT OF LUSAKA ACCORDS

Paris POLITIQUE AFRICAINE in French 19 Sep 85 pp 29-35

[Article by I. Diener: "What Sort of Future for Namibia After Lusaka?"]

[Text] In the stalemate it has engaged in in Southern Africa since 1980, the Pretoria-Washington duo won the first set with the Lusaka and Nkomati agreements in February 1984. But the points recently chalked up by the Pretoria regime in its fortress in no way protect it from its internal problems and any prognosis as to the consequences of these accords is risky.

When the carnation revolution tolled the bell for the Portuguese colonial empire, South Africa again found itself in front of a new hand, made even more unfavorable by the resounding failure of its lightning attack launched against Luanda in 1975-1976: A Cuban expeditionary corps had literally flown to the aid of the MPLA government and stationed itself in Angola to discourage any attempt to repeat that strike. Until then limited to Zambia, the SWAPO was able to step up its war of national liberation in Namibia, waged since then from the southern part of Angola. And since the Zimbabwean nationalist victory in 1980, the apartheid regime has felt itself hemmed in by a ring of very hostile black states and threatened by a growing guerrilla force on South African territory. It had also quickly opted for a "total strategy" which consisted of linking pursuit of the master plan of apartheid on RSA territory with active destabilization of those neighbor states deemed to be too sympathetic to the activities of the ANC and the SWAPO. Combining direct military forays with material support for rebel movements (UNITA in Angola, RNM in Mozambique, LLA in Lesotho),¹ Pretoria was counting on leading these states to the verge of ruin in order to force them to make a deal: the cessation on both sides of any support for the resistance fighters of the two camps, followed by economic aid. The advantages in the event of success looked promising: Deprived of its few close support structures,² the ANC guerrilla force would find itself facing a repressive South African machine relieved of the distant and costly war in Namibia and Angola; economic aid, which would open outlets for South African industry and run counter to the efforts outlined by the front line states in the South African Coordination and Development Conference (SADCC) to free themselves from the economic grip of South Africa.

Briskly set in motion and embellished with economic pressures, this total strategy did not fail to produce its effects. The constant sabotage of the economic

infrastructures of Angola and Mozambique also disturbed activities in Zimbabwe, which the RNM's ³ periodic raids on the Beira oil pipeline deprived of oil, and even in Malawi. Thus frustrated with their development efforts, which were already badly compromised by the enormous cost of their defense -- Angola devotes over 50 percent of its budget to it -- the governments of Luanda and Maputo in particular ended up running out of breath while South Africa benefited from unprecedented Western support. Of course, the test of strength engaged in by Pretoria involved a militarization of South African society, putting its economy and the morale of the whites to a harsh test: a constantly increasing defense budget, the doubling of Army troops at the end of 1982 through an extension of compulsory military service with the creation of a system of neighborhood commando units, a law on the "key points" entrusting the Army with the protection of all strategic installations, the hiring of blacks and other non-whites in the Army, etc. But the \$107-billion loan opportunely granted Pretoria by the IMF in November 1982 permitted it to defray its expenses.⁴

This was certainly the most profitable proof of the United States and South Africa's new "constructive commitment" designed to "put an end to the infamous laws that weigh heavily on South Africa throughout the world."⁵ Elsewhere, the Reagan administration has not ceased backing up Pretoria (still protected from economic sanctions thanks to the American veto in the Security Council) in its efforts to rearrange the situation on the continent in its favor.⁶ Reagan-style diplomacy has been particularly active with regard to Namibia and Angola. Asserting that the "only path to a settlement in Namibia goes through us," he has tied this to the departure from Angola of the Cuban troops and UNITA's participation in the Angolan Government.⁷ The stick, copiously administered by South Africa, and the carrot of diplomatic relations and economic aid, agitated for by Washington, were enough for the *pax americana et pretoriana* project for South Africa to take shape. At the end of the road, this entire region, rich in strategic raw materials and endowed with a solid economic infrastructure, would be favorable to the injection of capital and the absorption of American products without any exorbitant prior cost.

As for Mozambique, the subcontinental rollback is already well-advanced. Since Nkomati (16 March 1984) and completed by a series of economic aid agreements, Mozambican Marxist-Leninism and South African apartheid are mutually reproducing one another. As for Angola, where matters are considerably more complex -- the conditions for access to independence, civil war and the case of Namibia -- they have not yet achieved this type of treaty of nonaggression and good neighbor relations and on 16 March 1984 it was still only a first stage that had been completed in Luanda. Unlike the Nkomati accord, the Lusaka accord deals solely with the gradual withdrawal of South African forces from Angola. A joint commission, in which the United States participated, was created to see to it that the region evacuated by the SADF (South African Defense Forces) would then be occupied only by the Armed Forces of Angola, with the latter responsible for restricting the SWAPO's military activities in the direction of Namibia. Negotiated without the SWAPO,⁸ the agreement can only be realized at its expense, even if it intends to pursue or even step up the armed conflict until a ceasefire is concluded and a date for general elections set. The latter would, of course, have to conform to the procedures laboriously negotiated by the

contact group on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 435. But, lacking operational rear bases in Angola, the SWAPO will not be able to negotiate from a position of strength the details of a provisional process that would preserve the chances of a form of Namibian independence other than neocolonial.⁹

It is not very glorious for an Angolan government that regards itself as revolutionary to militarily force the national liberation movement of a neighboring land to go through the Caudine Forks [fall under the yoke] of the South African colonial power after 18 years of an unsuccessfully waged armed conflict. Of course, in return Pretoria has implicitly agreed to reduce its support of the UNITA. In taking possession of the region withdrawn from by the SADF again, the Luanda forces will do their best to cut Jonas Savimbi's group off from its Namibian rear bases. But the border is along one and South Africa has not expressly committed itself to cut off its assistance. It would have all the time in the world to, through the intermediary of the UNITA, pursue the destabilization of Angola, whereas Luanda has from now on traded its trump card, the SWAPO, for a South African withdrawal only as far as Namibia. Whether the Luanda Government cannot or does not want to prevent the SWAPO from maintaining (or reconstituting) its Angolan sanctuaries, it will in both cases lose its international credibility -- either for having failed to keep its word or for not controlling its national territory. Moreover, if it turns out that the Angolan Government was mistaken about the real regional base of the UNITA, described as a pack of pro-Western bandits in the pay of South Africa, the Lusaka accord would look very much like a sucker deal. True, the South African withdrawal was effected, after a delay of a year, in April 1985 and we still do not very well see what options Luanda will retain. Pretoria has nonetheless now launched the second phase of the U.S.-South Africa plan for this part of Southern Africa in demanding that any final settlement bestow on J. Savimbi a key position in a future Angolan government of national unity.¹⁰

Until then made dependent by Washington and Pretoria on the departure of the Cuban contingent in Angola, Namibian independence is as a result subjected to a second prior condition.

What are the prospects for a Namibian independence which, in principle acquired nearly a decade ago, has in fact been constantly postponed? It is appropriate to bear in mind that the growing pressure exerted by the SWAPO and by the international community at first forced Pretoria to abandon its grand plan for the establishment of an apartheid regime in Namibia, namely, a splintering of the country subsequent to the transformation of the Bantustans into satellite mini-states and the incorporation of a white homeland into South Africa. Pretoria then had to subscribe to the organization of elections placed under the protection of the United Nations for the purpose of forming a constituent assembly (Resolution 435 of the summer of 1978). But Pretoria was sure that the SWAPO would easily win such elections and would then have complete freedom to apply a "noncapitalist" development program; foreseeable at the time, such a program has since been worked out in detail by two investigators from the UN Institute for Namibia.¹¹ Their analysis, as firm with regard to the long-term prospects as it is circumspect in the interpretation of the empirical data, tries to take into account the frustrations that have unexpectedly occurred in other countries since decolonization.

Starting with the need for maintaining the level of national production, the authors recommend a strategy of qualified nationalizations. In the mining sector, during an initial phase that would last for at least from 2 to 3 years, there would be a partial nationalization of 49 percent of the capital accompanied by an indemnification calculated in conformity with Decree No 1.¹² The administration of foreign trade and the infrastructures would be entirely nationalized, as would capitalist agriculture. In this latter sector indemnifications would be paid and a system of financial incentives set up for the benefit of white farmers who would agree to help in the rapid training of an African relief force. During a provisional period Namibia would remain in the rand area. To prevent a rural exodus, the prices of food staples could be set in such a way as to increase farmers' income. An agrarian reform would authorize several types of property: national, private, cooperative, traditional and collective. They should be able to implement simple, partial mechanization thanks to the local cottage industries, which would be revitalized, rather than through the massive importation of sophisticated equipment. As for future development, the authors have largely picked up the recommendations already formulated by the Odendaal Commission of 1964 and which have remained a dead letter issue.

Designed to release Namibia from the grip of South Africa and more generally from the spiral of poor development, this program worries Pretoria by letting the prospect of a neighbor country arise, the black majority government of which would be capable of ensuring all inhabitants well-being, modest, to be sure, in the eyes of the whites, but attractive for the populations confined in the Bantustans.

But, since 1978, South Africa's efforts have been aimed at cutting off the SWAPO's political audience through a politico-military action and at satisfying the conditions appropriate for the establishment of a future neocolonial regime in which the SWAPO would be, if not excluded, at least neutralized -- because it would be militarily reduced. In the field to date, SWAPO fighters (several thousand) and the troops under Pretoria's orders (from 75,000 to 100,000 men) have not chalked up any decisive advantage over the enemy. At any rate, application of the letter of the Lusaka accords by Angola would severely handicap the SWAPO. Since November 1984, South Africa has made the registration of all Namibian men from the age of 17 to 54 compulsory for the purpose of a 2-year military service period (in 1980, in the face of the magnitude of the protests, general conscription had to be limited to only the south central part of the country). At the end of 1984 a new firing zone was created without invitation and in January 1985 rewards for informers were increased. And lastly, in March 1985 the five Bantustans of Northern Namibia and those of the Bushmen and the Hereros (along the Botswana border, where two-thirds of the Namibian population live) was transformed into a "security zone," access to which is subject to express authorization by the police.

In South Africa the installation of the South African vise was completed with the annexation, since September 1977, of Walvis Bay, Namibia's only deep-water port. Pretoria can now control the country's two channels that open on the outside world, through which almost all of Namibia's foreign trade moves. Furthermore, South Africa has transformed the enclave into a fiscal paradise,

bestowing on investors advantages similar to those reserved for "border" industries, that is, for those adjacent to the Bantustans. Whether independent Namibia agrees to enter into the competition produced by the desire to attract investors or not, it thus might find itself practically deprived of the means necessary for attaining a standard of living that would make of it something other than a big Bantustan. In the event that these structural constraints, likely to render a government pliable, might not for all that prevent political upheavals, South Africa could swiftly strike,¹³ thanks to the big military base at Walvis Bay.

Along with the installation of this regional disposition, South Africa has gone on to a renegotiation of the procedures for applying Resolution 435 in order to limit the powers of the constituent assembly. On the domestic scene, Pretoria is trying to establish political power relations likely to thwart the ascendancy of the SWAPO. Since 1977, they have been experimenting with a version of apartheid which is less discriminatory in everyday life, but which reproduces the basic mechanisms of segregation. It is specifically manifested through maintenance of the traditional landowning system in the homelands, the base of power of the chiefs who serve as the key element in the operation of the apartheid society. After the collapse in 1983 of the sorry patchwork solutions to constitutional problems which had given rise to the installation of a government machinery of the Turnhalle type, Pretoria tried to organize a multi-partite conference and a provisional government. While it has scarcely a chance of meeting a better fate than its predecessor, it will nonetheless complicate the procedures for applying Resolution 435 and permit Pretoria to have the time necessary to constitute a "modern elite" likely to pick up and carry the torch of its interests after decolonization. Forced to accept the challenge the SWAPO hurled at it by creating educational structures in exile, the South African colonial government was determined to in turn train a highly skilled Namibian labor force with the aid of the mining multinationals.

In the event that Pretoria should have the time to win its gamble on these "modern elites," a SWAPO government already sharply limited by the constraints of the new subcontinental order might find itself reduced, on the domestic scene, to expressing the interests of the lower classes and strata of the population, which are opposed to those of the privileged blacks or coloreds.

All indices allow us to predict a neocolonial future in Namibia. However, the driving force of the South African rolling mill could suddenly come to a halt because for over a year now South Africa has been sinking into a latent civil war. Seriously affected by the high cost of the policy of repression and by drought, the South African economy will sooner or later suffer the secondary effects of a social crisis that will not fail to influence the overall situation on the subcontinent.

FOOTNOTES

1. Respectively: National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, Mozambican National Resistance and Lesotho Liberation Front.
2. The ANC has military bases in neither Lesotho, nor Swaziland, nor Botswana, nor Mozambique, nor Zimbabwe, these to be found in Tanzania and Northern Angola. All these border countries do nothing but take in black refugees from South Africa, often ANC militants and/or permit the ANC to maintain offices. The South African action is, therefore, more preventive than anything else. 
3. While very distant from Maputo's official and Harare's unofficial Marxism, Malawi is, as far as South Africa is concerned, wrong in participating in the SADCC.
4. In a strong position with their 40 percent of the vote, the five Western powers of the Security Council for Namibia's "contact group" (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the FRG and Canada) granted this loan on terms on the whole more advantageous than usual. Cf. Jim Morell, "The International Monetary Fund and Namibia," AFRICA TODAY, first and second quarters 1983, pp 17-22.
5. State Department secret document (MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, March 1982).
6. Ibid. and LE MONDE, 30 November 1982.
7. Document cited in MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, March 1982.
8. LE MONDE, 3 March and 2 May 1984.
9. Basing itself on the official figures for South African expenditures in Namibia, the SUNDAY STAR estimates the cost of the war for South Africa at 1.7 million rands per guerrilla fighter. This is one of the most costly wars ever waged in Africa. SUNDAY STAR, 20 January 1985.
10. THE OBSERVER, 16 December 1984.
11. H. Aulakh and W. Asombang, "Towards Economic Development; Strategy Options for Independent Namibia," Lusaka, United Nations Institute for Namibia, 1982.
12. Decree for the protection of Namibia's natural resources adopted on 27 September 1974 by the United Nations Council for Namibia and approved by the General Assembly on 13 December 1979.
13. R. Moorsom, "Walvis Bay. Namibia's Port," London, International Defense and Air Fund for Southern Africa, 1984, pp 48-57.

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NIGER

SATISFACTORY AGRICULTURAL CAMPAIGN IN NIGER

1985 Agro-pastoral Campaign

Niamey LE SAHEL in French 9 Dec 85 p 1

[Editorial]

[Text] This year's harvest was abundant, as a result of which Niger has regained its food balance. This was the good news which President Seyni Kountche announced to Nigeriens on 7 December. On that occasion, the head of state drew up the balance of the agro-pastoral campaign of 1985.

Unquestionably, this campaign was marked by a good rainfall and the further productive toil of the population.

What makes the announcement by the head of state all the more important is that it reassures all Nigeriens and the international community. Who among us is actually unaware of the fact that 1984 was one of the most catastrophic ever experienced by Niger? The very infrequent rain, unequally distributed in terms of space and time clearly created a 30-60 percent, and even 100 percent, food shortages in some cases, affecting 1,635 of our villages inhabited by more than 1 million of our compatriots. In addition to a shortage of 350,000 tons of food, the 1984 winter season decimated our virtually entire herd.

Even the river, the permanent resource of the subregion, showed clear indications of shortness of breath in its course.

Luckily, the year 1985 was different from 1984 in all respects.

In terms of rainfall, for example, although the level of a normal year was not reached, precipitation during this campaign was higher than in 1984, and was quite well distributed. Furthermore, nearly 3,000 water units were allocated for the needs of the population.

Added to these are 394 million francs invested by the state in the cultivation of off-season crops, 350 million invested in the struggle against desertification and more than 3 billion francs in the marketing campaign.

On the phytosanitary level, this year the attacks mounted against the enemies of the crops by the pertinent services were conducted on time.

On the basis of these major advantages, the population, whose stated target was to put an end to the 1984 scarcity, went resolutely to work, with satisfactory results. One can suitably appreciate the efficiency of our strategy, which is "to anticipate even the unpredictable," knowing that on 30 November the OPVN [Nigerien Foodstuffs Office] had stocked more than 173,000 tons, 25,000 tons of which as emergency supply, which is a unique occurrence in the subarea.

In Niger, however, nature has accustomed us not to engage in any sort of complacency and never to slow our efforts down. That is why in the future we shall work even harder to master the parameters which have made our agro-pastoral campaigns, which have been difficult so far.

In this spirit, the growth of the population will be studied, the struggle against food waste pursued and the consumption of some local foodstuffs encouraged. Studies will be undertaken on improving the cultivation of peanut and niebe crops and to promote other species, such as soybean and sunflower. Actually, we shall harness out full potential and involve all Nigeriens in production, with a view to improving our gains.

The positive results achieved this year are proof of the courage of our population and its faith in the future, and it is because the international community believes in our own efforts that it is assisting us.

President Pleased With Harvest

Niamey LE SAHEL in French 9 Dec 85 pp 1-3

[Text] "The agro-pastoral campaign of 1985-1986 yielded satisfactory results," President Seyni Kountche said in drawing up the food balance. The grain shortage totals 32,569 tons. However, taking some other facts into consideration, Niger has attained a theoretical balance.

Generally speaking, the 1985 rainy season yielded satisfactory results because of relatively abundant and properly spaced precipitation and a virtually nil parasite damage.

Despite some delays in the advent of the rainy season, the amount of precipitation recorded was, with few exceptions, higher than in 1984, although remaining below the normal annual average.

For example, rainfall in Agadez totaled 60 mm as compared to 3.9 mm in 1984. In Goudoumaria, 377 mm as against 107 mm; and in the Ouallam region 241 mm as against 169 mm in 1984.

Nevertheless, some areas, such as the south of Maradi, Illela, Dakoro, Madaoua and even the north of Niamey experienced some periods of drought, whereas Maradi-Commune, Dosso and the Kirtachi area had relatively ample precipitation which, in some cases, even hindered cultivation.

In general, the rains stopped as of the second tier of September. In some areas, such as the west, the rains stopped definitively either by the end of September or beginning of October.

Last year the river had worried us somewhat. On 30 November a level of 434 centimeters and a flow of 1,482 cubic meters per second were registered as against 369 centimeters and 1,038 cubic meters per second in 1984.

Here as well, therefore, the signs are encouraging. The Komadougou as well shows clear improvement compared with last year.

However, as far as Lake Chad is concerned, the situation remains static. In any cases, contrary to our hopes, the lake's development showed no improvements.

In terms of the phytosanitary situation, attacks were virtually nil or else were localized. The evil was avoided thanks to the prompt intervention of the respective services.

On the subject of the food balance, we estimate a gross millet output of 1,435,000 tons, compared to 799,000 tons in 1984; sorghum, 330,000 tons as against 240,000 tons in 1984; unfortunately the peanut crop totaled 8,478 tons as against 30,000 tons in 1984. There was also a drop in the niebe crop, estimated at 100,000 tons for 1985, compared to 194,000 tons in 1984. Paddy rice production totaled 55,289 tons, compared to 51,000 tons in 1984 and cotton seed showed a slight increase, totaling 5,000 tons as against 3,000 tons in 1984.

Let us now draw up the food balance: this includes net output, harvesting losses, and the rebuilding of some reserves. Bearing in mind that millet and sorghum are basic food staples, accounting for 80 percent of the total, while the remaining 20 percent are covered by other foodstuffs. Considering that it takes 250 kilograms to feed a person in a sedentary job and 200 kilograms per urban resident and cattle breeder, the amount needed to meet the nutritional requirements of these population groups is estimated at 1,544,249 tons, whereas available amounts total 1,512,180 tons. Obviously the negative balance totals 32,569 tons.

Still, Niger is a rice-growing country and the 55,000 tons of paddy rice yield 32,000 tons of hulled rice. Bearing in mind that the 32,569 tons of millet and sorghum shortage is compensated by 32,000 tons of rice, Niger has a theoretical balance for the last season.

Even during a normal year some areas experience shortages, and even more so during a season which directly follows the 1984 drama. We counted nationally a total of 1,635 villages with a population of 1,026,056 in which shortages ranged between 30 and 60 and even 100 percent.

Let us go back to the method used to establish the food balance. Niger consists of three elements: a rural population, which is the main grower; livestock breeders, who are not growers and whose job is not that of grower;

and an urban population which, although being growers over the past few years, is usually not a population of growers.

We must bear in mind that stock breeders are traditionally not growers, and neither are the people in the large cities. It goes without saying that these two population categories must be fed between 1 October of one year and 30 September of the next.

Therefore, the traditional growers must meet the needs of the nongrowers.

Let us assume that there are nearly 2 million stock breeders and close to 1 million urban residents out of a population estimated at close to 6 million. This means that nearly one-half of the population are not growers and that it is those who grow the crops who must meet the needs of the nongrowers. This means that, in the case of Niger or the sum total of CILSS countries, the elements included in defining food requirements must be mastered increasingly, particularly when we are experiencing a 2.7 percent population increase, during good or bad years. Furthermore, a city such as Niamey is growing at the rate of 7 percent annually. All of this is based on two products: millet and sorghum, not taking into consideration the production of niebe, woandzou, fonio, potatoes and other produce which are part of the food diet, such as yams, noodles and others.

Therefore, in terms of the preceding 1984 season, which was one of the most catastrophic, our food deficit totaled 350,000 tons. In terms of the last campaign, Niger achieved theoretical balance.

What is the situation with our OPVN Stocks. On 30 November the OPVN had 173,624 tons, as follows: 63,000 tons for stabilization, some 84,000 tons for food aid and more than 25,000 tons in emergency reserve.

This is quite substantial and very important. At the time that Niger had assessed the urgent aid it needed, considering the speedy response of the international community and the distance separating us from the ports, by 30 September last we had actually distributed 200,000 tons.

The OPVN stocks and a small part of the international aid sold to us total 63,000 tons. As to the 25,000 tons, bear in mind that Niger is the only country in the entire area to have an emergency reserve.

The pastoral situation was bad in 1984. It has improved in 1985. However, although we have adequate pasture land, we are short of livestock.

As far as the off-season crops are concerned, it goes without saying, bearing in mind the exceptional nature of the campaign, that by the time of our visit the farmers had not yet completed the harvesting and storing, for which reason the off-season crops were delayed.

On the other hand, we must also bear in mind that as a result of the 1984 drought, a certain percentage of the population in the north had been relocated and that it was thanks to the good results of the campaign that it was able to return to its traditional areas.

I am not speaking of euphoria, but in terms of efficiency the 1985 off-season crops are different from those of 1984. However, here and there, we came across areas which had already started while others were still being readied. In some cases the abundance of rain has affected the wells which will have to be repaired. In order to support the growing of off-season crops, you will recall that the state had to allocate 394 million, half of this amount already made available.

Water: We registered more than 3,000 water units available or about to become available. As I already mentioned to the departmental personnel in Niamey, maintenance and repairs will remain the responsibility of the users. Briefly, the state no longer intends to carry out, maintain or repair hydraulic projects.

As far as the struggle against desertification is concerned, efforts have been made and positive results noted. In this area as well the state has had to put at the disposal of the population and the authorities nearly 350 million CFA francs.

What conclusion could be drawn? The conclusion is that we consider the results of the agro-pastoral campaign of 1985 satisfactory. The availability of traditional crops is clearly superior to 1984.

Unfortunately, the herds have declined. The preservation of pastures should be recommended if we are to prevent the losses caused by brush fires.

We remain firmly convinced that the population could draw useful lessons from this campaign and that rural stocks should be available or be set up. In January or February, the officers who were in charge of food distributions will be able to make an on-site determination of the existence of such village stocks.

As far as the marketing campaign is concerned, it has already started. In addition to the 3 billion, 300 million francs will be invested in the countryside, 1.4 billion as the share of the state and the rest from the European Development Fund (EDF), the FRG and Canada. This does not include funds invested in the marketing of paddy rice, which we estimate at 200 to 250 million.

However, bearing in mind the bountifulness of the crops, we see here and there a drop in prices. Thus, in some areas a bag of millet could be purchased for 2,500 to 3,000 francs. It is in order to avoid a certain loss on the grower's level that the efforts I mentioned were made both by the state and the international community.

Another decision affecting the rural community is the following: in some of our areas, as a result of the loss of livestock, as was the case with the departments of Agadez and Diffa, and the farming installations in Konni and Niamey, the population lost its means of production, animals used for watering or milking, in this case; however, thanks to what became known as the NATALI plan, something will be done to support the efforts of the population in these areas in terms of production.

I spoke of the food balance. To an increasing extent, on the national level, we must master a certain number of elements to establish this food balance. This applies, first of all, to the urban centers, where food habits tend to make marginal use of traditional cereals. This applies to the growing and consumption of local foodstuffs, such as niebe, woandzou, fonio, noodles and even rice, and the consumed share of animal protein. Above all, however, we must control the growth of our population.

To conclude, a very important element of this campaign was the decline in niebe production. That is why the ministries of agriculture and research must quickly, with the help of their services, engage in studies and research in order to avoid losses in niebe production and, above all, the disappearance of peanuts.

As some countries in the area have done, we could also try to grow some oleaginous species as part of the off-season or winter crops, such as soybean or sunflower.

The food problem remains an important political stake. As Sahelians and, more generally, in terms of Africa, it becomes more than urgently needed to use our entire potential in order to achieve self-sufficiency and do without food assistance. This is a very important element, which goes beyond the responsibilities which we are assuming in Niger and on behalf of the Sahelian countries. We believe that in the interest of our countries and area we must put to profitable use the beneficial results of the 1985 campaign and ask the international community to help us in production matters. In any case this is the sense of Niger's policy.

All Efforts Deserve a Reward

"All efforts deserve a reward," said General Seyni Kountche, the head of state, on the occasion of awards presented to elements of the Nigerian Armed Forces during his tour of inspection.

The head of state emphasized that, bearing in mind the locked situation of our country and the extent of the operation, the transportation and distribution of 200,000 tons of foodstuffs is noteworthy.

"The population," he said, "displayed its satisfaction and gratitude, and it is such feelings that we have translated into action by awarding decorations to some military personnel who spent months in field work."

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SENEGAL

ABDOU DIOUF STANCE ON OPPOSITION DENOUNCED

Dakar FLASH FAGARU in French Dec 85 pp 1,3

[Editorial: "Abdou Is Deriding the People!"]

[Text] On the eve of his departure for France, the president of the republic was asked a number of pertinent questions by newsmen members of the Third World Press Club. His answers strengthened our analysis of the unpopular and neocolonialist nature of his regime, for which reason we shall not return to them, with the exception of three. The first deals with the right of opposition parties to demonstrate and the events of 22 August 1985.

Let us frankly say that on this question Abdou Diouf is mocking the Senegalese people. Thus, it turns out that it is the political parties which are ignorant about what is to be done to stir up political life!

The Pretexts

But who is it that tirelessly tries, every day, to prevent the opposition parties from communicating with their members and sympathizers? Who is blocking these parties' access to state media? Who is denying to these parties the right to hold public demonstrations?

Is it those parties themselves? The truth is that the social foundations of the system has shrunk considerably and that any kind of gathering frightens Abdou Diouf.

He has made the heartfelt decision to ban all public demonstrations. That is why he has been reduced to resorting to the pretexts of the "acknowledged cadres" and "noxious ulterior motives."

As far as the 22 August 1985 events are concerned, the "reasons" for banning the ADS anti-apartheid demonstration have finally been made public.

Thus, according to Abdou Diouf, for one thing, the demonstration was aimed against him; for another, it was scheduled for "the same day that Mobutu was coming to Senegal for a working visit;" thirdly, "the leaflets of the

demonstrators named heads of state on the side of South Africa, Mobutu and Bongo."

Who Is Accusing Mobutu and Bongo?

It is common knowledge that the 22 August demonstration was not aimed against Abdou Diouf. On the contrary, he was even given the opportunity, as term president of the OAU, to play a role by welcoming the ADS delegation which was bringing a resolution calling for the efficient and consistent anti-apartheid struggle by all African regimes.

Furthermore, when the decision to have the demonstration had been made and submitted to the minister of the interior, Mobutu's visit was not as yet public knowledge or known to us.

Furthermore, nowhere, in no statement or leaflet was there any mention of Mobutu or Bongo. So, who was accusing Mobutu and Bongo?

The second decision worth mentioning briefly has to do with the unity with which Abdou Diouf dreams of being surrounded in order to "reach the essentials." Actually, we should assist the president of the republic in losing his illusions. The unity of the people of Senegal will be attained only in matters of its interests and nothing else. We do not know for what reason the people of Uganda were to rally around Idi Amin Dada when the latter became president of the OAU. The OAU crown should not make us forget the violations of democratic freedoms in Senegal, the Casamancais tortures, the IMF and World Bank funds, the misappropriation of public funds, capitalist domination and the economic and financial bankruptcy to which the party of the lucky winner led us.

Last but not least, let us emphasize and condemn the pretensions of the current OAU president of interfering in Ethiopian internal policies, consistent with the permanent part he plays in the imperialist camp.

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SENEGAL

DIOUF STAND ON UNITA EXAMINED

Dakar FLASH FAGARU in French Dec 85 pp 2-4

[Text] On 5 November 1985 Abdou Diouf made public his "Declaration of the President in Office of the OAU on the Situation in Southern Africa in General and the Aggressions Committed by the South African Racist Regime Against the People's Republic of Angola." The media made a great to-do of it. There most assuredly were good reasons for this. It is common knowledge that the Senegalese government had declared itself in favor of UNITA and against the MPLA currently in power in Luanda. Furthermore, it engaged in extensive diplomatic efforts in favor of UNITA on several fronts: In the OAU, in bilateral meetings with representatives of reactionary countries, acting or which could act in the same way and, finally, in granting UNITA important facilities, such as diplomatic passports to some members of its leadership, material and financial assistance, representation in Dakar, etc.

To Help Forget

Among others, the reason for such noisy publicity was an effort to remove the tarnished image of the powers that be. Yes, it was an effort to make us forget the absurd choice in favor of UNITA made by the authorities, a support which several Senegalese opposition parties, their sensitivities totally confused, have fustigated on frequent occasions and at different times. Our party, the LD-MPT [Democratic League--Movement for the Labor Party], has never "led into error" in this respect, and his instrument of analysis, Marxism, had allowed it to perceive quite soon, that in the course of its stubborn struggle for power in Angola, before independence, UNITA was "in the service of South African policy, financed, supplied, trained and transported by the South African army and the CIA (one should dare add)."

For quite a while proof which any honest person would consider irrefutable has been acquired and made public throughout the world.

Botha's Admissions

Abdou Diouf must have gathered pertinent data on the nature of UNITA in the course of his recent trip to southern Africa, the purpose of which was to guild his coat of arms after the 22 August 1985 events. Unquestionably, the

leaders of the People's Republic of Angola and SWAPO were open, incisive and convincing on the subject.

Therefore, we dare be naive enough to believe that Abdou Diouf, the president of Senegal, in addition to being the current president of the OAU, digested, once and for all, this truth and evidence. Furthermore, the South African government itself made public admissions. In effect, it recently admitted that the purpose of the aggressions it is committing against the People's Republic of Angola is to "support UNITA." It thus administered a strong slap in the face of those who hypocritically claimed that there was no complicity between UNITA and the supporters of apartheid. Contradictions in southern Africa have become so exacerbated that the margin for tricks and duplicity has necessarily been reduced.

The president of Senegal must understand this and clearly define his position. Not so long ago, in a WAL FADJR interview, Abdoulaye Bathily LD/MPTsecretary general, had asked him to make a public statement on his relations with UNITA.

If he were to listen, a minimum of good political sense and some idea of the greatness of our fatherland should lead the president of Senegal to "denounce the political undertaking of South Africa, carried out through UNITA" and make a definitive break with UNITA, withdraw the diplomatic passports granted to UNITA leaders, and expel its representative, who was still in Dakar as of 5 November 1985.

On this basis, the people of Senegal have the right to believe that diplomatic, economic and profitable relations will be established within the shortest possible time with the "legitimate government" of the People's Republic of Angola.

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SENEGAL

BATHILY SUPPORT FOR ARAFAT PLEDGED

Dakar FLASH FAGARU in French Dec 85 p 13

[Solidarity With Palestine: "A. Bathily Writes to Arafat"]

[Text] On the occasion of Palestine Solidarity Day, we renew the commitment of our party and all of its members to actively support the just cause of the Palestinian people.

The heroic struggle which your people have been waging for a long time under PLO leadership to regain their inalienable national rights have earned them the respect and solidarity of all peoples who love peace and social justice. It exposed the criminal, aggressive and expansionistic policy of the Zionist state which, like the apartheid South African regime, is a main obstacle to overall durable peace in the Middle East.

That is why our party is making comprehensive and ubiquitous efforts to ensure the universal condemnation and total isolation of the Zionist state. In this connection, our party expresses its indignation at the imperialist maneuvers in the African continent, aimed at destroying the solidarity between African and Arab countries in their unanimous support of the cause of Palestine. At this point, it seems to us urgent and imperative to promote vigorous and suitable initiatives to defeat the actions of some African states, such as Zaire and Liberia, who have resumed diplomatic relations with the Zionist state.

Our party will assist such initiatives fully and totally, specifically if their aim is to mobilize the mass democratic organizations on the continent (women, youth, students, trade unions, learned societies, etc.). In any case, our party is convinced and will act in the necessary way to increase the pressure generated by the mobilization of the people and international public opinion on the Zionist state and its allies to force them to acknowledge the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people to their sovereign and independent state under PLO leadership.

In the same sense, we also support the suggestion of the UN 1983 conference on Palestine, which was held in Geneva, and which called for the holding of an international peace conference on the Middle East under UN auspices, attended

by all the parties involved in the conflict, including the PLO and the full Security Council.

The recognition of the national rights of the Palestinian people necessarily remains the focal point of any overall solution and durable peace in the Middle East, and our party rejects any plan not resting on this foundation.

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SENEGAL

GERMAN MILITARY INSPECT NEW HOSPITAL

Dakar LE SOLEIL in French 6 Dec 85 p 6

[Article by Ndlogou Diop]

[Text] At the conclusion of their 6-day visit to our country, the West German military who have just built a children's hospital are satisfied. And they hope to return to support other projects.

The West German military who have just built the children's hospital in Joal-Fadiouth left our country yesterday morning. Completion of this important facility for meeting the people's medical needs gave Andre Sonko, minister of civil service and labor, the opportunity to point out that it is a novelty to see soldiers wasting their time and money to build a hospital in a developing country.

Speaking in Dakar-Yoff, he took the opportunity to thank the German Government and people on behalf of the authorities and the Senegalese people--and more specifically the inhabitants of Joal-Fadiouth. "In particular, I thank the Association of Friends of the Joal-Fadiouth Children's Hospital in Stuttgart and the German Army, which made it possible to complete this fine project." He was speaking in the presence of Norberg Lang, the FRG's ambassador to Senegal.

That association came into being thanks to Mr Ulmer, Senegal's consul in Stuttgart. In the opinion of Mr Beversdorf, who headed the project, the operation was guided by German tourists on the basis of one fact: "In Senegal, even if people are not dying of hunger, something needs to be done for sick children."

The result was that after collecting funds, those tourists contacted the West German minister of defense through Ulmer. During the interview he granted to us, Beversdorf also emphasized that the mayor of Joal-Fadiouth greatly appreciated the initiative because "we were not content simply to build the medical facility: we also shared everything with the local population. As a consequence, the second objective of our mission was achieved: that of making friends in Joal-Fadiouth."

The hospital, which he said would serve as a pilot project, will be inaugurated at the start of 1986. "Similar actions by Senegal and in the neighboring countries will depend on its success." To ensure its success, it will be headed by a West German physician before being turned over to the Senegalese Government.

He took pleasure in repeating the words of the secretary of state to the minister of defense for parliamentary affairs, who, when the foundation stone was being laid, had said that soldiers without weapons were doing humanitarian work, thus helping to eliminate the disparities and tensions between North and South and contributing effectively to the establishment of peace. He also expressed the general impression of satisfaction felt by the 30 West German soldiers as they left. "They all hope to return to Senegal with their families. That is expensive. They are already thinking about saving money for the purpose."

We note that the children's hospital in Joal-Fadiouth includes many internal facilities, among them an operating theater and a dentist's office.

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SENEGAL

MODERNIZED TEACHING OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY DISCUSSED

Dakar LE SOLEIL in French 6 Dec 85 p 7

[Text] On Tuesday 3 December 1985, Baba Akhib Haidara, UNESCO's regional coordinator for Africa, presided over the opening meeting at the second session of the regional advisory committee on the modernization of scientific and technological education in Africa. The meeting was held at BREDA [Regional Office for Education in Africa].

The basic purpose of the session, which ended yesterday, was to continue examining the components of a program for modernizing the teaching of science and technology in Africa, notably as regards the preparation of teaching materials for the training of secondary-level teachers and the training of teachers for the integrated teaching of science at the primary level and in the first secondary cycle. That examination was the object of the first meeting by the advisory committee, which was held at BREDA in Dakar from 4 to 6 December 1984.

We recall that the regional advisory committee was established to follow up on a recommendation by the regional conference of ministers of education and ministers in charge of economic planning from Africa's member states. It will be recalled that that conference had been held in Harare, Zimbabwe in July 1982. The recommendation in question (No 5) asked UNESCO to assist the member states in Africa in modernizing and developing the teaching of science and technology in Africa with a view to advising the organization on ways and means of contributing to implementation of the program.

To follow up on that recommendation, a preparatory meeting for establishing the committee was held at UNESCO's Regional Office for Education in Africa from 21 to 25 February 1983 with participation by African experts on the teaching of high-level science and technology. On the basis of the suggestions formulated at that preparatory meeting, the UNESCO Secretariat drafted bylaws for the committee that were adopted by the UNESCO bodies concerned.

11798
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SENEGAL

DROP IN SEAFOOD PRODUCTION NOTED

Dakar LE SOLEIL in French 6 Dec 85 p 11

[Article by Ioussa Sadio]

[Text] Seafood production in the Ziguinchor region, which is estimated at 8,915 tons for the 1984-1985 season, shows a drop of 1,727 tons compared to 1983, when landings totaled 10,642 tons.

According to Makhtar Ndaw, inspector of fisheries, that drop in production is linked to the ecological disruption noted in the region over the past few years as a result of the cumulative effect of successive years of insufficient precipitation.

Noting that in some places, the Casamance River has sometimes been from two to three times as salty as the ocean in the dry season, Makhtar Ndaw emphasized that that very sharp increase in salinity has had the effect of lowering the quality and quantity of species caught.

That situation, described as catastrophic, has caused the shrimp factories to shut down temporarily and lay off their employees due to lack of work, notably during an 8-month period from February to September 1984, as well as causing an exodus by a good number of shrimp fishermen to bordering countries.

Ndaw pointed out, however, that the factories had nevertheless managed to process 455 tons of shrimp between October and December thanks to a rather wet rainy season.

"If the precipitation noted over the past 2 years in particular--1984 and 1985--continues, we might be able to hope for a return to normal in years to come," said Ndaw, who was careful to mention the problems with which the shrimp fishing industry is being faced.

Difficult Coexistence

Ndaw says that the coexistence brought about by development of the shrimp industry--which led various communities of fishermen, most of them natives of the Fleuve region, to settle in this region--is often difficult and is made

worse by conflicting interests. It has been the source of numerous social problems.

The most recent of those problems, according to Ndaw, arose in the village of Baghagha because of a clash between fishermen using "fele-fele" nets and those fishing with [regular] nets.

Ndaw went on to say that the fishmongers, who supply nearly three-fourths of the seafood landings in the region, also have their problems, notably from the standpoint of preserving the fish.

Noting that that sector cannot develop suitably without an adequate supply of ice, Ndaw said that SEFCA, which produces a little over 1 ton of ice per day, is far from being able to satisfy the demand by fishermen for that product.

But thanks to the startup in the very near future of the new cold-storage complex, the problem of ice will be solved for good in Ziguinchor.

Discussing production levels achieved from January to September 1985, the inspector of fisheries reported that landings had totaled 6,092 tons of fish, 20 tons of crayfish and crab, 469 tons of shrimp, and 148 tons of mollusks with a commercial value of 1,163 million CFA francs.

Good prospects for the development of fishing are taking shape in Ziguinchor. Ndaw stressed the necessity of exploiting the sizable seafood resources available all along our region's ocean front.

Ocean Front

He said that a recent study by the Dakar-Thiaroye Center for Oceanographic Research (CRDDT) had revealed that there are currently 85,780 tons of seafood products available but not yet exploited.

He pointed out that correct implementation of the development program for small-scale fishing in Casamance would permit exploitation of all the current available potential in bottom-dwelling fish by inshore boats operated by the government and NGO's such as CARITAS, the purpose being to develop those sizable but still-unexploited seafood resources [sentence in the original is not clear].

Within that framework, the concern of the regional authorities is to induce young people to stay in their native region by creating nonwage-paying jobs.

11798

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SENEGAL

REFORESTATION EFFORT, OBJECTIVES DESCRIBED

Dakar LE SOLEIL in French 21 Nov 85 p 4

[Article by Abdallah Faye]

[Text] Diagle, a peaceful little hamlet nestled in the flank of the commune of Sokone. Most of the dwellings are of rough-hewn planks with thatched roofs. The village has a long agricultural tradition and a fierce determination to master the nature from which its inhabitants derive their main wealth. It was a peaceful life, sheltered in the trees planted here and there. Then came the drought with its cortege of desolation. The people had to react to protect their hard-won patrimony and the relentless battle was engaged.

The only solution to overcome the scourge: reforestation. The determination of these people of the land would soon be rewarded. Fame followed and Diagle became the leading village of Senegal with its community reforestation plan. It was a victory to be celebrated and celebrated lavishly. That was yesterday.

The chief of state came personally to pay homage to the enthusiasm of the people of the little settlement and encourage them to continue their effort and win even more victories. The fact is that the evil (of the encroachment of the desert) is insidious, cunning and perverse. For its eradication, sustained effort is needed, along with total commitment, a will of iron and the faith to turn the desert green again.

The chief of state sounded the alarm: "The drought and desertification constitute grave threats in various regions of the globe covering one-third of the land area and affecting over 15 percent of the world population."

Abdou Diouf said it. We must rely on our own efforts before the efforts of the international community pitch in. We must therefore lead and organize the defense and restoration of our country's natural resources.

It was for that reason that the government set as our objective for the next 25 years the development and reforestation of 3.5 million hectares, at a speed of 140,000 hectares a year.

However ambitious it may appear, that objective is not out of reach, deems the chief of state, "if every Senegalese man and woman feels involved and participates in the gigantic task of restoring our forests and land through the introduction of trees into our familiar universe."

However, he recalled that it was not enough to plant trees. We must also take care of them so that they will grow and so that the effort made will not be in vain.

Regeneration

It was within this framework that the minister of the protection of nature particularly emphasized restoring green areas, especially with this last rainy season that permitted their regeneration. There, risks of fire will be even greater. "That is why I ask my fellow countrymen to join in a determined mobilization, particularly rural areas, in order to snuff out any attempt at burning around the villages, in the fields, pastures, grazing or hunting areas. I am sure that this mobilization will be sustained by the 4,000 village committees already set up in rural areas."

However, reforestation will always remain a privileged tool. "It is a fundamental activity aimed at meeting the essential material needs of everyday life," the chief of state explained. "It has now been accepted that countries hit by desertification must wage the same fight in a lasting, concerted, general approach."

It is for that reason that the presence of the Gambian minister of water resources and the environment was greeted by the chief of state as a commitment on the part of President Dawda Kairaba Diawara and a determination to work along with Senegal to better safeguard our forests and fauna.

The chief of state called for a mobilization of all those who, "as determined, volunteer crusaders," will lead our country from under the spectre of desertification.

New Policies

Formerly, the minister for the protection of nature had recalled the new policy of reforestation defined by the chief of state, which should lead to self-sufficiency in firewood and in meeting the people's needs.

Sketching a rather gloomy picture of Senegal's situation, Sheikh Cissokho explained that 80 percent of our country is directly threatened by desertification at a rate of 100,000 hectares a year.

In this fight to contain the desert, the contribution of communities, rural communes and collectives is more necessary than ever. It must result, he said, in a true program of actions based on the open, regenerated village in a balanced community area.

After hailing the determination of the people of Diagle, the minister for the protection of nature, who particularly stressed community and people's programs of reforestation undertaken in other regions by rural communities, development companies and other groups, revealed that the total area of the different community programs is 14,000 hectares, compared with 6,700 last year.

However, these fine plantations (totaling 62,000 hectares) are constantly threatened by bush fires, "lit by carelessness and a lack of civic spirit and criminal hands," even though they represent inestimable capital in a Sahelian country such as ours.

200,000 Hectares Destroyed

For the season that just ended, 227 bush fires ravaged 200,000 hectares and it will cost over 300,000 francs to rebuild 1 hectare of trees in the savannah destroyed by fire. Last year, losses were only 17,000 hectares in 114 fires.

This is why efforts must be made by the people and the government to embark upon a campagne that will be difficult because of the green area rebuilt following a good rainy season.

Rather than the affair of 4,000 village committees, the mobilization must be the work of everyone.

The president of the rural council of Toubacouta, El Hadj Karamo Ndour, reaffirmed the commitment of the people in the arrondissement to fight effectively against bush fires and desertification. He was the first to set the example by planting 5 hectares. Finally, he expressed his joy over the presence of the chief of state, which constitutes great encouragement. His faith will not be disappointed.

Deputy Amadou Lamine Sarr once again expressed to the president the renewed pact of loyalty and the commitment of the people to the government, which has just given the green light to the paving of the Fatick-Foundiougne road and the startup of the ferry.

Following this exchange of remarks, the president of the republic and Mrs Abdou Diouf visited the parcel of the residents of Diag . and symbolically planted trees.

On the Silman road, he would later lay the cornerstone of the monument commemorating the reforestation campaigns.

11,464
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SENEGAL

DRINKING WATER PROJECT IN KAOACK DESCRIBED

Dakar LE SOLEIL in French 26 Nov 85 p 15

[Article by Ibrahima Ndiaye]

[Text] The city of Kaolack will soon have a modern drinking water distribution system.

This announcement was made at a meeting of the municipal council with district representatives, the main officials of SONEES [Senegalese National Water and Electricity Company] and a World Bank expert. This project, financed by the World Bank and the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation (CCCE), will cover the 11 secondary centers in the country.

It started in July with drilling.

In Kaolack, most of the work will be done starting in December. Two wells will be drilled, electric power will be supplied for the drilling, equipment will be brought in, the civil engineering work completed and finally, a 100-m³ water tower will be built at Kahone. Water pipes will also be repaired.

In addition, 1,090 private connections will be involved. The city of Kaolack is now supplied by three wells, whose water towers have a total capacity of 2,800 m³. However, these water towers need to be repaired.

At the same time, the fairly large existing system needs repair, expansion and renewal. Nevertheless, certain districts are poorly served or have no water at all. Such is the case of the outlying districts. One must also emphasize that a very large number of outlets (245 total) now serve the population, which means frequent problems in operation.

The goal of the project is to supply 45 percent of the population by the year 2000, using individual hookups, and 55 percent by outlets or faucets.

At the same time, it should be recalled that during the studies, several solutions were considered in order to improve the quality of the water.

Efforts will also be undertaken to ensure sufficient production and cover the needs of the city and the industrial zone.

The existing water towers will be repaired and the storage capacity maintained. It is adequate for the city until the year 2000. The existing primary system will also be expanded in most districts.

The expansion project essentially aims to complete the primary system with several hookups in peripheral zones and set up a secondary system in districts already serviced.

Densification of the system will always be possible by the laying of small-diameter pipe. There are also plans to replace existing pipe.

Concerning private connections, it should be noted that the purpose of the project is to encourage the people to hook up with the city system in order to limit the number of outlets whose proliferation does not encourage the masses to seek connections. The new distribution of faucets will therefore make it possible to adequately supply people living within a radius of 215 meters.

This project, aimed at the 11 centers, will cost 13 billion and the city of Kaolack will receive over 700 million of the total allocation.

Remarkable Efforts

The president of the municipal council, Abdoulaye Diack, who presided over the work session, expressed his pleasure over the presence of the general director of SONFES, in order to better study problems facing the commune. He warmly thanked SONEES for having made remarkable efforts to serve the people of Kaolack by providing drinking water.

However, the president of the municipal council noted the responsibility of every individual in this project so that the distribution of water to the city will be improved.

Commune administrator Sounkarou Kamara described difficulties encountered by the community in water distribution.

He revealed that the use of water must be rational before district representatives can be asked to step up vigilance with committees overseeing the faucets.

SONEES general director Abdoulaye Bouna Fall told the audience of its contribution to the project. He said that it would be better, before initiating work, to get together with the people directly involved in order to find a strategy capable of successfully completing the work.

Fall said he was satisfied to see that Kaolack had paved the way for completion of the project under the best possible conditions.

He also seized the opportunity to recall the orientation of the national company, which seeks to meet the people's need for water by the year 2000.

The official also defined the two objectives of the project before giving explanations of the commune's financial situation vis-a-vis SONEES.

It will be recalled that in 1984, the government forgave all the commune's debts, amounting to some 1.5 billion.

The project coordinator spoke of pipes in poor condition. Some 19 kilometers of pipe will be replaced and the expanded system will be 42 kilometers long.

Oumar Diallo also spoke of work on pipes before adding that the project would take a year. He emphasized individual connections, 80 percent of which will be financed by the project. In some cases, the customer will be asked to pay a deposit.

He also noted that the project has been halted since 1981 and that problems that arise will find adequate solutions.

Municipal council members and district representatives who spoke during the discussion expressed their pleasure with the project that will correct the situation in Kaolack.

However, many questions were asked relating to the elimination of faucets.

He also deplored the worn-out pipes that often result in major leaks. Clear and precise answers were then given.

El Hadj Dieng, head of the SONEES region, emphasized the drinking water system and then noted that necessary provisions have already been taken to supply new districts.

It should be noted that SONEES has also set up other projects to be carried out in the years to come.

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SENEGAL

EXISTENCE OF POLYGAMY EXAMINED

Paris AFRICA in French Oct 85 pp 33-35

[Article by Sophie Gallenec: "Long Live Polygamy?"; first paragraph is AFRICA introduction]

[Text] How can Africa still put up with polygamy now, at the moment of its feminist victories? Following a stay in Senegal, a French woman journalist attests to its existence.

One thing is certain, that the society has changed: While it has its roots in the past, polygamy does not rest on the same foundations it did in the past. The reasons that induce men and women to adopt one way of life or another have become more numerous and more complex, and sometimes a bit more obscure.

Many elements combine to preserve polygamy in some countries like Senegal. Above all, it is due to the importance of tradition. To be sure, things have changed and its original justification has disappeared: We know that in the past, essentially in a rural environment, the woman had a great deal of work to do, divided between the house and the fields. It was to lighten her burden that she herself set about looking for a cowife, a "sister," as she called her. We can readily imagine that this phenomenon has practically completely disappeared, all the more so since the former assumed the responsibility for educating her cowife. Today, what woman would not prefer to find a maid to avoid having a rival under her roof?

But while this initial phase has disappeared, the fact nevertheless remains that tradition has solidly implanted polygamy among their customs, in Sene-galese society. And the latter still finds many justifications for it. To begin with, there is sterility: Polygamy is in a way insurance against sterility.

Fatou is 40 years old. She told me: "I was married very young to a teacher. He told me that he would remain monogamous, that one wife was enough for him. Only, we came to realize that I couldn't have children. We decided together that he would take a second wife....

"Now, I don't regret it. He no longer blames me for not having children. Of course, some days it's hard for me, especially when he talks with joy about his children."

For Fatou these things are finally quite settled. We must realize that this is not always the case. But in any case monogamy wreaks havoc here: painful divorces, the even more grievous solitude of women without children and without husbands.

Polygamy is also a "cure" for the death of the husband who leaves behind a wife (or wives) and children. The Koran advocates protection of widows and orphans. In the case of a husband's death, his brother will often marry his sister-in-law. There is a double advantage in this: First, it assures the mother and the children material security⁷; secondly, and perhaps especially, it keeps the children from being abruptly transplanted into another family in the event the mother should remarry outside of the family.

Tradition has made reflexes become rooted in people and they are sometimes polygamous by "initiation"; they are not even polygamous by clear or rational choice. They see those about them marrying two, three or four times and end up by doing the same. Many men who were interviewed said: "I got to be polygamous without knowing how it happened," or even: "I found myself polygamous again." This clearly shows to what extent the situation does not arise from a deliberate decision. We must add to this that for some polygamy is an end, a crowning achievement, the sign of a certain standing, in short, a sort of mark of snobbery.

Among women tradition plays a moderating role; it silences those women who oppose polygamy. We know that in the past the first wife was supposed to display a great deal of dignity when her cowife arrived on the scene. If she did not, she was subjected to mockery and years later people still spoke of her shameful behavior. Even though this phenomenon has in part disappeared, women still very discreetly go to see the marabouts in such cases.

And finally, we may say that tradition is the first pillar of polygamy. Some have attempted to provide a psychological explanation. Dr Doudou Sarr, who spoke at a seminar on marriage last June, reported on this very interesting topic: "What drives Africans to be polygamous? I will simply report on the opinions of some authors who have attempted to answer this question.

"The education of the male child in Africa is such that there is an attempt to identify with the father, but the father constitutes a model that he cannot surpass. So there is a second identification with regard to the older brother. Thus the young African alternately behaves at times like an older son and at times like a younger one, sometimes like a responsible son and sometimes like one in search of security.

"According to these authors, this ambivalence of personality results in the fact that, once he is an adult, to satisfy the different aspects of his personality, the African has need of a wife with whom he will behave like an older son in an authoritarian way and another one with whom he will behave like a younger son in a more submissive way."

This could perhaps explain the fact that polygamy is traditionally rooted in certain African societies. On the other hand, it is certain that one of the chief pillars of polygamy is to be found in religion. This is not the place to delve too deeply into the problem, but the interpretations of the Koran that people offer are rather diverse.

The Koran attempted to annihilate adultery by authorizing polygamy. It also tried to limit it, no longer authorizing [polygamy on] a giant scale. But it makes of polygamy an exception, a concession, not a law, but an obligation.

Actually, to have several wives a man must meet two conditions: on the one hand, be sure that he has the means for maintaining his different households and, on the other, feel himself capable of being perfectly equitable toward his wives. Now this second condition should greatly reduce the number of multiple marriage candidates because it is certainly very hard to fulfill.

But men who misinterpret the Koran are not rare. Some even believe that they are "obliged" to be polygamous. Investigations have been undertaken by experts on Islam to determine exactly which attitude one should adopt.

The third pillar of polygamy is without a doubt one of the most solid; is the family. In fact, very often behind a second or third marriage we find parents and close relatives. And yet, families' attitudes are often paradoxical: They will do everything they can to see to it that their sons have several wives and they are very proud of doing so. But, most of the time too, they will act to see to it that their daughters continue to be the sole wives of their husbands.

The three pillars of polygamy: tradition, religion and family, sometimes do not move in the same direction. This is the case with Catholics: Their religion demands of them that they be monogamous. But if a brother dies, tradition and the family will press a man to marry his sister-in-law. Thus they are torn between two poles and we see Catholics who have one wife in the eyes of the church and several in the eyes of the law. We say this to show that polygamy rests on three feet that are at times wobbly.

Furthermore, it is not only tradition, religion and the family that completely explain polygamy. We know young men and young women who turn up their noses at what they call these "worn-out ideas" and find themselves in polygamous marriages again.

As for women, there are very simple reasons that may lead them to marry a polygamous man. First of all, the fear of remaining single: For many the acquisition of social status is achieved through marriage. A woman who is still unmarried at the age of 30 is often driven by this fear to seek a "husband at any cost." So she prefers a polygamous husband to remaining single.

This is the case with several intellectual women. The men with whom they completed their studies have turned to homebodies, good mothers and perfect housewives. There are many of them who, plunged into their studies and then later their work, find themselves without husbands. So for them the choice

will be swift; they will not always consider the fact that the one they choose is already married! Of course, we must not generalize this attitude.

It is fear of solitude too that forces some wives to remain silent when their husbands remarry.

And lastly, there is the case of divorced women or widows. If they want to remarry, after a certain age there is little chance of finding a single man. So they almost always marry polygamous men.

There are, therefore, factors other than the traditional factors that drive women into polygamous marriages. For men, the reasons are altogether different. Many opt for polygamy when they are married out of concern for security.

First, because committing oneself to monogamy is committing oneself for one's whole life. No chance of reversing oneself. Now who knows what tomorrow will bring? And even the most fervent defender of monogamy may some day change his mind.

But especially because polygamy permits a man to impose a threat on his wife. Knowing that he can at any moment go and look for a cowife, the first wife is on her guard and will avoid showing herself to be disagreeable. In a way, she is obliged to "knuckle under."

This raises questions: Does setting a third person between the couple resolve problems? Is there not resignation by the husband, a flight from dialogue?

But all that also depends on another question: Do women behave properly in Senegal? Why are men so bent on signing declarations of polygamy when they would like to remain monogamous? Why do so many others remain single for such a long time? This is another debate to be opened, but perhaps many young women ought to ask themselves these questions. In any case, one thing is certain: Many men in this country are afraid of women and do not trust them.

To this we must add that the laws are really too favorable for women. They wanted to overprotect them, shelter them and in the end did them a disservice since men choose signing a declaration of polygamy, an "excellent means of applying pressure," as a weapon to protect themselves with.

These are many reasons for maintaining the system. But the factor of chance is not to be ignored. There are cases in which polygamy is not the result of a real choice. Abdoulaye told us: "I was against polygamy and I said so in a loud voice. I loved my wife. At the age of 45 I fell in love. It hit me like that, all of a sudden. I got married. Not even today do I know what happened to me."

Chance also guided this young woman who asserted: "Of course, I was not in favor of polygamy. But when I discovered that I was very much in love with a man and that I wanted to live with him, I confess that the fact that he was already married presented no problem for me. I loved him and that was enough."

All this is just the result of luck, sometimes of bad luck. One would think that everything conspires to preserve polygamy. Yet, if we take a close look at Senegalese marriages, we note that the number of people who sign declarations of polygamy is on the rise, but that the number of monogamous marriages is also increasing. There is a definite swing toward monogamy.

The essential reason for this is growing Westernization: Not only do Europe and the United States often represent an ideal, but in addition intellectuals have been exposed to theories and ideologies that have made them burn their bridges behind them with African tradition.

One of the major reasons that makes men turn away from polygamy is a reason that is financial in nature: In the present economic situation it is very hard to maintain several households on a single salary. In the past, in rural areas women and children represented [useful] arms rather than dependents. Today, it is quite different. And the crisis has no doubt been one of the major obstacles to the spread of polygamy.

But, paradoxically, it is also a concern for material well-being that induces some women to marry polygamous men. Marrying an older and wealthier man is often a guarantee of financial security. The most celebrated instance of this is that of the Dryankes, who marry men for their money... and then run after others for the same reasons.

So we can see that the reasons for polygamy are many, and the criteria that induce each individual to opt for one or the other way of life are numerous and difficult to sort out from one another. The fact nevertheless remains: More and more couples are signing declarations of polygamy, but living monogamously.

Does this mean that there is an inevitable evolution toward a society of monogamous people? I don't think so. The economic situation favors monogamy, but polygamy has existed too long to be swept out within a century.

The problem perhaps lies in knowing whether a man is by nature polygamous. His society, his education, his culture have made of him a being inclined toward this or that way of life, but basically what is he like? No doubt we will never be able to answer this question, or perhaps there are quite simply men who are fundamentally polygamous and other fundamentally monogamous.

The fact remains that this debate is often a stormy one and responsible for a lot of convulsions. And yet, the key word here ought to be tolerance. No one has the right to dismiss one or the other form of marriage under the pretext of being in possession of the supreme truth. Everyone chooses his way of life, his own system of values considering that he respects others. And, in so doing, he has the right to the goodwill of all.

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SIERRA LEONE

ECONOMIC, POLITICAL STATE OF AFFAIRS REVIEWED

Paris LE MONDE in French 5-11 Dec 85 pp 1, 2

[Article by Laurent Zecchini: "Diamonds in a Broken Case"]

[Text] On 28 November in Freetown, General Joseph Momoh took oath as president of Sierra Leone, replacing Siaka Stevens who, at over 80 years of age, voluntarily stepped down.

At this wharf at the end of the world, time remains motionless. The heat saps all energy. The urchin placed on the ground his tray filled with eggs and "spanish fish," and his gaze wandered over the tiny fishing village, abandoned beside a glassy, hazy sea, pockmarked with islands. A long time ago, the women stopped offering big raw shrimp to travelers dozing in their vehicles. As luck would have it, the ferry will only be 2 short hours in coming. The trip back to the peninsula takes 35 minutes. It allows Freetown, the "free city" of the former slaves, to open itself gradually to the senses. One would have to "land" here as the first seamen did, on a night when the storm howls like a wild beast. Then, no doubt, one would also baptize this country "Sierra Leone," the "mountain of the lion."

Kissy Street climbs from the bowels of the port towards the city, pushing its way through a jumble of stalls and wooden stands. A segment of humanity close to the earth lives there, at the mercy of the furies of the sky which caresses the mountain tops with a misty halo, open to the blessing of the sea and its fish. One thinks of the swarming masses of India, then, on reading the names traced on the facades of the rickety stalls, of Arab cities: Tasane, Hussein and Fakry, Nahim and Sons, Pujem Bros., Diardias. It is here, towards Bombay Street, more than in the center whose broad arteries converge on the immense cotton tree, that one can get an idea of the domination which the Lebanese community exercises over the economic life of the country. Since 1982, Iran has spent more than \$150,000 to come to the assistance of the local Muslim organizations, to restore about 20 mosques and, by financing a few newspapers, to engage in Shi'ite proselytizing.

On Pademba Road, one skirts the high prison walls where, if the popular rumors are to be believed, "several hundred" prisoners are crowded in. Before arriving at the central square, one turns onto to State Avenue which opens onto the presidential palace.

State House, with its round tower, terraces and banners, calls to mind an operetta kingdom. At the door, some "Red Berets" of the State Security Division (SSD) seem so goodnatured that a handful of determined men could no doubt infiltrate the palace easily. But here, the authorities gain respect without having to show much force. From time to time, there are strikes by students or civil servants who are discontent because their salaries have not been paid for several months, but generally speaking, the "Siaka Stevens system" continues, in spite of its excesses, or rather because of its excesses.

The Charm of "Old England"

Everything in this country which nature has filled to overflowing with abundant vegetation, fertile soil, and rich mining resources, seems amiable, restful, and harmonious. Schoolgirls in uniforms the color of their schools saunter along the streets bordered by houses that are decrepit but are in lively colors; a very "British" changing of the guard, at the entry to the barracks of the first battalion, on the Wilberforce heights; parliament (built by Israel) on one of the hills which dominate the roads, where the speaker and the clerk of parliament preside with dignity; the wigged elegance of the magistrates in red robes so proud of their traditions; the stern bearing of the officers with their flat caps and stick; one tells oneself that there is some good in the discreet charm of "old England" and that this country, more than its neighbors, has preserved the essential foundations of a law-governed state. "Yes, it is a marvelous country which has everything it needs to succeed," observed an old Englishman, nostalgic for the empire. "It's a pity that gangsters have taken over and that the chief of them lives in State House!"

Siaka Stevens, since he is the one referred to, has not spent much time for several months now in residence at the presidential palace. At more than 80 years of age, he has chosen to hand over power. Distrustful, anxious to retain if not the right to oversee the country's affairs, at least the liberty to live there, he has chosen a successor "to measure" (or with the reputation of being such) in the person of General Joseph Momoh; after he had taken the precaution of ousting all potential rivals who might have been tempted to make him pay for the 17 years he was sole ruler.

The Complicity of the Authorities

On 1 October, during the presidential elections, General Momoh was elected by 99.85 percent of the votes cast. Since there has been no organized opposition since the SLPP (Sierra Leone People's Party) was banned (in 1978) and its leaders joined the APC [All People's Congress] or went into exile overseas, the transition took place quietly. The population applauded the appointment of General Momoh who, like the army as a whole, enjoys a favorable reputation: in Sierra Leone, the military are the only ones who still retain a reputation for integrity.

Freetown, a free town; Sierra Leone, an open country...to the highest bidder. Here, the freedom to do business, economic liberalism, have a concrete, palpable meaning, if one may say so, for a minority. This country, which identifies itself with a postcard showing beaches with white sand and a sea with

Polynesian colors, has continued to decline since independence, with a sudden acceleration after 1980, accompanied by excessive spending (more than \$130 million) undertaken at the time for the summit of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). A virgin country too where, in some remote areas, people still run away at the sight of a white man, and which, according to UNICEF, holds some sorry records: the highest infant mortality rate in the world (200 out of 1000); a life expectancy that does not exceed 34 years of age; a rural population of which less than 3 percent have access to drinkable water. In a country which boasts the oldest university in West Africa (Fourah Bay College), nearly 80 percent of the population are illiterate.

The "diamond explosion," at once the wealth, symbol, and myth of the country, hides the rest. To say it plainly, Sierra Leone is slowly being strangled by its diamonds since the "boom" of the 1950's. In 1970, official production came to nearly 2 million carats, and in 1979, it still represented approximately 75 percent of export earnings. Since then, the country has been in free fall: 265,000 carats in 1983-1984, 243,000 carats in 1984-85. The progressive exhaustion of the alluvial deposits, which should be partially compensated for in the future by the industrial mining of kimberlite (which fills the diamond pipes), is not all that is involved.

In fact, the sale of gems has basically served to make the fortune of a few individuals who have been able to profit from the complacency of the highest authorities in the government. This gentleman's agreement, based on the corruption of the entire machinery of state, can be illustrated by figures: it is estimated that nearly 85 percent of diamond production leaves the country as contraband. In short, of 335 million leones (the leone is worth approximately 1.45 French francs at the official rate, half that at the black market rate) in export earnings, diamonds now represent only 90 million. The drop in world prices since 1980, the totally lax handing over of mining licenses to a multitude of small-time prospectors at the mercy of a law of supply and demand fixed by Lebanese middlemen, some of whom are behind the smuggling network, have done the rest. Most of this unauthorized production is cashed in Liberia, in dollars.

The Archetype of the Rich "Lebanese"

No more than a few hundred members after the second world war, the Lebanese community today, attracted by a source of quick profits afforded by marketing diamonds, is about 25,000 strong. Its financial standing would no doubt turn out to be greater than that of the state if one could disentangle the overlapping economic interests of the two. "If Jamil were to invest one fifth of his profits in the country, it would come out in the black in less than a year," a diplomat declared. The comment is a caricature, no doubt, but the person concerned is no less so.

Jamil Said Mohammed received us amiably and with a great deal of irritation. "When you accuse someone, you must be able to prove your case. There is corruption in every country, in England, in the United States, in France." Said disputes the reputation he has of being a "strong man," the secret and all-powerful adviser to President Siaka Stevens. If he "lives well," it is because he "works hard." It is perhaps undeserved, but Jamil Said, in the

luxury of his Freetown offices, with his television cameras which film visitors and transmit the images to screens installed in his office, his Lebanese assistants who whisper into walkie-talkies, his prosperous business in Sierra Leone and in many other countries, his helicopter, his Mercedes cars and his jet, is the archetype of the ultrarich Lebanese who is feared and envied, the sort for whom the "little people" of Freetown have little liking. A Lebanese mestizo of Sierra Leonean nationality, this short stout man, dressed in white, smokes cigars that the rings he wears on his fingers could circle. His riches are only the "result of success" and it is relative. "In a village," he said, "the person who owns a chicken is rich."

Siaka Must Go

Jamil Said, to whom, by common knowledge, the present minister of finance, Bengali, owes money, is the chief executive of the National Diamond Mining Company (NDMC). He is also the general director of the Sierra Fisheries Company, which has a virtual monopoly on fishing (at least what escapes Soviet trawlers to whom exorbitant fishing rights have been conceded) and the marketing of fish. His other activities run the gamut from rice growing (the basic food of the population) to insurance. Jamil Said, Tony Yasbeck, Samih Haschim and Moussa Sumah, between the four of them, have control, according to diplomatic circles in Freetown, of more than 80 percent of the diamond market, and of many other things. The Lebanese community undoubtedly controls nearly 60 percent of trade, with the rest being shared among the Indians, and in smaller measure, the Guineans, of whom a large number have established themselves in Sierra Leone to escape the regime of Sekou Toure.

Does one wish to hear the voice of the people on this subject? Here are its assured statements: "Siaka must go. Momoh is a good man, an honest man. This country needs discipline to make good business, for everybody. Lebanese are not good." Oju Mends, mayor of Freetown, himself admits that there is a "Lebanese problem." The people concerned, for their part, basically believe that the British, who bit by bit allowed their former colony to go adrift, are the cause of their well-known poor image.

In Default

But in the meantime, the luxurious villas which the richest of them occupy, on the hills which overlook the Lumley beaches and Aberdeen hotels, are well guarded. It is also in this magnificent countryside that President Siaka Stevens's eyrie is located, his personal Juba Hill residence where it is said in Freetown that the candelabra at nightfall sparkle like "the fires of a diamond." No one knows the size of the fortune of this president who has chosen to go into a golden retirement leaving behind him, in the words of a Western diplomat, a "country in the process of collapsing." Stevens's inheritance can be summed up in a date: 1982, the year when Sierra Leone joined the PMA [least developed countries] club. Admittedly, as the Sierra Leonean authorities like to recall, Stevens can be credited with having imposed a degree of governmental stability, and especially a balance between the two main ethnic groups, the Mendes and the Temnes. To achieve this result, the head of state bought the loyalty of the leading party by the distribution of cushy jobs, surrounding himself with ministers who shared his own lack of interest in all

that had to do with development issues, and the desire to get rich. In the area of economic policy, the country has been managed by occasional measures at the whim of the appetites of the government's various customers. The example set in the state's highest office was scrupulously followed at all levels of the administrative hierarchy.

Under the oversight of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Sierra Leone has shown itself to be incapable of respecting its commitments. Those made in February 1984 to the Paris Club have not been honored and, despite a 140 percent devaluation of the leone, the IMF has still not released the \$30 million balance of standby credit totaling \$50 million which was part of an economic assistance program. It is true that the conditions imposed by the international organization (the abolition of subsidies for fuel and rice, a drastic reduction in the number of civil servants), are hard to bear. Devaluation, which has not put an end to the black market (the black market rate is less than half the official rate), has resulted in spectacular price increases. Since 1980, the balance of payments deficit has been \$100 million on the average, while that of the state budget has been four or five times greater than revenues. For the first part of the 1984-1985 fiscal period, revenues totaled 135 million leones, whereas expenses increased 60 percent (305 million leones). Half way through the year, the budget deficit increased 160 percent, and for 1984 the increase in the cost of living was estimated at 105 percent. In short, with a foreign debt of approximately \$480 million and service on the debt which is more than 40 percent of export earnings, the country is strictly speaking in default.

Daily life in Freetown enables one to measure the condition of the economy. Dozens of cars line up at the gas pumps. The arrival of a boat carrying 20,000 tons of oil products is greeted by the outbursts of a crowd who know that the respite from the shortages will be brief. Furthermore, for lack of fuel, the electrical supply is cut off, and the capacity of the decrepit oil driven generators often drops to 7 megawatts, whereas 24 megawatts are needed to supply the city. At the Paramount, the only hotel in center city, the visitor soon learns to keep a stock of candles and, since breaks in the telephone and telex lines are frequent, it is best to try one's luck by going directly to the offices on foot.

Oil Shortages

The example of fuel is characteristic: because it lacks foreign currency, the government is forced to buy petroleum in small quantities, which is expensive, whereas the country's needs do not exceed 250,000 tons per year, i.e., the equivalent of a small supertanker. Since all energy production depends on oil imports (50 percent of the cost of total imports), a substantial part of trade and industry abruptly closes down when there are shortages.

Despite a slight recovery for some national products for the last few months, the country's situation is catastrophic. The foreign policy followed by Freetown more or less consists in passing the hat, which does not even suffice to "make it to the end of the month." The Soviet Union has a nice annuity in the fishing sector, China, through its active cooperation policy, has become a "friendly country," Federal Germany, well ahead of the others, has become the

country's main backer (approximately Fr 115 million in 1984-1985) since the former colonial power, Great Britain, has gradually withdrawn. France, whose bilateral aid represents less than 10 percent of that of the FRG, remains a presence ... in people's hearts, due to a fairly strong Francophile current.

"Everyone is tired of the country's progressive decline," summed up Winnie, a professor at Fourah Bay College. Everyone, that is to say, even the Lebanese, whose business, paradoxically, is beginning to stagnate from the pillaging of the country. International organizations, foreign backers, the Sierra Leoneans, all are expecting a restoration of order. Will General Momoh carry out the surgery? Jamil Said, for his part, is confident.

Historical Perspectives

In 1462, Pedro da Cintra, a Portuguese seaman, landed in this territory which he baptized "Serra Leao." With a land area of 71,740 square km, Sierra Leone, which today numbers approximately 3.8 million inhabitants, was populated in three successive stages.

The first colonists, the "Nova Scotians," former American slaves from Nova Scotia who had taken refuge in England, arrived in 1787 to found a "province of freedom." In 1790, they were joined by the "Maroons," Maroon slaves, i.e., who had escaped from Jamaica, then, throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, by the "Recaptives," African slaves taken from Portuguese, Spanish, and French seamen by British ships whose task it was to suppress the slave trade after the abolition of slavery by the London parliament in 1807.

Bit by bit, a single community was formed, that of the "Krios" (creoles). Today, these people are mainly established on the Freetown (free town) peninsula, which became a crown colony in 1808, then from 1821 to 1827 became the capital of all English possessions in Western Africa.

Independence was proclaimed on 27 April 1961 and Sir Milton Margai, head of the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) became prime minister at that time. Upon his death in April 1964, he was replaced by his brother, Albert Margai. General elections in March 1967 were won by the opposition APC (All People's Party) party, led by Siaka Stevens. A coup d'etat and intrigues followed until April 1968, at which time Stevens became prime minister, then president, after the proclamation of the republic on 19 April 1971. In June 1978, the APC became the sole party.

Two of the country's 13 ethnic groups occupy a preponderant place, the Temnes (29.8 percent) and the Mendes (31 percent), followed by the Limbas (8.5 percent). The Krios are Christians, but the rest of the population practises various religions (Muslims, Christians, animists). Although the official language is English, the Soussous, Malinkes and Foulahs, horse-riding ethnic groups on the border with Guinea, also speak French.

Moreover, the country is much closer to Guinea than to its other English-speaking neighbor, Liberia. Disappointed by the British, the Sierra Leonean authorities admire the French model of decolonization, and envy the lot of Ivory Coast, Senegal, and Cameroon.

France, Second Supplier

More than 80 percent of the population lives from agriculture, although the cultivated land constitutes only 25 percent of the territory's land area. Rice is the basic food, and Sierra Leone, which produces 500,000 tons of it per year, has had to import: 80,000 tons in 1983, and 40,000 tons in 1984.

In addition to other food crops (manioc, peanuts, sweet potatoes, sorghum etc.), export crops include coffee and cacao (approximately 13,000 tons each), which contribute 4 percent to the GNP, and also palm cabbage.

Sierra Leone, moreover, has substantial mining resources (poorly operated). Official figures for exports are as follows: diamonds, 150,000 carats; bauxite, 1.2 million tons; gold, 30,000 ounces; iron, 1 million tons, and rutile (titanium ore), 82,000 tons.

France became Sierra Leone's second largest supplier (apart from imports of rice and oil) in 1984, after Great Britain. The balance of trade between Paris and Freetown showed a surplus of Fr 29.5 million in France's favor (Fr 68 million in exports, Fr 38.5 million in imports), with ore imports constituting 93 percent of French purchases.

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SWAZILAND

QUEEN REGENT PARDONS POLITICAL DETAINEES

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[Text] The queen regent this afternoon pardoned all five political detainees held under the 60-day detention order, marking the beginning of the new year. The message was delivered by the governor of Elusaseni [Royal Residence] on behalf of the queen regent at Nkanini National Offices.

The detainees are former Commissioner of Police, Mr Titus Msibi; a former Deputy Commissioner of Police, Mr Edgar Hillary; Army Chief of Staff, Mangomeni Ndzimandze; and Army officer, Major Abednigo Dlamini; and Dr Sishayi Nxumalo, former minister for finance.

Speaking on the occasion, the Governor of Elusaseni, Samuel Dube, said the queen regent has heard the detainees' grievances and as such set up a commission to hear their appeal. After hearing their appeal the queen decided to pardon them. She further warned them that when they go back home they should keep quiet. She said she was releasing them because she knows every human being has a weakness. She pointed out that their release did not mean that they had not done anything but, however, would not count their sins. She continued to say that she did not want to hear that they have again been involved in any other mischief.

Earlier, Governor Dube pointed out that the queen regent has no (?vergeance). He also urged chiefs, governors, and parents of the detainees to help advise them and make sure they do not start any other trouble.

Another speaker was Governor T.V. Mthethwa, who congratulated the detainees on the release. He also pointed out that there were suspicions that the four [as heard] did do something. He added that whenever there is instability in a country, it is bound that some people be detained, some of which are actually innocent.

The Prime Minister, Prince Bhekimp, also pointed out that this was the second time that the queen regent has pardoned political detainees, adding that some heads of state never even bother themselves with such humanitarian acts. He also warned that the detainees will always be watched to see that they do not revert to their old ways. He also emphasized that they should keep quiet when they get back home. It was pointed out on the occasion that the detainees will be given a chance to thank the queen regent for the humanitarian act.

Among those who were at Nkanini National Offices were Liqoqo [Advisory Council of State] member Prince Mboni; Chief Mfanawenkosi Maseko, Minister of Justice Mr David Matse; the Commissioner of Police, Mr Sandile Mdziniso, and other senior councillors.

Soon after their release, the detainees joined their relatives and were whisked away under escort.

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SWAZILAND

BHEKIMPI SPEAKS ON ECONOMY, FOREIGN RELATIONS

MB011801 Mbokane Domestic Service in Siswati 1600 GMT 1 Jan 86

[Excerpts] The Prime Minister, Prince Bhekimp, says even though 1985 was not a very good year on the economic front, the government, through the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, Mines, and Tourism, was able to forge ahead in promoting commerce and industry and this has gone a long way in boosting the country's economy.

He added that the problems experienced in the past year were caused mainly by the fall of the local currency against other world currencies, like the U.S. dollar and others used in the government's transactions. He said this has resulted in the government overspending by 10 million emalangeni and there was no hope of recovering the amount by the end of the financial year.

During his New Year speech to the nation this morning, Prince Bhekimp said that despite all the problems the government encountered in 1985, there has been marked progress in matters affecting trade, industry, and tourism.

On foreign relations, Prince Bhekimp said 1985 was a great success and cited visits by high-ranking UN and OAU officials. Despite an international economic slump, Swaziland was able to get sizeable grants and loans.

Prince Bhekimp also said that refugees are welcome in Swaziland provided they respect the laws of the country. He advised those seeking asylum to hand over the weapons in their possession to the police. He said that although the government was prepared to cooperate with the international community and grant asylum to refugees, it would not tolerate mischief makers posing as refugees.

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CSO: 3400/807

ZAIRE

MOBUTU INTERVIEWED ON FRENCH-AFRICAN SUMMIT, CHAD

Summit Discusses Debt

LD131527 Paris International Service in French 1215 GMT 13 Dec 85

[Interview with Zairian President Sese Seko Mobutu on his impressions of the 12th French-African summit in Paris, by Paris Radio correspondent Charles Lescaut in Paris; time not specified--live or recorded]

[Excerpt] [Mobutu] In my humble opinion the summit went off very well, and we dealt with the essential matters--above all the problems of debt. There is an unanimous feeling that France should be instructed to be our spokesman with the other financial great powers in the Western world to achieve some understanding from them of our debt problem.

[Question] Concerning political affairs, this is something which perhaps concerns such observers as us now. Do you think that the theory expressed yesterday about security in Africa is the right one?

[Answer] First, without security you cannot even talk of development. It is the basis of any development in our respective countries. Let us take Chad for example. Can Chad in its present well-known circumstances be in a position to develop? Even if it is classified among the poorest countries? No, because Chad does not have the same resources as the African country occupying it. This is just an example. Now let us take Angola as the second example; it is very rich and can develop very quickly, but because of the civil war it will always lag behind in its development program. So, until this problem of security in Africa is settled properly one day, it will be difficult: some will face drought, others famine, but we cannot forget that security comes first.

[Question] But as you are talking about examples, what about Zaire, Mr President?

[Answer] During the first 5 years after my country's independence there was no security, there was disorder and anarchy. You are well aware of all these problems, and I am not saying anything new. But from 1985 onward I think we have been considered to be one of the most stable countries on the African continent, despite certain situations which you are aware of--in Shaba twice and in the east of the country around Moba. But in a few days, in a few hours

this was dealt with and there is no more talk of it, except in the past tense. I think this shows that without security there is no development.

[Question] Have you discussed your plan for the League of Black States with the presidents who were here in Paris?

[Answer] Listen, it is quietly making progress; do not press me to say anymore. I think that contacts have been made and progress is good.

[Question] So, you have every hope of seeing this League born within a few months.

[Answer] Naturally yes, by all means, and whether people like it or not, it is making good progress.

[Question] Do you think that this sort of meeting--the French-African summit--is a forum well-adapted for talks on common matters--political matters--and do you think it is good to maintain this enlarged composition?

[Answer] I am now giving my personal viewpoint. I think that the framework created for these talks should have remained, let us say, French-speaking. But for a few years now France has preferred to expand the consultations, which is no bad thing. Now it is easy to get one's bearings. We are here with Portuguese speakers, French speakers, and English speakers, and when everyone is here, what is the purpose of it? A mini OAU summit? Or what exactly? That is the thing. How can I put it? It does bother me a bit.

Comments on Chad

LD131806 Paris International Service in French 1245 GMT 13 Dec 85

[Text] This morning, Charles Lescaut [Paris radio reporter] met with Marshal Mobutu, at the latter's private residence in Avenue Foch in Paris. Marshal Mobutu spoke to him about his feelings on the Chadian question, in which he is profoundly interested.

[Begin recording] [Mobutu] I believe France has done what it had to do. As I said yesterday, it is Libya that has not respected its agreements. Furthermore, according to these agreements--if my memory is good--Libya must not go beyond the red line, the 16th parallel. So far, thank God, it has not dared do it, but it has the impertinence to do so.

What does the agreement between the two sides say? Neither Libyans, nor French. That is clear. When you go to the southern part, you do not find a French presence any more, except technical cooperation workers who are mainly civilians. But in the north, according to figures given by President Hissein Habre, there are more than 7,000 Libyans, with tanks and airfields. This is not acceptable. The question I ask myself is whether we in Africa are serious. There is the OAU Charter which condemns occupation of the territory of a neighboring country by another African independent country.

At the same time, the OAU Charter condemns this kind of current practice. And that same head of state who occupies the territory of a neighboring country wants to ask others to make him chairman of the OAU. You see this from here.

[Reporter] As for the fact that the French-African summit is becoming more and more open to non-French speaking countries, at least these last few years, does this disturb President Mobutu a little?

[Mobutu] The framework laid down for this dialogue between nations should, to my mind, remain of a French-speaking character. But for a few years now France has chosen to enlarge the meeting. This is not a bad thing, but on the other hand it is not easy to see clearly. We have here [word indistinct]-speaking people, French-speaking people, English-speaking people; everybody is here. What exactly is it to be an OAU minisummit; what exactly? This is not perplexing, but it is a little disturbing.

[Reporter] Therefore, would you like to return to the initial formula: only French-speaking countries taking part?

[Mobutu] [words indistinct]; one knows exactly what the matter is. But things are not going smoothly; there is some beating around the bush, and things are adapted to what is [words indistinct] [end recording]

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CSO: 3400/815

ZAIRE

MOBUTU RULES NATION WITH CARROT, STICK

Zurich DIE WELTWOCHEN in German 21 Nov 85 p 7

[Article by Laurent Zecchini; first paragraph is WELTWOCHEN introduction.]

[Text] On 24 November, Marshal Mobutu will celebrate the 20th anniversary of his seizure of power. The Zairian head of state and "leader" of the only party, the People's Movement of the Revolution (MPR, rules his country with an iron fist. He is backed by various security organs who narrowly watch the people by spying and repression. The Zairians appear to fatalistically bear this burden.

Sakombi Inongo, Zaire's Ambassador to Paris, lately stressed that "for a people to accept such severity, it needs to have a strong man at its head, who embodies it." Marshal Mobutu Sese Seko who will celebrate the 20th anniversary of his seizure of power on 24 November next, is certainly such a "strong man." The "leader" of the People's Movement of the Revolution identifies with his country, however the opposition seeks to deny that. Doubtlessly that has less to do with his personal charisma--although he has that, too--than with the big stick by which he dominates the 30 million Zairians. With the exception of the sudden upheavals periodically occurring in Shaba Province, the "underbelly" of the country, nothing whatever seems to happen in Zaire. It gives the impression of being drugged, and the general public seem to bear with complete fatalism the steadily worsening decline of their purchasing power.

Everybody is a member of the MPR from birth. The party is so constituted that it encompasses all aspects of economic, political and social life. Anyone championing ideas deviating from the "theory of authenticity" (the head of state, the original thinker, establishes this politico-philosophical doctrine), is a dissident by definition. There is one oddity, though: The man who does not tolerate any distribution of his powers and dismisses ministers the moment they become a little too well known, this man allows a certain degree of opposition in the course of the debates conducted in the bosom of the unique party's central committee. Of course there is one condition: Nothing of this may be leaked to the outside. In return, the senior party and government officials enjoy the benefits of the nomenclatura and are given unexpected "gifts" whenever the president has a fit of generosity.

The government has made it its business to use the stick and the carrot simultaneously. Repression is carried on by various security organs, and the head of state put such men at their head who have every (financial) interest in remaining loyal to him.

The BSP [Special Presidential Brigade] is 2,500 strong, run by Israeli military advisers and represents a genuine pretorian guard for the regime. It is responsible in particular for the security of the capital.

The AND [National Documentation Agency], the infamous state police, has several thousand civilian agents who watch over the general public by spying, denunciation (there are several hundred informers) and repression. Its powers are virtually unlimited. It is headed by Seti Yale, special presidential adviser on national security.

The G-2. That is a secret military unit handling the less glamorous operations. It is run by Colonel Bolozi (who is a native of Equateur, like Mobutu himself). For its operations, the G-2 has links with the rural police and the provincial general staffs. Though the G-2 has not been very active in recent years, the Zairians fear its men. This police arsenal carries out the duty, assigned it by the head of state, to nip any revolt in the bud. A few months ago, it was supplemented by a "military information and operation service" for operations abroad. On occasion this latter handles the "conversion" of particularly obnoxious refugees in foreign countries.

Rewards According to Humour

The "carrot" is used for all Zairian emigrees. Mobutu knows exceedingly well how to simply buy people. He uses his trips abroad to recruit people for money. Innumerable are those "dissidents" who, on their way back "home," stop at the president's ranch in N'Sele. From there they emerge as the holders of a lucrative office or a ministerial job (which amounts to the same thing). A typical example of this practice is the "operation Karl-I-Bond." In the name of "national reconciliation," Nguza Karl-I-Bond, former premier and 4 years a refugee in Brussels, returned to Zaire last June, on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of Zairean independence. Though he has since returned to Brussels (Mobutu made him no offer), his return was noisily welcomed in Kinshasa and represented a successful public relations operation by the regime. This minimal concession in the matter of human rights was hailed by the Belgians and Americans who were worried about the image of a country they back with significant financial aid, and which is an indispensable ally of the "West." Despite the complaints repeatedly raised by Amnesty International in the past 20 years.

And yet: The thirteen former parliamentary deputies of the UDPS [Union for Democracy and Social Progress] resist the advances of the "president and founder" of the MPR with amazing courage. Two of them, Tshisekedi and Kanana, were arrested on 13 October last in the course of a BSP "operation." The Agence France Presse correspondent in Kinshasa reported the arrests. He was promptly expelled. Against this background, one feels inclined to doubt the assurances of the Zairian Government, that it had nothing to do with the

3 November forcible expulsion of the 59 Zairians by the Swiss authorities.

Internally, Marshal Mobutu relies on various powerful groups. The distribution of influence is difficult to assess. To begin with those of mixed blood. Among them first of all Kengo Wa Dondo (1st state commissioner) and Seti Et Mbemba (president of AZENA [Zairian employers' federation]). There follow the people from Equateur. They predominate in the army and in positions of power. On the other hand, Mobutu has long and fiercely distrusted the Balubas, one of the most important ethnic groups of Kasai. For historical reasons, they are distinguished by above average education and hold numerous jobs in business and social life. According to his humour, the president today rewards the one, tomorrow the other. And with this tactic of divide and rule he has not done badly up to now.

He acts on the same principle in regard to the country's external security, in other words his alliances. Since the May 1978 events at Kolwezi (the invasion of Shaba by the so-called Katanga gendarmes from Angola via Zambia--editorial comment), a strong military force has been stationed in Shaba. Belgians provide the backbone for the 21st Brigade in Lubumbashi, the regional "capital." Israeli military advisers are reorganizing the former Kamanyola Division. Mobutu is still afraid that the former "Katanga gendarmes" might surface again. Actually, their last survivors are in exile in Tanzania and Zambia and do not appear to represent a genuine threat to stability. Still, last May's sudden uprising in Moba on Lake Tanganyika served as a reminder that the borders of the empire are not secure. In this northeastern region, Chinese advisers make up the cadre of the 41st Brigade. Also, in addition to the Americans who maintain a military cooperation office in Kinshasa, some 60 French advisers represent something like an elite unit, the 31st Brigade. Paris also agreed to the establishment of a second paratrooper brigade. Overall, the Zairian Armed Forces, around 95,000 strong, are an African fighting force which must not be underestimated in terms of the Continent. They also serve to satisfy Mobutu's ambition. He would like to be acknowledged the "policeman" of Central Africa.

Mobutu constantly endeavors to gain respect for himself and his country. He was quite successful in that regard in the past 2 years. Zaire had long been notorious for not repaying its debts to international financial organizations and for carrying on an inept economic policy, the so-called Zairiazation. By now, though, it has become almost exemplary in the field of fiscal administration. The International Monetary Fund describes it as its "best student." Directed by its creditors, it embarked on reconstruction, and this policy is gradually bearing fruit. Unfortunately, the many excesses committed during the copper "boom" of the 1970's (specially the systematic recourse to loans at fantastic interest rates and terms) had the result that the foreign debt remains significant, roughly \$4.5 billion. Though, thanks to its return to a state of grace, Kinshasa satisfies its creditors each month and, generally, respects the "performance criteria" imposed by the International Monetary Fund (disregarding at this point the large and chronic deficit), its debt service--amounting to about \$500 million in 1984--largely paralyzes all efforts at recovery.

The structure of Zaire's debts acts rather like a vicious circle--each year's new loans are greater than repayments (in 1984 the former exceeded the latter by \$190 million). As the international financial world appreciates Kinshasa's efforts, it extends some solidarity to the country. In April 1984, Zaire obtained a standby credit amounting to \$162 million and entered into an obligation to the International Monetary Fund for the end of April 1986. Last May, during the meeting of the Paris Club, agreements on debt rescheduling were signed with Kinshasa. They amount to \$350 million. The World Bank, the UNDP [UN Development Program], the EDF [European Development Fund] and various bilateral sleeping partners take their turn at the sickbed of the Zairian economy. Britain doubled its aid in 1985 (from 500,000 pound sterling to 1 million). French aid increased from frs 429 million to frs 500 million, FRG assistance from DM38 million to DM48 million.

In fact the Zairian economy is extremely fragile, mainly because it depends on price fluctuations on the world market. Its natural resources (copper, tin, silver, cobalt, gold and diamonds) provide 80 percent of export earnings. Zaire ranks sixth in world copper output. The success or failure of its economic reconstruction therefore depends on the sudden changes in the prices of this raw material.

The Splendid Style of Government

Admittedly, overall economic results are encouraging. However, their effects on the people's standard of living are dramatic--already in 1983 they bore the full brunt of the currency devaluation. In the "bush," intact families and the dominant Catholic Church (which often steps into the breach for the government) help the population bear the rampant inflation. Though slowly receding, it still exceeds 25 percent. The phenomenon of the so-called black economy is fueled by the rise in the prices of basic foods in the urban areas. The outstanding example is the price of manioc, the most important basic food. Everybody in Kinshasa tries his best to cope. People attempt to get on at the expense of the government, nominally hold various jobs at once. Fraud and theft are the order of the day.

It is expected that, on the occasion of the certainly splendid festivities at the anniversary of 24 November, Mobutu will proclaim the establishment of LENA [League of Black African States], because that is his heart's desire. The Zairians are bound to be delighted with this diplomatic initiative, and it is bound to increase Mobutu's prestige. However, people in the humble quarters of Matonge or the "Kinshasa zone," the center of the city, would certainly prefer the "leader" to carry out another one of his promises--to make a serious effort to realize the "social era."

11698

CSO: 3420/17

ZAIRE

LEADER OF ZAIRIAN OPPOSITION IN EUROPE EXPLAINS POSITION

Zurich DIE WELTWOCHER in German 5 Dec 85 p 49

[Article by Ulrich Kaegi: "How a Favorite Turned into a Refugee"]

[Text] The circles of the Zairian opposition are still disturbed by the fate of the six allegedly murdered Zairians who, thanks to a headline in Geneva's LA SUISSE aroused horror in Switzerland and other countries. According to the terrifying rumor, six of the fifty-nine Zairians forcibly deported from Switzerland back to Kinshasa are said to lie in the refrigerated drawers of the morgue at Mamayemo Hospital.

Neither the denials by Belgian chief physician Jean Seghers nor the eyewitness account by a group of Swiss reporters on the occasion of the parade of the deportees--staged by Mobutu--("How Mobutu Taught the Small Swiss to Count," No 48/1985), sufficed to stifle the misgivings of Mathieu Musey, listed in the telephone directory as professor dr phil, lic theol, cand iur.

Mathieu Musey (45) came to Europe in 1963 for the expressed purpose of studying for the ministry. In 1970, he entered Switzerland with his wife and son (now 18). He vehemently rejects the suspicion of having himself set going the report of the six murder victims. He insists that he had heard this news from four or five sources simultaneously. From whom? "From the immediate surroundings of the Zairian Government."

A WELTWOCHER interview with Professor Musey in his modest apartment located in a suburb of Berne and conducted while his wife dandled 10-months old Alain-Daniel on her knee, did not yield any details. Though the sky outside hung low and gray over the dreary tenements anyway, the lowered blinds on the small balcony made for even more semidarkness in the living room.

Musey marshals his arguments: "According to our analysis it would be surprising if no one had been killed." I had found out by now that "us" means a committee appointed, according to Musey, by a conference held in Lausanne on 9 November 1985 and attended by several hundred representatives of a dozen Zairian opposition groups. The conference accepted Musey as its official spokesman. The meeting had decided to send some representatives to Brazzaville to investigate the alleged deaths from the opposite bank of the

Zaire River. Musey assured me that "the day we have definite proof that the six are alive, we will publish a statement to that effect."

The shadows of no less than three family members emerge from the semidark living room. The Museys are convinced that they were murdered by Mobutu's killers. One prominent victim is said to be the former president of the Zairian Parliament, in other words the No 2 man in Zaire, a brother-in-law of Mrs Musey and therefore the erstwhile protector of her family. He was dead the day after a dinner party given by Mobutu. This seems to be a fact. "Poisoned," says the shocked couple. "A coronary," is the official version.

Professor Musey does not feel secure even in Switzerland. He claims that Mobutu's agents had twice tried to poison him. He met one suspect Zairian acquaintance in Freiburg. Musey filled the man's glass to the rim, his own only half full. Returning to the living room after taking the bottle to the kitchen, he saw to his horror that his guest had switched the glasses.

At the present time Professor Musey has even more and pressing concerns--he himself is threatened by deportation to Kinshasa. It is true that he arrived in Switzerland not as a refugee but as a student, following studies in Padua and Rome, initially at the Dominicans and subsequently at the Jesuits, graduating as licentiate of philosophy and theology. He earned his Ph.D. at Freiburg University, at which point the authorities concluded that the purpose of his stay in Switzerland was fulfilled.

Moreover, in 1975, Musey who speaks 13 languages, was appointed professor of mathematical logic in Kinshasa. As a result he went back and forth between Zaire and Switzerland for a number of years. His health suffered in the process, and he therefore decided to move to Berne to prepare for a Ph.D. degree at a higher level. However, the Zairian Government seems to have continued paying his salary in the form of a grant. An enemy of the regime would surely not have received such preferential treatment. At the same time, his wife worked for the Zairian Embassy in Berne from 1981 to 1983 (the embassy still owes her 20,000 Swiss francs salary).

In 1982, Kinshasa suddenly stopped all payments, though Musey at the time did not contemplate anything else than his academic career and a return to his chair (theoretically a life appointment). He thinks the reason for this abrupt change to have been a denunciation. This brought him the dubious pleasure of his name figuring on a list of Zairian dissidents in Switzerland, which was discovered in Geneva in 1982. Did Musey thus turn from a favorite into a refugee?

Financed by the National Fund, he initially worked on two dissertations. Both are completed but have not yet been accepted. Guest lectures at various universities keep him going.

In the meantime, the immigration authorities hardened their view that the professor had sufficiently enjoyed Swiss hospitality. Musey, on the other hand, claims to have expected early naturalization. When that failed to happen, and Musey was compelled to fear final expulsion, he submitted an

application for asylum in July last. The Federal Office for Police considered the rapid change from favorite to refugee somewhat suspect and rejected the application. Musey in turn appealed that decision, and the appeal is still pending.

The one thing certain at this time is that Professor Musey did not endear himself to either the Zairian or the Swiss authorities by his public appearance as the spokesman of Zairian opposition groups and his outspoken suspicion that six of his countrymen were murdered in Kinshasa. The Mobutu Government feels itself slandered, the Federal Department of Justice and Police feels duped, while Mathieu Musey and his family consider themselves the innocent victims of persecution by sinister powers there and here.

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SOUTH AFRICA

GOVERNMENT ISSUES FURTHER STATEMENT ON UNIVERSITIES

MB091409 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1245 GMT 9 Jan 86

[Text] Cape Town, Jan 9, SAPA--The government has backed down after accusing the press of "incorrectly" reporting a shift in its policy on admission to "whites-only" universities.

Department of Education and Culture public relations officer Mr C.P. Bester said today press reports -- that racial curbs on admissions to English and Afrikaans universities had been lifted by the government -- were correct but had given people the impression they were being "thrown open." Mr Bester said: "We were in a spot and had to respond because of political pressures. From the response we got from the general public, they understood it as the government throwing universities open.

"The intention was not to say the press created the wrong impression, but that some members of the public came to the wrong conclusion."

Mr Bester was asked to comment after the department released a statement saying that "the impression careted by press reports that there had been a basic shift in the governments whites-only policy was incorrect.

The statement said that under a "new arrangement" between the minister and university principals, universities no longer had to apply for individual permits to admit people of other races to certain undergraduate courses.

However, said the statement, this did not change the extent to which students from other population groups could be admitted to white universities.

The department said this change would not "lead to the alienation of own institutions from their communities."

In terms of the 1983 amendment to the Universities Act, students of other races registered at white universities no longer needed ministerial permission.

But to make sure expensive facilities at black universities were fully utilized, certain courses had to be protected by means of permits, said the statement.

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CSO: 3400/857

SOUTH AFRICA

ANC'S REPLY TO STATE OF EMERGENCY

London THE AFRICAN COMMUNIST in English No 103 Fourth Quarter 1985 pp 5-11

Editorial note: "ANC's Reply to the State of Emergency" /

Text "Long live the African National Congress!

"Long live the South African Communist Party!

"Long live the South African Congress of Trade Unions!

"Forward to battle on all fronts, on every front!"

With these rousing slogans the President of the African National Congress, O.R. Tambo, brought the 2nd national consultative congress of the African National Congress to a close on June 23 last, after 8 days of intensive debate and discussion by the 242 delegates who had been brought together from all corners of the globe. The delegates shouted their enthusiastic responses -- "long live" and "forward" — and then sang the national anthem in a spirit of solemn dedication to struggle. Afterwards, chanting freedom songs, they surged out of the conference hall and, in the glare of floodlights in the crisp night air outside, demonstrated their support for their leaders with a fiery war-dance under the appreciative gaze of their President.

If the Botha regime and its security chiefs had been hoping for a crack to appear at the ANC conference, they must have been grievously disappointed by the outcome. In his speech opening the conference on June 16, President Tambo had forecast:

"The days we will spend here will live forever in the records of the struggle for national liberation as marking a turning point in the history of all the people of South Africa. Our conference itself will be remembered by our people as a council-of-war that planned the seizure of power by these masses, the penultimate convention that gave the order for us to take our country through the terrible but cleansing fires of revolutionary war to a condition of peace, democracy and the fulfilment of our people who have already suffered far too much and far too long".

The very holding of the conference, in the middle of a liberation war, under the noses of the enemy, was in itself a staggering achievement — a demonstration of courage and determination. Only a few days previously, the enemy had launched his barbarous attack on Gaborone in Botswana,

killing innocent and defenceless men, women and children as they slept in their beds. The conference itself was held only a couple of hundred miles from the huge South African military base in the Caprivi strip — but even if the enemy had physically attacked the conference and blasted the delegates into oblivion (as he had the capacity to do), the fundamental contradiction between the interests of the racist regime and those of the majority of the population would have remained unaltered. The commitment of the black majority to strive for liberation would not have been quenched. On the contrary, it would have been intensified.

This has been proved by the Botha regime's resort to emergency powers — an open confession that its attempt to "pacify" the people through a combination of the carrot and the stick was an abysmal failure. Indeed, the government is patently no longer able to govern in the old way. In the townships, its writ does not run at all, its institutions have been destroyed, its emissaries and stooges driven out. The police and military, with the aid of bullets, batons, tear gas, dogs, agents provocateur and undercover assassins, can manage to blast their way into and out of the townships, but all attempts to establish any form of civil authority responsible or responsive to Pretoria have come to nothing. Schools and universities are shut down. An economic boycott has been launched which has threatened the very basis of the white economy in the urban areas.

In the townships, the people rule. OK? In some areas we see the beginnings even of an alternative civil power set up by the people in place of the stooge councils which have been destroyed. It was in the hope of preventing this process from extending further that the Botha regime resorted to emergency rule last July, blaming its predicament on the "total onslaught" by international Communism which it once again held responsible for all its troubles. But the declaration of a state of emergency solved nothing. On the contrary, it worsened the plight of the regime, making it even more difficult to restore any semblance of peace or order. The drive for the imposition of international sanctions was intensified, with even Reagan, Thatcher, Kohl and their friends under ever-increasing pressure to take effective action. Big business took fright, investors panicked, the rand collapsed and the South African economy faced its biggest crisis since the 1930s.

Botha's resort to naked force is not only useless but counter-productive. Today neither the ANC nor the SACP can be killed by beheading their leadership. Those 242 delegates who attended the ANC conference in Zambia last June represented many thousands of ANC members — in the townships at home, and in the camps and missions in Africa and elsewhere abroad — who had been preparing for the conference and discussing its draft reports for many months beforehand. If need be, those 242 delegates could have been replaced by another 242 delegates elected from the same constituencies, and with the same determination to carry on the struggle.

and military carte blanche to jail, kidnap, torture and murder without fear of redress, attempting to bring "peace" to South Africa through an intensification of terror. Under the blanket of the emergency the regime has resorted to the foulest stratagems, inciting black against black, African against Indian, in the long discredited imperialist tradition of "divide and rule". Atrocities and pogroms carried out by the agents of the regime are advanced as justification for the retention of power in white hands. At the time of the shameful attack on an Indian community near Durban last August we saw Buthelezi join hands with Botha to make the disgusting accusation that the UDF and the ANC were to blame when the real responsibility for what happened lay closer to their own door. But as our whole history cries out, these tactics never work. On the contrary, they only intensify the contradictions in our society, raise still higher the level of political consciousness of the people, stiffen their opposition, steel their determination, strengthen their organisation, send thousands more young people flocking to join the ranks of the ANC and Umkhonto we Sizwe, the people's army.

Funeral Politics

The futility of the regime is nowhere demonstrated more revealingly than in its attempt to place a curb on township funerals. After all, it was in the wake of the abductions, beatings and killings in the townships in pre-emergency days that funerals inevitably became political demonstrations, and the flags and banners of the ANC and SACP were hoisted high in the air. It is the regime's terror which has produced the death-defying courage of our youth. The more repression is intensified, the less likelihood there is of peace. The passion of the people will not be doused by petty proclamations.

It was the military themselves who long ago pointed out to the apartheid regime that they could contribute only 20% to a peaceful solution, and the remaining 80% would have to come from the politicians. This was the origin of Botha's "reforms", which he mistakenly hoped would be accepted as the 80% prescribed by the military, but which most interpreted as just a crude attempt to hoodwink not only the people of South Africa, but also apartheid's critics abroad who were stoking up the disinvestment campaign and clamouring for sanctions.

Yet it is perhaps a mistake to discuss Botha's "reforms" as purely "cosmetic". They are more than that. They do not, of course, satisfy the legitimate demands of the people — especially the African majority — but some of them represent a reversal of regime policy and doctrine which is not until final victory. And beyond the organised ranks of the ANC and the SACP are the masses of the South African people who have been roused to a level of political consciousness today which is being displayed through their actions from end to end of our country, bringing the administration to its knees and finally compelling the declaration of a state of emergency.

The ideas and ideals for which the ANC and SACP stand are so deeply rooted in the people that not all the terror perpetrated by the regime under the blanket of the emergency could wipe them out. After all there is not much more the regime can do than it has already done. Under the Internal Security Act it has had all the powers it needs. It has jailed thousands of people without trial, tortured prisoners to death under "interrogation", launched treason trials after treason trials, organised death squads to kidnap and murder the people's leaders. With its emergency powers it merely gave the police without significance. We may scorn the tricameral parliament as a farce, but we cannot dismiss as purely cosmetic, for example, the alterations in trade union law which have facilitated the development of the independent trade union movement and made it possible for African workers to organise legally, take part in collective bargaining and go on strike, albeit with many constraints. Nor can we oppose the scrapping of the Mixed Marriages and Immorality Acts, or the colour bar on the mines — the last refuge of job reservation, which Botha has promised to end by the beginning of 1986. And there are many other concessions of a similar kind which have been prised out of a reluctant regime by the mounting tide of internal and external pressure: freehold rights in the townships, free movement of African labour in both urban areas and Bantustans, the abolition of the Prohibition of Political Interference Act etc.

It is true that all these "reforms", as Nelson Mandela has pointed out, are mere "pinpricks". They affect only a tiny handful and leave the fundamental structure of apartheid intact; white supremacy remains. What then is their purpose?

In our view they are clearly part of a strategy which has been worked out by the Botha regime and its "constructive engagement" partners in the west to defuse the South African revolution. Open expression of the thinking behind "reform" was given by Professor Blackie Swart, head of the industrial relations research unit at the University of Stellenbosch and a former member of the Government's National Manpower Commission, in an appeal widely publicised in the press calling on the government and employers not to use strong-arm tactics against the independent trade union movement. Breaking the present collective bargaining structures could give some companies short-term benefits, he said, but would have disastrous long-term consequences and could lead to unmanageable industrial unrest not necessarily related directly to the work situation.

"My feeling is that if, over the next 18 months to two years, the unions fail to gain reasonable benefits from the negotiating table, they will lose a large part of their power base, become weaker and lose their influence which will result in a shift towards more politically motivated organisations. Unions which fail at the negotiating table and see their influence dwindling may have no alternative but to become more politically motivated". (*Star* 18.5.1985)

In other words, he is appealing to the bosses to let the unions succeed in negotiations for higher wages and better conditions because failure at the

negotiating table would throw the workers into the arms of the ANC and SACP. This explains why so many employers recognised the relevant trade union and allowed it to function. This explains why millions of rand are being channelled by the ICFTU, AFL-CIO and other bodies towards South African unions which it is hoped will develop into a "third force," drawing the workers away from the ANC. This explains the grant of millions of dollars and pounds by western governments and institutions to "cream off" bright students, trade unionists and even "agitators" for training and influencing to serve imperialist interests.

In his presidential address to the ANC conference President Tambo explained how "through struggle, in which we put to the fore our policy, strategy and tactics, while continuing to intensify the struggle against the apartheid regime, at home and abroad, we defeated this attempt to create a 'Third Force'. The ANC alerted the people to the dangers of the enemy's strategy and called on them to intensify the fight. "We charged them with the task to make the country ungovernable and to defeat the cunning enemy manoeuvre represented by the amended apartheid constitution. And to that call and that challenge our people have responded with unequalled enthusiasm, persistence and courage". And President Tambo presciently warned:

"The apartheid system is in a deep and permanent general crisis from which it cannot extricate itself. The apartheid regime cannot rule as before. It has therefore brought its military forces into the centre of the state structures and is ready to declare martial law when the need arises. The widespread and increasing use of the army in the effort to suppress the mass struggle in our country, even before martial law is invoked, reflects the depth of the crisis engulfing the racist regime".

This was the perspective which confronted the ANC conference. The delegates were fully aware of the dangers that lay ahead, but calmly and without panic went about discussing their plans. Angry at the massacres and murders carried out daily by Botha's assassination squads, they worked out the strategy and tactics needed to destroy the apartheid state machinery. They devised means to strengthen the presence of the ANC and Umkhonto we Sizwe within the country so as to be able to take advantage of the rising mass struggles of the people and lead them towards the seizure of power through a combination of mass political action and armed struggle.

Democracy in Action

The conference was above all an inspiring demonstration of democracy in action. The leadership openly acknowledged mistakes, the rank and file delegates openly voiced their criticisms. Far from the platform imposing its will on the floor, if anything it was the other way around, and the conference decisions bore the emphatic stamp of the majority will. No delegate with a grievance was reduced to silence; no one left the scene feeling he had had no

chance to speak his mind. At the end of the proceedings the entire executive resigned and submitted themselves for re-election. Had there been a wish for fundamental change, this is where it would have expressed itself. By re-electing the overwhelming majority of the outgoing executive, adding to their number some new blood, the conference decisively expressed its wish for continuity, its confidence in the ANC leadership and declared its willingness to follow them on the course that had been charted.

Where does that course lead? In the words of the conference communiqué:

"Conference agreed that the Freedom Charter provides the basis for the satisfaction of the aspirations of the overwhelming majority of our people. In this regard the participants agreed that it was important that we should win as many whites as possible to our side. We should also adhere to our opposition to and our struggle against the Bantustans as well as the apartheid tricameral parliament and related institutions. We must continue to pose the alternative of a united, democratic and non-racial South Africa".

The conference resolution "opening the doors" of the African National Congress to South Africans of all races (two Indians, two Coloureds and one white were elected to the executive which was previously all-African) was a convincing demonstration of ANC self-confidence and maturity. The resolution was passed by an overwhelming majority, with only two delegates voting against and three abstaining. This was no sign of a split, hesitation or uncertainty, but an unambiguous declaration by the African majority that they wished their national liberation organisation to reflect their determination to create a united, democratic and non-racial South Africa on the lines set out in the Freedom Charter.

In the dark days of emergency rule and state terror through which South Africa is passing, more and more people are realising that the strategy and tactics of the ANC provide the only answer to the chaos and misery flowing from the policies of the apartheid regime. The strife and conflict which is tearing our country apart must be brought to an end. The ANC's consultative conference has shown the way.

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SOUTH AFRICA

ANC'S VIEWS ON 'SOFT', 'HARD' TARGETS

London THE AFRICAN COMMUNIST in English No 103 Fourth Quarter 1985 pp 13-18

[Editorial note: "Soft" and "Hard" Targets]

[Text] Almost without exception the South African and foreign press have misinterpreted the decisions of the ANC's consultative conference mainly in relation to the abolition of the distinction between "soft" and "hard" targets in operations by the people's army Umkhonto we Sizwe. This has almost invariably been interpreted as a decision by the ANC to go for "soft" targets in that it is not down white civilians, pregnant women and children, to carry out an orgy of slaughter, bloodshed and general mayhem in order to achieve its objectives. By concentrating attention only on this aspect of ANC policy, the scribes seek to justify their classification of the ANC as a "terrorist" organisation and freely label our freedom fighters as "terrorists" who deserve no support or mercy from the civilised world.

The liberation movement must not fall into the enemy's trap and allow itself or its activities to be pigeonholed in a manner that promotes the enemy's objectives. The ANC's consultative conference took no decision to mount an offensive against whites or civilians, to go for so-called "soft" targets (civilians) in preference to "hard" ones (presumably military and police personnel, government institutions and the like). Any such decision would have been contrary to the ANC's principles and objectives, as well as counter-productive. The ANC is not out to alienate but to win friends and influence people amongst all sections of the population.

What the ANC conference did decide, most emphatically, was that the people had been the victims of state terrorism for far too long and were now determined not only to defend themselves but to raise the level of struggle against oppression until final victory was achieved. In his remarks at the opening of the conference, President Tambo declared:

We meet two days after Pretoria's assassination squads invaded the Republic of Botswana and murdered South Africans, among them members of the ANC, as well as colonised Botswana and foreign nationals - men, women and children. Only yesterday the South African racists killed yet another comrade, the late one Kekana Nkadieng, son of John Nkadieng, the general secretary of the South African Congress, who was also a member of the ANC.

"We have also just lost nine comrades in Angola, victims of an act of terror by our enemies. Our chief representative in Zimbabwe also died (Joe Gqabi, also killed by a car bomb -- Ed.)

"Today is June 16, the 9th anniversary of the Soweto uprising. The bloody repression that the Pretoria regime unleashed on that day continues. Inside our country, patriots are killed every day.

"The moment has come when we should avenge these martyrs. The cause for which they perished will emerge victorious. The crime of apartheid which is responsible for their deaths must be suppressed.

"The darkness that has shrouded our country for so long is now lit by flames that are consuming the accumulated refuse of centuries of colonialism and racism. For us, these flames are like a beacon which draws us faster to our goal ... Our people want freedom now. They want to govern and determine the destiny of the country today and not tomorrow. They have lost patience with all ideas that liberation can be postponed for any reason whatsoever. They measure the purpose of life by no other standard than that it should have been spent in the struggle for liberation of our country. They have therefore shed all fear of death because the words *to live* have acquired the same meaning as the words *to be free*."

The activities of the ANC and Umkhonto we Sizwe have in the past been marked by caution and restraint in the choice of targets and the means of attack. Care has been taken to avoid unnecessary casualties among civilians, and on occasion targets have been switched for this reason. But the enemy, far from respecting this restraint, has responded with ever-increasing ferocity and brutality. In the townships the police and military hunt down people like animals, shooting them dead, attacking them with dogs and whips. At night gangs of police and their agents, their faces concealed by balaclavas and some in civilian clothes, drag men, women and children from their beds or round them up in the streets and haul them away. Some simply disappear and are never seen again. Others are found dead miles away from where they were seized, their bodies mutilated or burnt beyond recognition.

The *London Times* reported on July 8, 1985:

"Policemen wearing balaclava helmets raided the black township of Duduza east of Johannesburg last Friday and killed between two and six people ... A police spokesman in Pretoria, Lt. J.C. Barnard, confirmed that a police unit had visited the township 'to root out criminal elements'. He said this was a routine function of the police."

The *Cape Times* reported on July 1, 1985:

"The bodies of two of four community leaders who went missing on Thursday night have been found near the burnt-out shell of their car outside PE (Port Elizabeth). The other two men are still missing. Mr Sicelo Mhlawuli, an Oudshoorn teacher, was found in the bush... He had been stabbed and set alight, and his right hand severed". The mutilated bodies of the other two were found later.

Mr Murphison Morobe, acting publicity secretary of the United Democratic Front, said on July 4 that acts of terror were perpetrated by the regime in areas where the people's resistance was strongest.

"He said the toll of terror thus far was 27 people missing in the Eastern Cape, Transval and the Free State -- at least 20 activists in Duduza and Soweto being on the hit lists with one person dying as a result, and at least 11 other 'political assassinations'. The state of terror and the occupation of black townships by the SADF and the SAP made it difficult to establish what had happened to the many people who had disappeared." (*The Sowetan* 5.7.1985)

Since Mr Morobe spoke the scale and ferocity of the regime's attacks on the people have increased. And there has been a new upsurge in state terrorism. On the night of August 1, 1985, Mrs Victoria Mxenge, one of the defence lawyers in the Maritzburg trial of 16 UDF leaders, was gunned down outside her home by police agents who were waiting for her in the shadows. Four years earlier, in November 1981, her husband Griffiths Mxenge, also a lawyer and people's leader, was lured from his home and hacked to death by the hired assassins of the regime. Nor is it only in the townships that the savagery of the regime is to be encountered. A young white serviceman, in court applying for classification as a religious objector because he was not willing to use weapons, testified:

"I was told a story about an incident at the border when a corporal ordered the young rifleman to shoot the baby on the back of a woman who was being questioned about the presence of terrorists. When she was unable to reply to the questions the baby was shot and then the mother". (*Star* 25.5.85)

On the very same day the *Star* was reporting the Minister of Constitutional Development, Chris Heunis, as having "told foreign and local newsmen that the government could not at this stage commit itself to a declaration of intent to negotiate power-sharing with blacks".

The exclusion of the black majority from power-sharing is in itself an act of terror by the white minority regime, which is forced in consequence to rule not by consensus but by the gun. That apartheid is the main source of racial friction and conflict in South Africa has now been admitted by none other than the Human Sciences Research Council, a government founded and funded body, which in a report on a four-year study by 200 researchers, 11 work committees and a main committee,

"singles out entrenched separation, population registration, a racially-bound legal system, unequal education, and economic and job restrictions as contributing to mistrust and resentment. It describes classical apartheid as a failure and... call for the sharing of political power and the broadening of democracy". (*Star* 2.7.1985)

Not surprisingly the HSRC report has been attacked for giving aid and comfort to the "terrorists" -- though it should be noted that it is the real terrorists, the racists and their allies, who complain loudest about it.

Weapon of Imperialism and Racism

We have long known that South African terrorism is not confined to South African territory. The atrocities of Kassinga, Matola, Maseru and Botswana, the book and car bombings, have resulted in the killing and maiming of thousands of defenceless men, women and children in recent years. In fact, South Africa's terrorism has fuelled the anti-apartheid campaign worldwide, forcing even the United States Congress to devise a sanctions bill in response to popular pressure, and in open contradiction of President Reagan's policy of "constructive engagement".

Yet constructive engagement, and the terrorism it encourages, remain as the policy of the Reagan Administration. While Reagan last July was calling for action against what he described as a "confederation of terrorist states" — Iran, Libya, North Korea, Cuba and Nicaragua — and highlighting their "close ties with Moscow", the United States itself in co-operation with South Africa was organising an international meeting of the world's real terrorists at the UNITA base of Jambawhere representatives of the bandit gangs fighting against Angola, Nicaragua, Laos, Kampuchea, Afghanistan and Cuba discussed plans to create a permanent alliance to oppose the spread of "Soviet imperialism" and promote "democracy" throughout the world. According to press reports, Reagan sent a message of greetings to the meeting and an invitation was issued for the holding of a "first world congress of anti-communist rebels" in Washington.

Reagan and Botha, who fulminate against terrorism and terrorists, thus take to their bosoms the MNR and UNITA assassins in Mozambique and Angola, the contras who mutilate the bodies of their Nicaraguan victims, the Pol Pot mass murderers who wiped out half the population of Kampuchea, the anti-Castro Cuban exiles and the assorted bands of hired mercenaries who in the name of anti-Communism have perpetrated some of the most ghastly atrocities in modern history in order to hold back social advance by the peoples of the underdeveloped countries and make the world safer for capitalism.

The hypocrisy of Reagan and Botha has nowhere been exposed so clearly as in their relations with Angola. Both were parties of the Lusaka agreement of February 1984 which provided for the withdrawal of South African forces from Angolan territory as a step towards Namibian independence. Yet South African forces have remained on Angolan soil to this day, and South African commandos were involved last May in a vain attempt to blow up the American-owned oil installations in Cabinda which provide Angola with most of its foreign exchange. The adventure was to have been credited to UNITA, like most other achievements of South Africa in destabilising the Angolan economy.

Had Reagan been truly opposed to "terrorism", he would have severed all relations with South Africa and UNITA as the authors of this terroristic enterprise. Instead, he called for the repeal of the Clark amendment passed in 1976 to prohibit US support for elements opposed to the Angolan government. In July both houses of the US Congress obliged, and the way was made clear for direct US intervention in the dirty war against Angola. Reagan, Botha and Savimbi are now unashamedly joined together in an international terroristic alliance under the tattered flag of anti-communism.

Anti-Communism Linked with Racism

There is another side to this anti-Communist conspiracy which deserves notice, and that is the link between anti-Communism and racism. We in South Africa know full well that the ferocity of the state's attack on the people is fuelled by racism. It is also almost invariable that the mercenaries who serve the interests of imperialism are whites ready at all times to shed the blood of blacks and capable of any barbarity even against women and children if their skin is of the wrong colour. Not only the mercenaries but their masters too are afflicted by this racism. The point was made on the floor of the United States Senate by Senator Alan Cranston, a Californian liberal. Replying to the argument of US Assistant Secretary of State Crocker and right-winger Senator Helms that sanctions against South Africa would only harm the Africans and would be vetoed by President Reagan, Cranston said:

"There seems to be, at the heart of the American ultra-right-wing movement, an undercurrent of racism ... I strongly suspect -- and gravely fear -- that that dirty current of racism is rising to the surface again in the tolerance of apartheid and the apparent lack of concern over the suffering of 23 million blacks."

Senator Cranston said some people would accept any evil, even the evil of apartheid, if it could be enlisted "in the unholy crusade of blind, uncritical anti-communism" which had put the US "in political, economic and sometimes military bondage to virtually every right-wing dictator and virtually every ultra-conservative reactionary movement that appears anywhere on the globe". (*Star* 9.7.1985.)

This is the reason why Western leaders make a bigger fuss over the imprisonment of a single dissident in Poland than over the slaughter of 30,000 Palestinian refugees by the Israelis and their agents in the Sabra and Chatila camps in Lebanon. This is the reason why so many white South Africans remain indifferent to the daily slaughter of their black fellow citizens in the townships.

And this is the reason why black South Africans today are so angry. It is not the ANC but the regime which has abolished the distinction between "soft" and "hard" targets — abolished it from the very first days of conquest right up to the present day. Now the people have had enough and are gearing up for war. They have shed all fear of death because, in the words of President Tambo, they understand that to live they must be free. They are no longer prepared to submit to a regime which offers only hardship and deprivation, and tortures and murders those who resist oppression. Today the mass of our people demand peace and equality and are determined to achieve victory in their lifetime.

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KUHL AFRICA

MK CADRE REPORTS ON ANC CONFERENCE

London THE AFRICAN COMMUNIST in English No 103 Fourth quarter 1985

Article by Temba Hlanganani: "The Greatest Moment in my Life"; [An MK Cadre Reports on the ANC Conference]

Text From June 15 to 23 the African National Congress held its Second National Consultative Conference in Zambia. The first conference of this nature was held in Morogoro, Tanzania, in 1969.

I attended the conference as one of the elected delegates from the ranks of our people's army, Umkhonto we Sizwe. Those eight days of hard but rewarding work were for me, alongside the day when I joined the ANC shortly after the 1976 Soweto upsurges, the greatest moment in my life. To have been part of that historic gathering of South African revolutionaries was a wonderful experience that will always serve as a source of inspiration.

It was the most representative conference of the ANC since it was banned in 1960. About 2 000 delegates came from all corners of the world where there are ANC members - determined veterans and dynamic youth; leaders and diplomatic functionaries; commanders and political commissars of our people's army; political organisers and trade unionists; administration; production; health and cultural workers; propagandists and students.

The conference was honoured with a message from Nelson Mandela and other national leaders in Pollsmoor and Robben Island prisons. The message read in part:

"We were most delighted to hear that the ANC will soon have another conference. We sincerely hope that such an occasion will constitute yet another milestone in our history. It is most satisfying, especially in our present situation, to believe in a tested organisation which exercises so formidable an impact on the situation in our country which has established itself firmly as a standard bearer of socialist tradition and which has brought us such coveted laurels."

We feel sure that all those delegates who will attend will go there with one central issue foremost in their minds: that out of the conference the ANC will emerge far stronger than ever before.

"Unity is the rock on which the African National Congress was founded and the principle which has guided us down the years as we feel our way forward."

Messages of solidarity came from all corners of the world, from heads of state, diplomatic missions, governmental and non-governmental organisations, liberation movements, political parties, solidarity movements and other organisations. They included messages from the Presidents of Botswana, Algeria, the German Democratic Republic and Guinea Bissau; the Central Committees or the equivalent committees of the ZANU (PF) of

Zimbabwe, the Frelimo Party and MPLA, the British Labour Party, the Swedish Social Democratic Party, the Communist Parties of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Romania, the United States and other countries, trade unions, students, women's, youth, religious and solidarity organisations and the peace movement.

No Surrender

The conference was characterised by unity of purpose, firm resolve, optimism and a sense of urgency among the delegates. This fighting spirit found its clearest expression in the contributions made by delegate after delegate from the floor, contributions which contained pointers to new and exciting initiatives. The spirit of the delegates was also uplifted by the free and comradely discussions and the revolutionary songs, sung with inspiration, telling the story of our people's tradition of "no-surrender" displayed in decades of fierce resistance.

Each day started with a news report compiled by D.E.P. personnel, concentrating on the Pretoria regime's campaign of terror directed against our people and the frontline states, and our people's mounting resistance spearheaded by the lightning attacks of MK combatants. These reports served to emphasise that the conference was both a People's Parliament and a Council of War.

Another reflection of the fighting mood of the delegates was the tributes which the conference paid to the heroes and martyrs of our revolution. We remembered stalwarts like chief Albert Lutuli, Moses Kotane, J.B. Marks, Yusuf Dadoo, Braun Fischer, comrades who were murdered by Pretoria's death squads, assassins and hangmen in Matola and Maseru and most recently in Gaborone, Joe Gqabi, Griffiths Mxenge, Ruth First, Jabu and Petros Nyawose, Mini, Mahlangu and Mosolodi and many others. Also honoured were our leaders and other comrades who have continued to hold high the banner of our revolution in spite of many years of imprisonment. A special tribute was paid to the MK combatants of the Lutuli Detachment who had come out alive from Smith's dungeons and had rejoined our ranks to continue the freedom struggle.

Perhaps the best way to describe the spirit of the conference would simply be to say that the delegates were wholly in tune with our people who are locked in a life-and-death combat with the oppressors and exploiters.

With Flying Colours

The Second National Consultative Conference of the ANC was held quite a number of years after the historic Morogoro Conference of 1969. During the intervening years the ANC has gone through many a testing moment. It has survived numerous sinister schemes devised by the Pretoria regime and its imperialist backers aimed at destroying it as a genuine and consistent revolutionary mass political movement, the vanguard of our people in the struggle for national liberation.

In the years since 1969 there have been, *inter alia*, attempts to:

*Divide the leadership of the ANC in prison from that which is outside.

*Drive a wedge between the democratic mass movement inside the country and the section of our liberation movement which is outside.

*Pressurise the ANC into abandoning the vital tactic of armed struggle.

***Divorce the ANC from its battle-tested ally the South African Communist Party.**

***Isolate the ANC from the true friends of our liberation struggle, the Soviet Union and the rest of the Socialist Community, the Frontline States and other progressive forces the world over.**

To achieve these aims the Pretoria regime has employed every means at its disposal, ranging from blatant lies and slander to so-called reforms and outright terrorism.

The ANC has not only survived but has actually emerged stronger and more determined to advance the struggle until final victory. It can be said, therefore, that the past 15 years provided our movement with a necessary schooling for the future decisive battles. The ANC had to recover from the heavy blows suffered by the entire forces of liberation in our country since the early sixties. It had to learn to defend its unity in the face of an all-out offensive by the enemy. It had to draw ever closer to its allies, no matter what the price it had to pay. It had to learn to combine a variety of methods and tactics in an unfavourable situation to advance the people's struggle.

That the ANC has stood the test of time is clearly borne out by its great achievements which are honoured by the world progressive forces and even grudgingly acknowledged by the oppressors and exploiters in South Africa and in the citadels of imperialism. Today more than at any other time in our history our people see the ANC as their unchallenged leader and an alternative power to the tyrannical apartheid regime. More and more of our people are rallying around the Freedom Charter as their banner of true liberation and have accepted armed struggle as a vital component of the mass popular offensive for people's power.

Lessons Learned

The conference had to take stock of this period and draw lessons from its experiences to appreciate to the full the ANC's achievements, to consolidate them and, by pinpointing our shortcomings, to overcome them. In doing so the delegates were guided by the overriding need to ensure that the ANC emerged more united, better organised to lead our people to victory, and to become a stronger force in the struggle against imperialism.

It was crystal clear to the delegates — and in the intensive pre-conference discussions this had become the dominant idea — that as a movement and a people history is presenting us with a precious opportunity we cannot afford to miss. While the apartheid system is in the grip of a paralysing economic and political crisis, the oppressed and exploited masses for their part are increasingly realising that for them there is no middle road, that it is better to die fighting for freedom than to continue to lead the miserable life of a slave. At the same time the African National Congress has won its rightful place in the front ranks of this united and determined mass upsurge so that the situation we are confronted with is one which in the words of one delegate can be described as 'a crisis of achievement'.

Put simply it means that through our own actions involving many sacrifices on the actual battlefield and not just our revolutionary ideas, correct and vital as they are, we have set in motion an irresistible wave of mass resistance in which different forms of struggle are used with great initiative and resoluteness. This in turn places even greater demands on our liberation

alliance. While the capacity of the apartheid regime to rule our people is declining daily, the forces of change in our country are faced with the challenge of mustering enough strength to prepare the ground for the overthrow of the apartheid regime.

Our situation demands new and daring tactics and initiatives, and the delegates resolved the responsibility that was placed on them by history to give an effective lead. The conference took bold decisions and "hammered out guidelines for the future progress."

It was clear to all that the Botha regime is still determined to defend the apartheid system of white minority rule by force of arms. Accordingly conference agreed that there was no reason for us to change our broad strategy which pursues the aim of seizure of power by the people through a combination of mass political action and armed struggle.

Victory is Possible

It was agreed that the possibility of victory is greater now than at any other time in our history. This requires that we should step up our all-round political and military offensive sharply and without delay. The masses of our people have been and are engaged in a struggle of historic importance directed at making apartheid unworkable and the country ungovernable. The delegates agreed that it was vital that we take all necessary measures to strengthen the ANC and Umkhonto we Sizwe inside our country so as to be able to meet the demands of our people.

The conference also resolved that we cannot even consider the issue of a negotiated settlement while our leaders are in prison. It was agreed that we must continue with the campaign for the immediate and unconditional release of these leaders.

In the situation which obtains within the country, where the crisis of the apartheid system has become endemic, conference agreed that the Freedom Charter provides the basis for satisfying the aspirations of the overwhelming majority of our people. In this regard, the participants agreed that it was important that we should win as many whites as possible to our side. We should also adhere to our position to intensify our struggle against the bantustans as well as the apartheid tricameral parliament and related institutions. We must continue to pose the alternative of a united, democratic and non-racial South Africa.

Conference endorsed the view advanced by our imprisoned leaders that unity among the anti-apartheid forces is essential. In a call to our people inside the country, the leaders said:

"Those of us who are true liberators should not fight among ourselves. Let us not allow the enemy's dirty tricks department to succeed in getting us to fight one another."

Conference paid tribute to the contribution that the United Democratic Front has made towards strengthening the unity of the democratic forces of our country and condemned the arrest and prosecution of its leaders and activists.

The participants also agreed that this unity must find expression in the mass action of all our people against the apartheid regime. Consequently, delegates stressed that all our people should be organised and mobilised, in the towns and the countryside, including those in the bantustans. The Black workers are of special importance in this regard and are, as we have said

before, the backbone and leading force in our struggle for national liberation.

Conference also assessed the international situation. It agreed that we should further expand our system of international relations and reach out even to regions, countries and governments with which we may not have had contact before. It urged the international community to "declare the apartheid white minority regime illegitimate".

In a spirit of militant solidarity the Conference also addressed special greetings to each of the Frontline States, Lesotho, the OAU and Swapo among others.

New Structures

To ensure that the decisions adopted by the conference are fully implemented questions relating to the improvement of our structures were discussed. Steps are to be taken to firmly root the ANC and Umkhonto we Sizwe among all sections of our people and thus ensure the uninterrupted intensification of our people's war until state power is in the hands of the oppressed and exploited masses. Constitutional guidelines were laid down to create a firm basis for improving the ANC's style of work as a revolutionary vanguard organisation. It was decided that the movement must hold conferences once every five years and that the National Executive Committee should hold office for the same period. Conference also decided that membership of the ANC should be open to South Africans of all races who accept the policies of our movement, with equal rights and duties at all levels of the organisation.

Of the 22 members of the outgoing National Executive Committee 19 were re-elected. The three most senior officials of the ANC, the President, Secretary General and the Treasurer-General (Comrades O.R. Tambo, Alfred Nzo and Thomas Nkobi respectively) were unanimously re-elected.

The Conference also decided to increase the size of the National Executive Committee to thirty members and gave powers to the NEC to co-opt an additional five members should the need arise.

There can be no doubt that the conference did its work "in a manner befitting our movement, our revolution and our times." The high level of unity displayed will undoubtedly increase the capacity of the ANC to lead the people in the struggle for national liberation. But more than that, this unity demonstrated the further growth of the ANC ideologically and shows that the ANC has taken yet another step forward in developing its revolutionary nationalism. This becomes particularly clear when one considers that being a mass movement, the ANC embraces within its ranks patriots with different social backgrounds. The conference gave expression to the movement's unshakeable conviction that the masses of our people are the real makers of history, with the Black workers as the leading force. We are an inseparable part of the anti-imperialist forces which are changing the world irreversibly.

The conference further consolidated the revolutionary alliance between the ANC, the South African Communist Party and the South African Congress of Trade Unions. In a very striking manner a number of delegates, both senior and rank-and-file members of the movement, called for closer co-operation between these three frontline detachments of our national democratic revolution. The alliance has proved its worth in countless battles, in the prisons and even on the gallows. It has provided the framework within

which all of us, both as component parts of the liberation alliance and as independent organisational formations, have been able to grow stronger through united action.

As the delegates declared to all our people: the old order in our country is coming to an end. The racist regime is losing ground. The white racists are splintered into hostile factions and parties and their morale is in decline. They can no longer sustain their old myths of baasskap, of a master race destined to rule over Black slaves forever. All they can do now is corrupt and kill ...

The Black giant is rising to his feet tall and strong. He is breaking the chains that have bound him for centuries. He is marching forward with strength and confidence to a new social order. He is determined to liberate not only himself but also the whites whose lives have been distorted and corrupted by the apartheid system.

Forward our people in a single mighty current. The struggle will yet be hard. There will be many more sacrifices. There is no easy road to freedom. But we are on the advance. The enemy is falling back. Let us turn his retreat into a rout, the rout into a collapse, collapse into surrender!

Editorial in "The International," June 1, 1923

"Every intelligent worker, whether of European or African descent, must associate himself with the demands of the SA Native National Congress, representing for this purpose, we think, the subject races of the Union in general, for equal rights with the other races, right to ownership of land, equality in the eyes of the law, 'equal rights for all civilised men', equality of treatment and citizenship irrespective of race, class, creed or origin, equal share in the direction of public affairs, and direct representation by members of their own race in all legislative bodies ... On their side also is the historic fact that national liberation is, in the case of subject races, the necessary introduction to proletarian revolution."

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CSO: 3400/735

SOUTH AFRICA

BUTHELEZI ASKS WHITE FOR 'BOLD MOVES'

MB301001 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1453 GMT 29 Dec 85

[SAPA PR Wire Service; issued by: Chief Ministers Office Ulundi]

[Text] Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi warned whites today that South Africa's desperate economic plight would become endemic and violence would increase unless they prevailed on the government to take bold forward steps during the coming parliamentary session.

And he warned fellow blacks that, if they dehumanised themselves in the way in which they conducted the struggle for liberation, apartheid would have gained its final victory.

The 1986 session of parliament could be a make or break affair--possibly the last whites would have in which to do something meaningful, the KwaZulu chief minister and Inkatha president said in an end-of-year message.

He called on the state president, the government and white South Africans to recognize that only bold moves towards establishing a just society would salvage the country from the terrible effects which the "upward spiralling of violence for political purposes" was having.

Chief Buthelezi said violence was at its most hideous when used for party political purposes, and this was the kind of violence used by the state to enforce apartheid.

Tragically, a great deal of violence by blacks was also used for party political purposes. The good of the state and the good of the people had been sacrificed by those who wielded violence to maim, kill and destroy--whether they were black or white.

It was wreaking havoc with all decency and was reducing the prospects of a just, democratic solution to the country's problems.

Talk of reform was no substitute for the real thing, and South Africans and the world were disillusioned. The great democratic nations were at one with black South Africa in demanding an end to political verbosity and the beginning of real political action which would normalise the country as an industrialised, democratic state.

Chief Buthelezi said black South Africa must combine its vast reserves of decency with its enormous power in order to reinforce every step in the direction of creating a just, open and democratic society.

"I call on every black South Africans to deny apartheid its final victory of dehumanising blacks," he said. "If we dehumanise ourselves in the way in which we conduct our struggle for liberation, apartheid will have had its final victory."

He urged blacks to walk tall as people committed to tactics and strategies which preserved the very decency "on which the God-given right to demand justice and freedom" rested. Decent objectives could not be achieved through hideous behaviour.

Decency was as vital to whites (who needed it in order to survive) as to blacks, he said, and he called on whites to conduct their polities in a way in which they increased the prospects of such decency surviving in South Africa.

Chief Buthelezi urged every black leader and organisation to recognise that black unity in a multi-strategy approach was a prerequisite not only for defeating apartheid but for doing so in a way that would avoid the tragedy of exchanging a white oppressor for a black oppressor.

He called on black South Africans to resist intimidators and to insist on the same democratic rights in black politics as those being demanded from the white political establishment.

"We simply now must put our house in order," Chief Buthelezi said, "and it is ordinary people on whom the burden to do so rests so heavily.

"You, the ordinary people, are the people for whom [words indistinct]. It is your life and your future we seek to secure. It is your freedom and I, as a black leader, call on your decency to uphold the things our heroes and martyrs suffered for."

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CSO: 3400/813

SOUTH AFRICA

MANY ZULUS LEAVING UMBOGINTWINI AREA

MB301453 Umtata Capital Radio in English 1400 GMT 30 Dec 85

[Text] Scores of Zulu people are leaving Umbogintwini area on the south coast where factional fighting has killed more than 60 people. Police are still maintaining a strong presence in the area which is reported to be quiet but tense. Mike Robertson reports from Durban:

[Robertson] At this stage it appears Pondo people who were told by Zulu Chief Bhekisetha Makhanya to be out of the territory by the weekend are refusing to budge. Instead, Zulu people fearing further outbreaks of violence are leaving, possibly because it is easier for them to find accommodations elsewhere and a Amanzimtoti employer who approached police to provide an escort for an employee who wanted to leave was told it could not be done immediately as there was a long list of people who wanted police protection as they moved. Police said they have already escorted large numbers of Zulu people out of the area.

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CSO: 3400/813

SOUTH AFRICA

BLACK AREAS IN NATAL, KWAZULU TO BE UPGRADED

MB301332 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1328 GMT 30 Dec 85

[Embargoed until 2300 GMT 30 December]

[Text] Ulu'di, 30 Dec (SAPA)--The South African Government and the leader of KwaZulu, Ch. of M.G. Buthelezi, have approved proposals to upgrade at least 14 black areas in the homeland and Natal territories.

Their agreement is an initial response to a report by the KwaZulu/Natal planning council, which was appointed last year under Dr Louis Rive to investigate ways of improving the quality of life for blacks in the Natal areas, according to a statement released today.

Chief Buthelezi made the statement jointly with the minister of constitutional development and planning, Mr Chris Heunis, and the minister of education and development aid, Dr Gerrit Viljoen.

Although details of the projects are unknown, the statement specified the areas to be upgraded. These included 40 projects in Inanda, Umlazi and Edendale, as well as the improvement of conditions in 11 townships and at 19 hostels in various centres.

"Approval has been given for the proposals regarding the upgrading of living conditions of black residents within the areas covered by the report, to be accepted in principle as basic guidelines for the implementation of initial development," the statement said.

A committee, which will determine the allocation of state funds to the projects and the priorities of the areas, is to include representation from the two government departments, the KwaZulu administration, the Natal provincial administration and the treasury, according to the statement.

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CSO: 3400/813

SOUTH AFRICA

DET REACTS TO BLACK STUDENTS' RETURN TO SCHOOL

MB301534 Johannesburg Domestic Service in English 1500 GMT 30 Dec 85

[Text] The Department of Education and Training [DET] says it is not prepared to comment at this stage on the decisions taken by the Soweto Parents Crisis Committee over the weekend regarding school attendance by blacks next year.

The head of Liason Services of the department, Mr Job Schoeman, says it is not the policy of the department to liaise with organizations on the strength of media reports. He says the department is prepared to study thoroughly any documents submitted to it by the committee, and on the grounds of such documents to hold discussions about the matter.

At a conference on the crisis in black education held in Johannesburg, about 400 delegates representing various organizations resolved yesterday that all black pupils should return to school in the new year.

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CSO: 3400/813

SOUTH AFRICA

COMMENTARY PRAISES RETURN OF BLACK STUDENTS TO SCHOOL

MB310602 Johannesburg Domestic Service in English 0500 GMT 31 Dec 85

[Station commentary: "Black School Attendance"]

[Text] The weekend decision by the Soweto Parents Crisis Committee [SPCC] and related bodies that black children should return to school in the new year was not unexpected. There had been indications for some time of growing hostility to the radical boycott organizations in the black community, among parents, teachers, and the children themselves. The time had come for groups like the SPCC to bow to popular sentiment or face increasing alienation and the possibility of an organized backlash in the community.

They have obviously decided to change tactics timeously, while they can still represent themselves as leading public opinion rather than being led by it. Perhaps the greatest tragedy of the 1985 unrest was the extent to which radicals succeeded in capturing the imagination of immature youngsters and directing them on a course that had no chance of succeeding. No doubt, the radicals achieved much of what they wanted: disruption of essential local services and peaceful political evolution and an intensification of international pressures on South Africa.

Their instruments were young blacks whom they rallied to the banner of "liberation before education." It was an updated version of the doctrine with which Kwame Nkrumah led Ghana into chaos and misery. But a new generation fed on a romanticized pseudohistory of Africa's decolonization was not to know that. The youngsters paid dearly for their ignorance. At the least, they have lost a year of schooling. They will be those whose parents affected by the recession cannot send them back to school; others, too deeply indoctrinated and dehumanized by the crazed life they have been leading are no longer capable of returning to the quiet discipline of academic life.

It was to be expected that the silent majority would begin to react against the exploitation of their children. That it has now led to a commitment in at least one part of the country to get the children back to school is to be welcomed. As far as the conditions set by the SPCC are concerned, some are of a nature that can presumably be negotiated with the educational authorities.

Others affect aspects of schooling that are clearly the province of professional educationists and cannot possibly be dealt with by laymen without lowering standards. A third group comprises purely political demands and the resolution of which will depend not on the decisions taken by particular interest groups, but on the outcome of negotiations among political leaders of all communities.

These matters will have to be sorted out in the next few months. What is important now is: that the destruction of youthful potential must come to an end, and the children return to school. There is no shortcut to true political, economic, and personal liberation.

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CSO: 3400/813

SOUTH AFRICA

DEPUTY MINISTER HAILS RETURN OF BLACK STUDENTS

MB311118 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1002 GMT 31 Dec 85

[Text] Johannesburg, 31 Dec (SAPA)--The decision that the boycott of black, Indian and coloured schools must end next year was "good news," Mr Sam de Beer, deputy minister of cooperation, said yesterday.

The SPCC [Soweto Parents Crisis Committee] decision to end the boycott was taken at a mass meeting at the University of the Witwatersrand at the weekend. The decision has the support of leading black community figures such as Bishop Desmond Tutu and Dr Nthato Motlana.

Mr De Beer told DIE BEELD newspaper in reaction yesterday he had had three meetings with the SPCC recently. According to BEELD, "it looks as if the discussions had favourable results."

On the decision to end the educational boycott, the deputy minister said it was "good news, because it means the children will go back to school."

On SPCC demands that the state of emergency must be lifted within three months and that the SADF must be withdrawn from black areas, Mr De Beer said although these were not education issues, the demands had been discussed at a previous meeting with the parent body.

At that meeting, Mr Adriaan Vlok, deputy minister of defence and of law and order, had told SPCC delegates troops could be withdrawn and the emergency lifted only when the safety of the people could be guaranteed.

Mr De Beer told BEELD there was no political motivation on his part. He was concerned with the interests of children. "If they (SPCC) want to discuss that (the issue of children), we will listen," he said.

"Our door is open. We are prepared to negotiate with them on all educational questions."

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CSO: 3400/813

SOUTH AFRICA

FREE STATE LEADER, TRANSKEI MATANZIMA NEW YEAR MESSAGES

MB311850 Johannesburg Domestic Service in English 1700 GMT 31 Dec 85

[Text] The administrator of the Orange Free State, Mr Louis Botha, says a secure future for South Africa would be the responsibility of everyone in 1986.

Delivering his new year's message, Mr Botha said that attitudes and interaction could help to reduce or worsen tension between the various population groups. South Africa had enough room for all and its inhabitants would have to bear with one another as tension and disharmony could not be afforded. Development would continue, and the people of the country would be responsible for its orderly progress. Mr Botha said that all differences would persist; political activity had to be confined to its own peculiar domain as political struggle introduced dissension and destroyed national life.

In his new year's message, the state president of Transkei, Paramount Chief Kaiser Matanzima, exhorted the people of Transkei to join hands to weather the storms that would gather on the horizon and to march steadfastly to their cherished destination. He said the internal and external wings of the ANC had fought far and wide in 1985, sometimes using remote control to exterminate South Africa and Transkei. The ANC had taken it upon itself to imbue the youth with the negative attitude and spirit towards their parents.

President Matanzima reiterated his contention that violence is not the answer to national problems, saying problems were solved at the negotiating table.

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SOUTH AFRICA

DET SUPPLYING TEXT BOOKS TO BLACK SCHOOLS

MB060620 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1001 GMT 5 Jan 86

[Text] Pretoria, 5 Jan (SAPA)--Textbooks to the value of R13.68 million are being distributed to black schools by the Department of Education and Training [DET] in anticipating the re-opening of the schools on Wednesday.

In a statement in Pretoria today, the department's director-general, Dr Braam Fourie, said the DET had been supplying free textbooks to pupils in its schools since 1979, at a total cost of well over R90 million.

In addition, free stationary was being supplied to schools where compulsory education had been introduced at the request of communities.

A further R11.3 million had been spent over the past four years on library books for primary and secondary schools.

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SOUTH AFRICA

BRIEFS

MINERS STRIKE IN BOPHUTHATSWANA--Johannesburg, 2 Jan (SAPA)--Almost the entire workforce of four Impala mines in Bophuthatswana failed to turn up for duty yesterday, according to a statement issued by the Gencor mining group today. The mines are Wildebeest North, Wildebeest South, Bafokeng North and Bafokeng South. The situation has been calm and orderly with a "few minor incidents" and no damage to property, the statement said. Discussions between management, employee representatives and senior members of the Bophuthatswana Government took place after the submission of a set of demands affecting both management/worker relationships and the Bophuthatswana Government. More than 50 percent of the workforce reported for duty today, the statement said. [Text] [Johannesburg SAPA in English 1125 GMT 2 Jan 86] /8309

CSO: 3400/813

SOUTH AFRICA

COMMENTARY URGES U.S. ASSISTANCE FOR UNITA

MB311111 Johannesburg International Service in English 0630 GMT 31 Dec 85

[Station commentary: "Angola and Southern Africa"]

[Text] The leader of the UNITA movement, Dr Jonas Savimbi, believes that events in Angola next year could determine whether all of southern Africa and central Africa fall under Soviet domination. Much will depend [on whether] the United States decides to provide aid to UNITA and to what extent.

Writing in POLICY REVIEW, the magazine of the Washington-based Heritage Foundation, Dr Savimbi says: Hesitation and refusal to aid UNITA in its fight against the Cubans and the Soviets will be taken as a signal by all the countries in the region that the United States has abandoned them to the Soviets. This can hardly be said to be exaggerating the situation. The vast amounts of sophisticated military hardware being shipped by the Soviets into Angola and the ever-increasing number of Cuban, Soviet, and other Communist troops and advisers in the country show that the Soviet Union has wider ambition than merely keeping the MPLA government in power.

The United States threw away one of its chances 10 years ago, when it pulled back, at the minute, from backing South Africa in helping UNITA and the FNLA to unseat the MPLA and to force elections in the country. The result is that the civil war in Angola is now more intense than ever before. In addition, southern Angola has become a base from which the SWAPO terrorists attack the people of South-West Africa Namibia in an effort to grab power in Windhoek in much the same way as the MPLA did in Luanda.

As Dr Savimbi says in his POLICY REVIEW article, not UNITA alone but all of central and southern Africa await the decision of the United States. With more military and political support, other nations will follow your lead and give us aid. The Americans again face a big decision on the Angolan situation. It boils down to whether or not they will they time [as printed] back pro-Western forces all the way or whether they will again stand back and hold the door open for the Soviets.

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CSO: 3400/812

SOUTH AFRICA

COMMENTARY SAYS UN FAVORS SOVIET, THIRD WORLD INTERESTS

MB030635 Johannesburg Domestic Service in English 0500 GMT 3 Jan 86

[Station commentary]

[Text] The United Nations has declared 1986 to be its year of peace. According to Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar this presents member-countries with a unique opportunity to make a real contribution to peace in the world. Presumably the irony is unintentional: Nevertheless the decision and the remark of the secretary-general are a curious commentary on how the majority of members of the world body have interpreted its mandate in the last few decades.

The United Nations was formed for the specific purpose of promoting peace in the world. That was intended to be the overriding preoccupation of its members, at all times throughout its existence--not just on specially selected occasions. It was certainly never foreseen that it would one day be necessary to declare a year of peace so that members might have a "unique" opportunity to take the founding Charter seriously.

Nowadays Dr De Cuellar prefers not to be explicit about why it has since become necessary. The care he takes not to antagonise the bloc that dominates the UN was reflected in his address to the closing session of the General Assembly. There had been no major breakthroughs on major political and economic problems during the year, was all he would say. He was more to the point when he presented his first annual report some years back, and warned members that they had strayed far from the path of the Charter.

A great deal has been said and written about the forces that drove the UN off that path. Their influence is seen in the refusal of the General Assembly to condemn Vietnam for its military occupation of Kampuchea, or the Soviet Union for its invasion of Afghanistan and the genocide still being practiced there. It is seen in the lip-service paid to condemning terrorism while the Palestine Liberation Organisation is granted special status in the General Assembly itself and the ANC is lauded and supported financially. It is perhaps most starkly evident in the plight of Africa, where three successful and three failed coups have taken place in the past year and seven civil wars and a border war are still in progress while the UN looks the other way--ostensibly because of an agreement with the OAU not to intervene unless invited by it.

The Soviet-Third World bloc has turned the United Nations into an instrument not for a disinterested striving for peace but for promoting its collective interests. UN peace-keeping forces do still operate, but only in areas where their presence serves the purpose of the dominant bloc or where it has no particular interest in the dispute. Any conflict situation that seems to be going its way is off-limits to the UN. On the other hand any potential conflict situation which it hopes to turn to its advantage becomes a big issue in the General Assembly--not to mediate a peaceful resolution but on the contrary, to vilify the selected opponent and generate hostile pressures against it worldwide. As the previous American ambassador, Mrs Jeane Kirkpatrick, said of the General Assembly: "Conflicts, rather than being resolved there, are in fact polarised, extended and exacerbated."

The composition of the United Nations, and the interests represented there, are not going to change in 1986. Global peace will be as elusive a goal this year as it has ever been.

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CSO: 3400/812

SOUTH AFRICA

CAPE COURT DISMISSES TEACHERS APPLICATION

MB032010 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1927 GMT 3 Jan 86

[Text] Cape Town, 3 Jan (SAPA)--A full bench of the Cape Supreme Court today dismissed with costs an urgent application by the Cape Teachers' Professional Association [CTPA] and 21 others aimed at allowing pupils and students to write supplementary examinations.

The applicants applied for relief against decisions prohibiting coloured pupils from standard six to nine and students at teachers training colleges who did not write examinations or did not complete examinations in 1985 from writing supplementary examinations.

The court was asked to direct the officials to allow pupils in standards six to nine in 95 affected schools in the Cape Peninsula and surrounding areas and students at 11 teachers training colleges to write supplementary examinations after they had undergone special tuition and to allow all candidates who wrote matric in 1985 to write supplementary examinations, whether they wrote examinations in 1985, or not.

Mr Justice M.R. de Kock, with Mr Justice W. Vivier and Mr Justice P.W.E. Baker concurring, ruled the court had no power to dictate to an administrative official as to the expediency or desirability of his decisions, unless these had been taken in bad faith, for ulterior motives or if the official could be proved not to have applied his mind to the matter at hand.

In judgment he said that 1985 had been a year of unprecedented turbulence, with widespread violence and unrest.

The applicants alleged these conditions had prevented the completion of education and the writing of examinations in conditions which would allow for a fair test of knowledge.

Evidence was that various requests to the authorities for internal examinations had been refused, except for concessions to matriculation pupils.

The applicants alleged the officials made a discriminatory and misdirected decision.

"The applicants are trying to procure just treatment for the pupils and to remove discrimination and the sense of grievance together with the danger that this sense of grievance could be exploited," he said.

He said there could be no denying the decision taken had resulted in great hardship for many students and said the court had sympathy for innocent victims who had been prevented from writing examinations through no fault of their own.

The applicants were the CTPA, represented by Mr Franklin Sonn, its president and rector of the Peninsula Technikon; Mr Randall Van den Heever, Mr Aaron Snyders, Mr Lionel Kearns and Mr Arthur Vergotine, all school principals, Miss Rochelle Strauss, a student teacher; Mr Antonio Alexander and Mr Roger Petersen, both standard 9 pupils; Miss Aida Southgate, a standard eight pupil; Professor Owen van den Berg, dean of the Faculty of Education at the University of the Western Cape and Mr David Alexander, Mr Stanford Southgate and Mr Edgar Petersen, all parents of pupils and student teachers.

The application was brought against decisions of Mr Carter Ebrahim, minister of education and culture in the House of Representatives, the director-general of Mr Ebrahim's department, Mr A.J. Arendse, and the joint matriculation board, although no order was sought against the board.

Mr Justice M.A. de Kock, Mr Justice P.W.E. Baker and Mr Justice W. Vivier were on the bench.

The deadline for coloured matriculation students to apply to write supplementaries has been extended to January 14, it was announced this week.

Pupils wishing to register must apply to the department.

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CSO: 3400/812

SOUTH AFRICA

JOURNALIST SPEAKS ABOUT WHITE LIBERAL INFLUENCE

MB031651 London BBC World Service in English 1309 GMT 3 Jan 86

[From the "24 Hours" program presented by Hugh Price-Jones]

[Text] In South Africa, the police have banned a memorial service for Mrs Molly Blackburn, the white antiapartheid activist who was killed in a car crash last week. Mrs Blackburn has already been buried, of necessity in a segregated churchyard, but her funeral showed people of all races mourning together, evidence of cooperation across the racial divide in anti-apartheid politics. But how acceptable are white liberals to black and colored activists in 1986? Are whites considered perhaps too privileged, too compromised by their color? Helen Viller is a journalist who follows the internal thinking of South Africa's political opposition, and she knew Molly Blackburn well. But I asked her if other white liberals, less well-known, were equally acceptable to black and colored anti-apartheid activists.

[Begin recording] [Viller] Molly Blackburn was in a very unusual position in South Africa. She was one of the very few whites with strong credibility in the black community, but at the same time she was also a woman of very strong liberal convictions. And this combination is somewhat unusual in South Africa. (?So it is) important to point out that the word liberal has become something of a political swearword on the left, and particularly among black activists. The [words indistinct] extends beyond regarding the word something as a swearword portraying the privileged white class who are avowedly antiapartheid but really ineffective and unable to ring fundamental change. It is at the same time somewhat patronizing and paternalistic toward blacks.

[Price-Jones] But what about the Progressive Federal Party [PFP], the constitutional white opposition? Is that considered to be at all credible by black and colored activists?

[Viller] Well, of course, Molly Blackburn was a provincial councillor representing the PFP. I don't think that one can make any blanket statement over the PFP as a whole. Individuals in the PFP (?seem) very accepted, like Molly Blackburn, like Di Bishop, but this tends to differ from individual to individual and that is because the PFP faces this very serious dual constituency problem in South Africa, and many of the members of the PFP have chosen different roles to play in the South African political context. But I think the PFP as a whole will be considered an ineffective grouping of white liberals by the bulk of black activists.

[Price-Jones] Is there an ideological stand among black thinking in particular that all whites are really in the same boat and that no help can be expected from any of them?

[Viller] Well, clearly there still is a very strong black consciousness position in South Africa, which is really built along the premise that blacks must do their own things and that when whites come in they tend to try and take the lead and take over. I think it is very interesting to see that in recent months we have had a lot involved in action in South Africa against the system of apartheid, that whites have tended to move in two different directions. I think the right wing has grown, but so have the number of people who have come out of their political holes and their noninvolved positions, and have raised their voices in opposition to the prevailing system. So this is very interesting to see how whites are reacting to the current set of circumstances in South Africa, with blacks actively rising up against the system here.

[Price-Jones] And you would argue that these whites who are moving in a more liberal direction find the welcoming arms of black and colored activists waiting there for them?

[Viller] I wouldn't say that. I wouldn't go as far as saying that, because I think that there is a very strong state of preconditions before people feel that they are able to make that sort of leap. You see, people who have taken charge of the progressive opposition in South Africa probably see South Africa's future to lie in some kind of socialist direction, and I think that that constituency is particularly small among the white community. [end recording]

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SOUTH AFRICA

BATTLE OF IDEAS BECOMING SHARPER

London THE AFRICAN COMMUNIST in English No 103 Fourth Quarter 1985 pp 45-62

Article by Nyawuza: "New 'Marxist' Tendencies and the Battle of Ideas in South Africa"

Text The ANC consultative conference held last June expelled a group which styled itself a "Marxist tendency within the ANC". They gave the impression that they were ANC members and yet they were suspended from ANC membership as far back as 1979.

When the ANC conference expelled this group it was not mincing words. It was stating quite clearly that if we cannot achieve a unity of ideas, let us achieve a demarcation of differences. This is all the more necessary because inside South Africa the battle of ideas is very sharp and becoming sharper.

In this article we shall examine some of the theories propounded inside and outside the country.

The Programme of the South African Communist Party adopted in 1962 advances the thesis of "Colonialism of a Special Type" and the two-stage revolution. In 1969 the Morogoro conference of the ANC adopted the Strategy and Tactics document which took some of the concepts of the Communist Party programme a stage further.

In the 1970s new "Marxist" ideas emerged in South Africa. These ideas originated mainly in the white student community and white intellectual circles. What were the reasons for this?

The banning of the Communist Party in 1950 and especially of the ANC in 1960 caused what Raymond Suttner calls a "rupture in the tradition of non-racial, democratic resistance to apartheid". Footnote 1 Suttner, R.: The Freedom Charter: The People's Charter in the Nineteen-Eighties; The Twenty-sixth T.B. Davie Memorial Lecture, delivered in the University of Cape Town on September 26th 1984, p.2.

He goes on to say that the period immediately after the Extension of University Education Act (in 1959), the enforcement of apartheid at universities, led to an "artificial prominence" of white liberals, especially students, in the forefront of the struggle against apartheid:

"Thus was" a period when (mainly white) liberal and university political activities achieved considerable prominence, more or less in isolation from blacks, but also, in a sense as surrogates for black opposition." [Footnote 2] [Ibid]

At the same time there emerged the black-consciousness movement which was violently "anti-white liberal". [Footnote 3] [Cf.: Biko, S: "I Write What I Like." A selection of his writings edited with a personal memoir by Aaelred Stubbs, C.R., London 1978. A critique of Steve Biko's theories has been made by Toussaint in "The African Communist," London, Nc 78 Third Quarter 1978.] This black consciousness was "unfortunately... a one-sided, partial recovery of the tradition (of the ANC and CP). Blackness tended to be asserted in a romantic manner, to the exclusion of the other components of the tradition. Alliance with white democrats, far from being considered politically necessary or important, was regarded as a dilution of what was now viewed as the struggle of the blacks alone. In addition, the oppression of blacks was treated primarily on the psychological, cultural and ideological levels. This in turn was linked to an organisational emphasis on consciousness-raising, mainly amongst intellectuals, rather than mass activity". [Footnote 4] [Suttner, R.: op. cit. p.3.]

What was the impact of this approach on the white radicals at the time? Graeme Bloch from Cape Town tells us:

"We could find no home, of course, within the black consciousness movement, and against B(lack) and C(consciousness) our class analysis provided easy answers (they were intellectuals cut off from the working class). Outside of B(lack) C(onsciousness), the trade unions presented the only real force amongst the people -- we could neither conceive of other forms of struggle, nor did they seem necessary. All these factors underlined our narrow understanding of where and how change could occur. Cape Town's Unity Movement tradition and its purist approach, added to this intellectual approach". [Footnote 5] [Bloch, G: "Ideology and National Democratic Struggle", in "Beyond Reform -- The Challenge of Change," Speeches presented at the NUSAS July Festival held at the University of Cape Town, July 1983, p.48]

If one takes into consideration that "by 1970 the 10 years of boom were over, South Africa was entering into a serious recession. By 1976 South Africa's economy was in total decline", [Footnote 6] [Webster, D: "Nature of the Crisis in South Africa, in Beyond Reform"... Ibid. p.9] it becomes obvious that these different problems and political tensions had economic and social roots.

This was the period of the 1973 Durban strikes and the Wages Commission excited some special interest and appeal amongst some white radicals. The re-emergence and rise of black, especially African, trade unionism on a scale hitherto unknown in South Africa seemed to vindicate the theories of these new "Marxists". The Soweto uprising of 1976 needs special mention in this regard -- amongst the whites it led to some soul-searching, to say the least.

What about the "external factors"? One of them is the growing influence, impact and attractiveness of the achievements of the socialist countries -- although these new "Marxists" would disagree on this point. But this to me seems to be a decisive objective factor -- despite the subjective feelings of these new "Marxists". The Independence of Angola and Mozambique had an electric effect on our people. The invasion of Angola by the racists in 1975/76 strengthened the conviction in our people of the correctness of the policy of the MPLA! I once asked some young Soweto students why they came to support the MPLA. They told me "we knew nothing about MPLA, nothing about Angola. But when we saw that the racists are supporting UNITA, we became convinced that the MPLA is the right organisation". Sechaba commented that:

"The revolutions in Angola and Mozambique teach us the simple lesson that in Africa there is a need to differentiate between formal independence and genuine independence." [Footnote 7] ["Sechaba", London, Third Quarter, Volume 12, 1976]

It should be remembered that Angola and Mozambique (before Nkomati) had a special appeal to those radicals as countries -- in Africa and specifically in Southern Africa -- which sought to combine Marxism-Leninism with African liberation.

The situation in Zimbabwe was a bit difficult for our people to assess. But it had its impact. Commenting on the Zimbabwe elections of 1980, Sechaba stated:

"The present campaign for the release of Nelson Mandela was initially a reaction to a call for a convention by two 'influential' Afrikaans newspapers following the overwhelming victory in the recent Zimbabwe elections of the Patriotic Front alliance. But these Afrikaans papers blundered. They misread the mood of the people.

"This is exactly what the Zimbabwean whites did. They misread black attitudes. And not only that. The Zimbabwean elections, against most white expectations, have shown that black leaders who are picked out by whites as suitable people to lead, will be politically destroyed by precisely that recognition and replaced by a people's choice. Zimbabwe has also shown the folly of believing that a white minority can enjoy power and privilege indefinitely at the cost of a black majority.

"These reasons perhaps explain why recently in the South African press there has been a consistent use of terms like true leaders or real leaders, recognised black leaders, right leaders or even authentic black leaders. Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela is one. This is the unique leadership role accorded him by our people." [Footnote 8] ["Sechaba," July issue, 1980, p.3]

In other words, the military and political defeat of Portuguese colonialism in Africa, the rise to power of socialist-oriented states in Angola and Mozambique were a source of inspiration not only to the oppressed and exploited masses but also to the white radicals. The economic

independence of these countries would enable them to give assistance to liberatory movements in Southern Africa -- ANC and SWAPO. The fall of the Smith regime in Zimbabwe and the escalating conflict in Namibia and South Africa inspired both the "Marxist" tendency and black consciousness. These are some of the factors (not forgetting the polarisation within the white community and "world" recession" which lie behind the emergence of these new "Marxist" theories in South Africa.

These forces -- in their own way -- were giving expression to the national and class struggle. It was all distorted and confused -- and confusing.

Sources of Inspiration

Antonio Gramsci is the most often cited authority -- Bloch says Gramsci is "someone who has become a bit of a craze in this part of Africa".
Footnote 9 [Bloch, G: op. cit. p.48] Althusser, Poulanzas and "also the West German State-derivation theorists" Footnote 9 [Bloch, G: op.cit.p.48] also feature in this list of sources of inspiration. Belinda Bozzoli complains of the "strong hold over radical scholarship in this country of an Althusserian and/or a structuralist method of analysis, at least until recently". Footnote 11 [Bozzoli: "History Workshop 2 -- Town and Countryside in the Transvaal -- Capitalist Production and Popular Response," Johannesburg, 1983, p.2] There were also influences from South African academics in Britain. Bloch tells us the whole story, not without self-criticism:

"Legassick and Wolpe had been mounting a successful attack on the liberal school of South African analysis and challenged the notion that race could provide explanations for South African analysis and challenged the notion that race could provide explanations for South Africa's historical development. Against this, they posed an analysis that stressed class, and the use of race by capitalism as a divisive and mystifying tool against the exploited workers. This view came through in our SSD Footnote 12 [The SSD (Students for Social Democracy) was a student movement formed by white radical students who feared that NUSAS, a white student body, was becoming more right wing.] programme -- we didn't mind struggles against racial discrimination, but what we actually wanted was real change. Behind South Africa's apartheid system lurked simply and unproblematically the real struggle over the country's resources. Most of our theoretical training was developed using the abstract concepts of Western Marxism unquestioningly imposed on to South Africa's reality. If capitalism was the problem, the answer followed naturally: the workers, the proletarian struggle". Footnote 13 [Bloch, G: op.cit.] (Emphasis added.)

The question arises: why should "Marxist" theories today be "popular" or "widespread" amongst the affluent, white academic and student circles in South Africa? To explain this phenomenon we shall take Belinda Bozzoli as an example. She is one of these new "Marxists". Recently I glanced through her book, The Political Nature of a Ruling Class: Capital and Ideology in South Africa 1980-1933. This was her Ph.D. thesis at Sussex University.

In her preface she thanks more than 20 people who helped her in her research, "Marxist" orientation, understanding and outlook. She praises "Martin Legassick's wide-ranging understanding of both Marxist studies and Southern African history (which) were always something of an inspiration", and says "Stanley Trapido taught me a great deal about historical materialism, perhaps often without realising it."

She also thanks two African women, Lizzie Mthembu and Florence Zikabla, "for their generous help with caring for Gareth and Jessica".

This is not to suggest that the "example" of Belinda Bozzoli is a prototype of these new "Marxists" but it tells us a lot about the role assigned to African women. These "Marxists" talk "on behalf" of the black working class; but their relationship to the black workers is suspect. Recently one of them in Britain was talking to an ANC activist, a former black consciousness leader. This "Marxist" started telling the ANC activist about how much contact he had with black consciousness leaders in Durban. He mentioned a long list. Little did he know that he was talking to one of the people he mentioned who was now using a different name!

These examples reflect the attitudes of the new "Marxists" towards the conventional ruling-class ideology and outlook, and also their insensitivity towards the national question about which in their writings "there is a deafening silence". [Footnote 15] ["Colonialism of a Special Kind... op.cit.p.76] This insensitivity was one of the reasons which made the black consciousness people wary of the whites -- whoever they were and irrespective of their political persuasions. The situation has changed now -- some of the architects and propounders of black consciousness are with the United Democratic Front (UDF) advocating non-racial policies while others have gone in the opposite direction: during the recent Kennedy visit to South Africa, it was difficult to differentiate between the apartheid propaganda and the propaganda of AZAPO, a prominent if not predominant "affiliate" of the National Forum.

National Forum

The National Forum is a conglomeration of people with various and at times divergent politics: what unites them is their opposition to the Freedom Charter and the UDF. [Footnote 16] [Cf. Nyawuza: "The National Question and Ethnicity -- The Case of the United Democratic Front and the National Forum," in The African Communist, No 98, Third Quarter 1984] One of the "shining stars" in the National Forum is Neville Alexander, who did his Ph.D. in West Germany in 1958-61 [Footnote 17] [Alexander, N.: Unpublished interview with ISSA, Bonn, August 1984 (in German)] and became involved in the student politics of that country, especially in the SDS in Tübingen and Frankfurt. This was the period of the Algerian revolution, the banning of the ANC and the formation of its military wing Umkhonto we Sizwe. Note that Alexander was not involved at that time in the politics of South Africa, though we do not hold that against him.

In July 1961 he returned to South Africa where he became a member of the National Liberation Front, "the continuation of the Yu Chi Chan Club". [Footnote 18] [Nyawuza: op.cit] He was imprisoned for ten years on Robben Island, released in 1974 and restricted -- the ban expired in 1979. He still has very "good contacts" in West Germany which he visits often.

This record in itself is not a bad one. What puzzles us is that the "Marxist" Neville Alexander does not seem to have much contact with the workers and workers' organisations in West Germany, though he enjoys the support of the ruling circles. The West German government -- through its ambassador in South Africa -- intervened on his behalf when South Africa refused him a passport to go to West Germany. He got it!

The theories of the new "Marxist" are not always derived from the study of Marxist-Leninist texts or documents of the Comintern and the international communist and workers' movement on the national and colonial question and national liberation movements. In South Africa it may be difficult to come across these. The new "Marxists" seem to depend much more on "Marxist" literature published in the West.

When it comes to theories of the new "Marxists" it becomes clear that we are dealing with a clearly worked-out "school of thought" or ideology. The new "Marxists" are not unanimous even in their criticism of the thesis of colonialism of a special type. They talk about "racial capitalism", a term which has been used in a variety of ways. Some people say "racial capitalism", a term which has been used in a variety of ways. Some people say "racial capitalism" has been developed in opposition to the "crude versions" of Black Consciousness which insist that class exploitation is irrelevant in South Africa and also in opposition to sectarian ultra-left positions which regard racial oppression as equally irrelevant. [Footnote 19] ["National Democratic Struggle -- A Struggle Against Colonialism," in Social Review, Cape Town, April 1984, p.9]

The problem seems to be broader and more serious than that: there is an attempt to pose "racial capitalism" as an alternative if not antidote to the Freedom Charter and the thesis of colonialism of a special type (CST). Stephen Gelb is quite open about this:

"Having derived the above critique of CST in relation to both its analytical approach and its strategic implications, it seems incumbent on me to ...offer an alternative conception which might be able to avoid the different problems I have argued characterise CST..."

"It seems to me that 'racial capitalism'...might be able to serve as such an alternative conception". [Footnote 20] [Gelb, S.: "Some Socio-logical Perspectives on Race, Class and Democracy in South Africa (unpublished) p.15]

If one considers that the programme of the National Forum uses the term "racial capitalism" to characterise South Africa and goes further to state that the Forum is fighting for the "establishment of a democratic anti-racist worker Republic in Azania" and that the black workers "alone can end the system as it stands today because they alone have nothing at all to lose", [Footnote 21] [Cf "National Forum," published by the National Forum committee, Johannesburg, 1983] then the implications become more serious.

In his book "One Azania, One Nation", [Footnote 22] [No Sizwe: "One Azania, One Nation", London, 1979] No Sizwe goes so far as to oppose the use of the term "race" altogether preferring the term "colour caste". He accuses the Communist Party programme of "pluralism". No Sizwe draws a parallel between our movement's position and the policy of apartheid. No Sizwe maintains that the ANC and CP, by adopting a position of recognising various national groups, reflect a class position other than that of the working class.

No Sizwe's accusation that the movement has produced a theory similar to that of the "pluralists" is false. The charge that the recognition of different national groups, each characterised by conditions specific to it at economic, political and ideological levels amounts to "pluralism" and by implication liberalism, shows how far removed No Sizwe is from South African reality. His rejection of the concept of race and by implication racism is indicative of the world he lives in -- far from South African reality.

Colonialism of a Special Type

The real (that is, the objective as distinct from the subjective) aim of these new "Marxists" is to reject the two-stage theory of our revolution. To do this successfully, they have to question the validity of the thesis of "colonialism of a special type" and then proceed to demolish the national-democratic stage thesis and question the role and genuineness of the non-proletarian forces in the struggle. They want to change the orientation and language of our movement and all that we stand for.

Several years ago four of these new "Marxists" -- Martin Legassick, Rob Peterson, David Hemson and Paula Ensor -- joined the ANC and SACTU in London. They became more active in SACTU and usurped SACTU's official organ "Worker's Unity" which overnight became their mouthpiece. Some of these people left the country years ago and after studying in the US became "heavy intellectuals" in Britain. Others were involved in the formation of black trade unions in 1973 -- in the Wages Commission and the Durban strikes.

Because they began to advocate policies which were in conflict with those of the liberation movement employing them, the movement took steps to stop their undermining activities. They were removed from SACTU and the ANC, but constituted themselves into a "faction" outside our ranks

and published a quarterly called "Inqaba yaba Sebenzi (Workers' Fortress) with the misleading subtitle: "Marxist Workers' Tendency of the African National Congress".

Their ideas were conceptualised in programmatic form: "South Africa's Impending Socialist Revolution" again with the misleading subtitle: "Perspective of the Marxist Workers' Tendency of the African National Congress". [Footnote 23] ["South Africa's Impending Socialist Revolution -- Perspective of the Marxist Workers' Tendency of the African National Congress." An Inqaba Publication, London, 1982] It is obvious that they joined the ANC for no other reason than to gain "acceptability" and/or "respectability" for their ideas which have nothing to do with the ANC. That is why they continued to use the ANC "tag" even when they had been suspended from the ANC.

Their programme is full of flaws, innuendos, lies and distortions. But for the purposes of our discussion I shall deal with only a few of these:

On the ANC they have this to say:

"A careful consideration of the policies put forward by the ANC leadership indicates that they have not adequately come to grips with the objective character of the South African revolution and do not put forward the tasks of overthrowing the bourgeoisie. [Footnote 24] [Ibid p.150]

And on the SACP, they say:

"A major influence in this regard has been the erroneous approach of the leadership of the SACP. The programme of the Communist party, adopted in 1962 and still its programme today, shows how deeply rooted the CP leadership has remained in the ideas of two stages, despite all experience".

Then they give advice to the "rank and filers" within the CP:

"Comrades in the SACP ought to draw these questions to the attention of their fellows and insist on clarification from the Party leadership. So far the leadership has shown itself completely unwilling to break with the two-stage theory and all its implications, because they have remained cemented within the international tradition of Stalinism. This is a problem which the rank and file of the SACP will find themselves increasingly having to confront".

And then they lecture, of all people, Nelson Mandela who should be lecturing to them:

"It will be vital for him, as it is vital for all ANC leaders, to 'openly proclaim a programme of proletarian revolution as the only basis on which the demands in the Freedom Charter can be carried through'". (Emphasis added)

The arrogance and ignorance revealed in these few quotations are beyond description. The programme and policies of our movement were discussed, debated and adopted by thousands of our people -- and are being followed by them. Some of our people have been arrested and hanged for their activities in implementing these policies and programmes. Yet these policies and programmes, tried and tested by history, are now reduced to "problems of the leadership" of the ANC and SACP. The "rank and filers" are charged with the task of "forcing" our leadership to change its policies -- and not to fight the regime so that we can liberate ourselves.

The recent ANC conference expelled this "Marxist" tendency. Let us hope that they will now stop their parasitic and dishonest attempt to exploit the reputation and prestige of the ANC to further their own aims.

National and Class Struggle

These people who are against the two-stage theory seem to see national and class struggle taking place "co-terminously" and by implication so interlinked that it is difficult to differentiate the one from the other. There are also those who see national liberation as an "aspect" of the socialist revolution -- the socialist revolution will "sort out" the national question. In fact, some of these new "Marxists" see the socialist revolution as the "opposite" of the national struggle; while some see national oppression as only one of the many evils such as sexism, Bantu Education, housing, mass media etc. This "equality", "parity", or "equation" of these evils is misleading because the national question therefore becomes "marginalised", that is as opposed to the "real oppression" which is regarded as "class exploitation". The national liberation movement becomes trivialised.

This brings me to the question of what we understand by colonialism of a special type and the two-stage theory.

It was Lenin who said at the Second Congress of the Comintern in 1920 that "The cardinal idea underlying our theses" was "the distinction between oppressed and oppressor nations. Unlike the Second International, we emphasise this distinction". [Footnote 25] [Lenin, V.I.: "Collected Works", Vol 31, Moscow 1966 p.240]

And this is exactly what the 1962 Communist Party Programme did. In the context of South African reality this means in South Africa there are two major contenders, two major social poles: the forces of oppression and the forces of revolution. The situation in our country resembles that in a colonised country with the difference/distinction that the coloniser and the colonised are located within the same territory and participate in the same economy.

There is (and always will be) a need to emphasise the colonial aspect of our situation. This is all the more so because since 1652 "when the colonialists first invaded our country, South Africa has never been decolonised". Botha and others are "the direct descendants of their colonial predecessors". [Footnote 26] [Sechaba Third Quarter 1978 p.47]

But we stress that the white minority and the black majority are not two classes. There are class differences and struggles within both camps. Within the white society these classes struggle around the issue of how best to preserve the status quo -- how best to maintain the colonial oppression of the black majority.

Black Class Divisions

Within the black community there are also classes and class struggles, but all these classes are affected by colonial oppression -- true, in different degrees, some more severely than others. But all of them have a real interest in putting an end to colonial oppression. This explains our insistence on the unity of the oppressed and on the national democratic revolution as the immediate goal and necessary stage. To do otherwise would be to split our forces. But we are not vague about this. We insist that the black working class or the black workers are the most consistent class in this struggle for a national democratic state -- hence their leading role in this struggle for national liberation.

Having said this, we should not forget that although "we have divided" South Africa into coloniser and colonised, there are people -- individuals and not classes -- who cross over to join the other camp. (Their numbers are dependent on the strength, impact and future prospects for winning of the contending forces). We have in mind the white democrats and revolutionaries who, by joining hands with the Blacks, have made the cause of the Blacks their own and have contributed tremendously to the struggle. Although their numbers are not large, they are increasing. There are also Blacks, the sell-outs, who identify with the white rulers. In some cases these black sell-outs outshine the racists in their brutality: the Ciskei is a case in point. But it is clear that the stronger we are on the ground, the closer we come to the seizure of power, the more we intensify the struggle against the "real enemy", the better shall we be able to deal with these "lost souls" -- including the new "Marxists".

This concept of the coloniser and the colonised also helps us to explain the historical development and nature of our national oppression in South Africa. This is connected with another equally important question of the need to emphasise the unbroken record and militant tradition of resistance to colonialism -- a struggle which began with colonialism itself and was fought at different times, by all the African people. We must encourage a sense of pride in the militant, centuries-old traditions of anti-colonial resistance among our people: a tradition which finds expression today in the ANC, CP, SACTU and Umkhonto we Sizwe. So as not to be misunderstood, we are not suggesting that we must live by the glories of the past: we live by our daily achievements. To put this differently, the future of our revolution and movement does not depend on abstract hopes and wishes -- our ideals and aspirations will become a reality as a result of our actions and thinking today and here. But part of that is the inspiration and lessons we draw from our predecessors.

The emphasis on national oppression also helps to explain and clarify the political character of our struggle which is a national liberation struggle and not a civil rights struggle.

Capitalism and National Oppression

The discovery of diamonds and gold in the last third of the 19th century introduced capitalism in our country. This was "deformed" and "distorted" capitalism -- hence the "deformed" and "distorted" class structure. Capitalism in South Africa -- like in all colonies -- was not a result of internal developments or a bourgeois revolution against feudalism, as was the case in Europe. Capitalism was "imposed" on South Africa during the era of imperialism. Hence the deformity and distortion. This explains the emergence in 1910 of colonialism of a special type; this explains why South Africa has a two-faced state structure: a "democratic" face for the Whites and a neo-fascist one for the Blacks. The "two faces" operate within the same country and territory. In a different context Bloch makes the point:

"Matanzima and Sebe may make the fact of oppression by blacks more visible -- they have not made whites carry passes". Footnote 27
Bloch, G: op.cit. p.50

In South Africa we are involved in a national liberation struggle because the black majority -- that is African, Coloured and Indian -- have yet to gain national independence or self-determination, that is democratic control over their own lives. Our struggle is not a civil rights struggle; it is not a struggle for gradual assimilation of the black majority into the white society. It is a struggle for the transformation of the whole society: the struggle for national liberation remains at the centre of our agenda.

By national liberation struggle we mean a struggle that incorporates all our people, all over the country. In the light of the regime's attempt to divide the country into so-called bantustans, "nations" or "group areas", this aspect is particularly important. It is connected with the demand for a single and unfragmented South Africa.

The new state we are struggling to build will encompass and unite with a single loyalty all our people but at the same time be predominantly African. We hope by then we will all call ourselves Africans, not just South Africans. But even if we all call ourselves Africans, that will not mean that the different cultures and languages will disappear. We shall develop them all in the letter and spirit of the Freedom Charter.

What is the role of the national liberation movement in this process? If at the beginning of this century the central issue was to transcend "tribal" divisions amongst Africans, the 1920's saw the emergence of the African working-class as an independent force, organised in the ICU and other trade unions.

The question of national and class struggle became clearer than before. It is not surprising that the Comintern suggested the slogan of an "independent Native South African Republic as a stage towards a workers' and peasants' republic, with full equal rights for all races" -- the two stage theory.

In the Communist Party there were stormy debates on the interpretation of this slogan. Footnote 28 For details see Bunting, B.: "Moses Kotane -- South African Revolutionary," London 1975, especially Chapter 2, "The National Question." See also Lerumo, A.: "Fifty Fighting Years," London, 1981, and Ginyibhulu Zha kaledusha, "National Question and Ethnic Processes," in African Communist, Fourth Quarter, 1979. In a sense today we are reliving that period, with the difference that then the debate was "within" the Party, more structured and disciplined -- discussing the interpretation of the slogan. But these new "Marxists" are not only outside the CP, they are challenging the two stage theory with the aim of "imposing" their adventurist ideas on the movement.

The ANC and the Party progressed and developed and in the 1950s the Congress Alliance introduced a new element and dimension in our thinking, namely inter-racial unity. Today we are all united under the umbrella of the ANC. This process, this unity in all its dimensions and implications is still being advanced in numerous discussions and debates.

The decision of the recent ANC conference to open ranks to all South African revolutionaries irrespective of race at all levels -- a decision which was long overdue if one considers that Umkhonto we Sizwe since its inception was open to all South Africans -- raised this question of unity in action and interracial unity to a higher level.

This achievement of our unity has been a remarkable success. It has changed the ANC and CP in both their social composition, leadership and outlook. But the strategic goal -- the liberation of the African people and other nationally oppressed Blacks -- remains the same.

But these successes and achievements should be no reason for complacency. The enemy is trying to split this unity: by co-opting sections of the black community, the Coloured, Indians and sections of the African population in the urban areas and the Bantustans. By the way, the bantustans which are meant for Africans, affect the whites as well. David Webster makes the point that the inflated salary of Matanzima -- the most highly paid politician in South Africa -- is not unconnected with the fact that 75 percent of the Transkei budget consists of a grant from South Africa.

"So taxpayers like myself end up paying Matanzima's salary". Footnote 29 Webster, D: op.cit. p.127 This is one instance which shows the validity of Marx's comment that a nation that oppresses others forges its own chains.

All this and much more poses a challenge to us to strengthen and articulate our inter-class unity. Does this not negate the concept of working-class leadership?

Working-Class Leadership

A discussion on the leading role of the working class would be incomplete if we did not say a word or two about the "workerists". [Footnote 30] Toussaint analyses this trend in his article, "A Trade Union is not a Political Party," in The African Communist, No 93, Second Quarter, 1983.] These are people who advocate "workers' control" over production as the main objective of working-class organisation and maintain that the hope of achieving this objective raises working-class consciousness. For the "workerists" capitalist society is characterised by a basic contradiction between capital and labour based on the fact that the wealth produced by the class of non-owners of the means of production is appropriated by the class of owners. This places these two classes in an antagonistic relationship in which the class interests of the one can only be realised at the expense of the other. "Workerists" see this contradiction as the primary one in a capitalist society and locate it most explicitly at the point of production. It is there that an "undiluted" relationship of exchange exists, yielding a surplus which accrues to the capitalists by virtue of their ownership of the means of production.

There are problems with this position, but let us hear what other workers have to say about it. Sisa Njikelana, Secretary-General of SAAWU, replies:

"It seems that there is a tendency to conflate the definition of the working class as a class with that of trade union membership and hence to see trade unions as the only true form of a working class organisation. This tendency emphasises the distinction between the trade unions which are characterised as single class organisations and other organisations and hence not working-class organisations ... This implied claim by certain trade union leadership to special status within multi-class organisation needs to be carefully examined.

"It is questionable whether trade unions, with their accepted ambiguities, will represent the interests of the working class any better or more thoroughly than community organisations based within the residential areas of the same workers who are members of the trade unions. To conflate the working class with union membership is to confine the membership of the working class to union membership only, to the exclusion of dependants (husbands, wives, elderly parents and children) of those union members. Non-unionised workers and the unemployed constitute a vast portion of the working class. The community, women's, student, youth and other organisations based within class communities, are also in a position to express the views of the working class and are also legitimate organisations of the working class.

"The distinction between trade union struggles and struggles engaged in by other mass-based organisations has tended to be exaggerated in an attempt to show that the economic struggles waged by the unions are far more real and working class in nature than other mass based struggles". [Footnote 31] [Lenin, V.I.: op. cit. p.244]

On this question of "workerism" it is important to note Lenin's remark: "Whoever expects a pure social revolution will never live to see it".

We need to clarify our minds on some of the concepts we use perhaps unwittingly. This refers to concepts such as "internal colonialism". The concept of "colonialism of a special type" has different premises from "internal" or "domestic" colonialism. Whereas the latter refers to the relationship between "white South Africa" and the reserves, "internal colonialism". The concept of "colonialism of a special type" has different premises from "internal" or "domestic" colonialism. Whereas the latter refers to the relationship between "white South Africa" and the reserves, "colonialism of a special type" has implications for the whole of South Africa including the bantustans. This is not juggling with words: we have to establish a demarcation line between ourselves and the Gwendolyn Carters -- even in the field of terminology.

Danger of Sectarianism

The problem with people advocating "socialism now" is that they expect those Blacks who cannot read or write to run socialist industries and mines. The danger here is that we can easily find ourselves depending on the expertise of the very forces we want to defeat: people who are against our socialist principles. The result would be an economic crisis. And the people will not only be against the new government but against "socialism" in general because they will see their problems as caused by the socialism we have declared.

Lenin says:

"Not only should we create independent contingents of fighters and party organisations in the colonies and the backward countries, not only at once launch propaganda for the organisation of peasants' Soviets and strive to adapt them to the pre-capitalist conditions, but the Communist International should advance the proposition, with the appropriate grounding that with the aid of the proletariat of the advanced countries backward countries can go over to the soviet system and through certain stages of development, to communism, without having to pass through the capitalist stage." [Footnote 32] [Lenin, V.I.: op.cit, p.12]

It is important to examine the theory of "colonialism of a special type" in the light of Lenin's advice. But before we do that let us remark that Lenin was talking of "backward countries" by which he meant "colonial countries" which would be what we today call "former colonial countries", "developing countries" or "underdeveloped countries". Yet the Party Programme characterises South Africa as a country which has both "all

the features of a colony" and "all the features of an advanced capitalist state in its final stage of imperialism". It could be argued that Lenin was referring to countries with "pre-capitalist conditions", countries that "can go over to the soviet system and through certain stages of development, to Communism, without having to pass through the capitalist stage" and this problem does not confront us in South Africa since capitalism exists there.

The Communist Party Programme is unambiguous on this question since it envisages the national democratic stage as a stage towards socialism. Starting from the correct premise of identifying the main contradiction as that between the interests of the racist and colonial forces on the one hand and those of the Black masses on the other, it takes the reality of South Africa into account. We are not "excited" by the economic and industrial development at the expense of subjective factors and we determine our strategy accordingly. Our struggle is for the seizure of political power precisely because we want to solve the class and national question. This presupposes the destruction of the present system and that lays a basis for the implementation of our ideals.

But we should move away from such superficial and not well-thought-out formulations as that the national democratic stage will be a "short phase", a "formality" or an "unnecessary bother". We need to grapple with the implications of this process -- the national democratic revolution -- more so that the revolutions in Africa, Zimbabwe lately, do indicate that this process has a momentum of its own, perhaps even stages one has to go through before it is possible to talk of transition to socialism. Perhaps we need a re-look at the suggestion of the Comintern about "An independent Native Republic as a stage towards a workers' and peasants' republic with full and equal rights for all races". Incidentally, a workers' and peasants' republic is not the same thing as a "socialist republic" -- it is a stage towards socialism and therefore the Comintern seems to have had in mind a number of stages in the revolution. This is not to suggest that our theories of a two-stage revolution are wrong -- even the first stage might have to be divided into phases. We need to guard against the simplification of complicated processes.

Even the question of the essence of the democratic and revolutionary content of African nationalism and its relations with the ethno-cultural groups to one or other of which South Africans of all nationalities belong needs to be clarified. This problem never faced the revolutionary movements in Kenya, Tanzania or even Zimbabwe for the simple reason that the Indian or Coloured communities in those countries never participated in a meaningful way in the African struggle for independence, though individuals of all minority groups did so. In South Africa, however, the situation is different -- the contribution of the minority national groups to the liberation struggle of the African majority has been significant.

This question becomes more urgent now that the ANC has assumed the responsibility of being the leader not only of the Africans but also of all the oppressed and democratic forces. The ANC has truly become a national

organisation, that is, an organisation of like-minded people, united by their hatred of colonialism, racism, exploitation and national degradation, sharing a common goal -- and whose activities consist in propagating its ideas amongst the people and fighting in a constituency which it itself defines.

If there are any contradictions in the Freedom Charter (as some people suggest) this is a reflection of the simple fact that our struggle is complex and this should be all the more reason why we should work for it. We are involving the working class in its implementation because we want to strengthen the working-class forces and their positions in the national democratic revolution: and this is what we understand by working-class leadership (as opposed to working-class leadership exercised from university libraries).

The black working class cannot afford the luxury of standing aloof from or outside the on-going struggles of the people, making demands about a future, "glorious" socialist revolution when everybody including the petty bourgeoisie is fighting for national liberation. Who can doubt that Bishop Tutu -- with all his inconsistency -- is fighting for national liberation? Ironically the outcome, the direction of our national liberation struggle, will depend on the extent of the participation of the working class -- a fact which testifies to the dangers of sectarianism. It is important to remind these super-revolutionaries that our people are more concerned with the question of class domination rather than their pet subjects such as the "state apparatus". This is because the class struggle reinforces the national liberation struggle and the national liberation struggle weakens class domination. The national question cannot be equated with the class question and therefore class struggle is not identical with the national liberation struggle. True, the two are interlinked and overlap but they are not identical.

Lenin and the Freedom Charter

The Freedom Charter talks about complicated concepts such as "equality". How do we achieve equality between Blacks and Whites -- Blacks, especially Africans, who have been disadvantaged for more than three centuries?

Lenin has advised us that internationalism, that is from the point of view of the oppressor nations or "great nations" which are great only in their violence and as bullies (these are all Lenin's words and can be applied to the whites in South Africa):

"must consist not only in the observance of the formal equality of nations but even in an inequality of the oppressor nation, the great nation, that must make up for the inequality which obtains in actual practice."

Some people call this "positive discrimination". What this means is that during the implementation of the Freedom Charter we shall have to "arrest" -- I might be using a wrong word -- the development of the whites in favour of the development of the Blacks. This is nothing new.

It was done in the Soviet Union. It worked. And the Russian people are very proud to have contributed to the development of the Asian Republics in the Soviet Union. The essence of Leninism here is the question of "aid" from the proletariat of the "advanced nations" to the "weaker nations". If we maintain -- as we do -- that "Black South Africa" is a colony of "White South Africa" surely one of these "advanced countries" Lenin is talking about is "White South Africa". And since the white workers are not aware of their role -- even on this question -- our national liberation movement must assume responsibility. And the opening of ranks within the ANC will show the white workers that they have a role to play in this mammoth task.

The Battle Will Not Be Won In Libraries

The problem with these new "Marxists" is that they are afraid of the nationalism of the oppressed which seems to be "obscure" to them -- they just do not understand it. And yet this nationalism of the oppressed is nothing but an ideology reflecting an unsolved national question. These new "Marxists" who have read much about the suffering of the people are reluctant to learn from the very people they are theorising about: people who have not read all those books in the libraries but know oppression and exploitation from personal experience. The new "Marxists" seem to have a distaste for the hard-slooging day-to-day explanation and mobilisation of the people on bread and butter issues. There is a lot that is assumed without being worked for, for example, working-class leadership. This is a refusal to move from abstract theory or abstract intellectualism to concrete and living reality.

One thing is clear. If these new "Marxists" do not want to learn that the national liberation struggle is a priority at this stage, they should understand that the struggle against colonialism, national oppression and capitalism in our country will not be won in libraries. True, libraries are important but not decisive battlegrounds; safer and not dangerous; but this is definitely not where the struggle for the seizure of political power will be won.

FOOTNOTES

Footnotes as numbered⁷

10. "Colonialism of a Special Kind and the South African State: A consideration of recent articles in Africa Perspective, Johannesburg, No 23, 1983, p 76.
14. Bozzoli, B: op. cit.
33. Lenin, V.I.: "The National Liberation Movement in the East", Moscow 1976, p 321.

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SOUTH AFRICA

SHIFTING PATTERNS IN APARTHEID ALLIANCE DUE TO PRESSURES

London THE AFRICAN COMMUNIST in English No 103 Fourth Quarter 1985 pp 84-93

Article by T. Halloran: "White Power Begins to Crumble: Shifting Patterns in the Apartheid Alliance"]

Text Like a recurrent nightmare, the cycle of racist violence and repression which, a quarter-century ago, helped convince the leaders of the national liberation movement of the need to take up arms, seems to be repeating itself. Thus the bannings and mass arrests of Communists and Congressives of the 1960's find their echo today in mass arrests and the trials of the leadership of the United Democratic Front. The murderous volleys fired at Sharpeville on March 21, 1960, rang out again at Langa on March 21, 1985, followed by another state of emergency.

This phenomenon of the apparent self-repetition of historical events is, of course, one which Marx took note of in the Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte:

"The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. And just when they seem engaged in revolutionising themselves and things, in creating something entirely new, precisely in such periods of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service and borrow from them names, battle slogans and costumes in order to present the new scene of world history in this time-honoured disguise and this borrowed language." (Footnote 1) (Marx-Engels "Collected Works", vol 2, Lawrence and Wishart, London 1979, pp 103-104")

Marx's aim in this passage is not simply to affirm or deny the recurrence of historical events. He is making the far more subtle point that, in all events of genuinely revolutionary significance, there is a deep blending of old and new elements; that it is the task of an historical materialist analysis to discover what has really changed and why. It is in this spirit that the current state of affairs in the White South African class alliance, and its complex relations with international capitalism, require to be understood.

The truth that, at a fundamental and infrastructural level, nothing has changed, must not be allowed to obscure another truth, namely, that at a more superficial and superstructural level there has been a significant transformation in the pattern or surface-structure of the class-alliance administering apartheid in the interests of White South Africans in general and large-scale capital in particular.

As a system apartheid -- colonialism of a special type as analysed in our Party programme -- predates the political party which gave it its name, and has undergone various modifications before and since the 1948 election which put the Nationalists in power. It has, however, always served and still serves the interests of White capitalism. Its chief function was and is to guarantee White-owned industry and commerce the flow of cheap Black labour on which profits mainly depend while denying the Black majority access to the power-structures on whose strength the system depends. The massive repression needed to achieve this made the White class alliance necessary. But the arrangement of class forces has not remained constant, varying in response to economic and political pressures, themselves the result of the development of basic productive forces. Thus the dominance of the English-speaking minority over the Afrikaner majority among the Whites in the spheres of finance and industry has been diminished in recent decades by the intrusion of Afrikaner interests. Volkskas now competes, though still unequally, with Barclays and Standard Bank, as Nasionale Mynbou does with Anglo-American and De Beers.

With the migration of rural Afrikaners to the cities in the 1930's the composition of the White working class was significantly altered. Malan's accession to power in 1948 ushered in a period when Afrikaner farmers and workers gained a dominant voice (in Parliament at least) over the political representatives of English-owned capital. Until the close of the 60's, the hegemony of the White alliance seemed to depend on two factors which were really changeable features of its altering structure. The first of these factors was the continuity of the Westminster-style Parliament, chief political instrument of overall White domination. The other was the culturo-political unity of the Afrikaner "volk", main guarantee of the National Party's dominance within the parliamentary system. The effective operation of the parliamentary system depended on a set of unwritten understandings between Government and Opposition which would survive public displays of hostility in the Assembly, Senate and on election platforms. This was the way the British system had worked, and Afrikaners, having themselves been victims of British imperialism, understood it well.

Roughly speaking, the "gentlemen's agreement" was that, differ as they might on issues of policy, neither side would deviate from the principle of White domination, whether it chose to call this "baasskap", "apartheid", "separate development", "White leadership" or the preservation of Western civilisation". In the economic sphere the informal understanding was that both sides would defend the capitalist mode of production. As to

Afrikaner churches and such cultural and political organisations as the Broederbond, Die Afrikaanse Taal en Kultuurvereniging and Die Vroue Federasie.

New Forces

As far back as the Verwoerd era, however, forces were operative which would bring these two factors -- parliamentary cohesion and Afrikaner unity -- into contradiction. Verwoerdian "volkist" ideology spawned policies which made the economic plank of the unwritten contract difficult to maintain. The increasing isolation of South Africa, legislative curbs on the flow of migrant labour, the ban on the flow of capital investment into the so-called "homelands" were all perceived by the parliamentary representatives of finance and industry as inimical to their interest.

It was to offset these tensions that Verwoerd's more pragmatic successor, Vorster, embarked on his "outward" foreign policy, set about wooing the middle strata of the English-speaking bourgeoisie, and began tinkering with aspects of so-called "petty" apartheid. In fact it was precisely Vorster's anxiety to redress the international isolation of the apartheid regime which led to the information scandal that eventually toppled him, even from the protective heights of the State Presidency. Vorster's efforts to appease the English-speaking bourgeoisie had a dramatic counter-effect on Afrikaner unity and led, in 1969, to a split in the National Party when Vorster's former acolyte, Jaap Marais, and his Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, Hertzog, led a small group of Verwoerdian fanatics out of the party to form the Herstigte Nasionale Party.

These historical events are noted here for three reasons: firstly, because they explain the situation in the White power structure which faces us at present and were, in fact the harbingers of that situation. Secondly, because the challenge to authority presented by the activities of the African National Congress and the South African Communist Party made an important contribution to the undercurrent of events which brought that situation about. Finally, because the national liberation movement, owing to the repression it experienced in the 1960's and early 70's, had to expend the main stock of its physical and intellectual energies on the vital task of reorganisation and was not always able to give developments in enemy's camp the attention they merited. It should be remembered that it was during the period of Vorster's leadership that the campaign of destabilisation which preceded Nkomati was planned, or at least considered as an option.

The Split Deepens

Although the HNP's share of the poll decreased in every general election for a decade after its formation, it was not eradicated from political life. Moreover, factionalism continued to haunt the National Party in the form of a large group of Verwoerdian MPs, led by Andries Treurnicht, whose aspirations to seize the premiership were scarcely concealed.

Both the HNP and the Treurnichites were able to appeal to the racist phobias and economic discontents of the Afrikaner working class, small farmers, as well as some bureaucrats and intellectuals. The rightists also tried to siphon off support from the right wing of the United Party, whose collapse further complicated the functioning of the White Parliament. It was, however, pre-eminently the mass "Soweto usurge" of 1976 which, by forcing the Nationalists to seek a new constitutional mode of enforcing apartheid, intensified the contradictions within the White class alliance in general, and within Afrikanerdom in particular.

First evidences of the latter phenomenon were the results of the 1979 by-elections in the predominantly working class constituencies of Germiston, Tustenburg and Koedoespoort, in which the HNP polled some 40% of the votes cast. It was this resurgence of rightism which provoked P.W. Botha into calling an early general election in 1981. That decision proved mistaken. For, although the Nationalists won 131 of 165 contested seats and the HNP none, the latter increased its share of the total vote from 3.2% to 14.1% and attracted nearly double the 100,000 votes which it had itself predicted. By contrast, the Progressive Federal Party, although its parliamentary representation increased from 17 to 26 seats, increased its slice of the vote by only 2.3%, from 17.1% to 19.4%. These results signalled to the Treurnichites that the time was ripe for open revolt.

The split came on February 24, 1982, when 22 MPs refused to support a motion of confidence in Botha, then still Prime Minister, at a National Party parliamentary caucus. Six of these subsequently retracted, but the other 16 were expelled, and on March 2, Treurnicht announced the formation of the Conservative Party, which is now the third largest party in the White Assembly.

The relatively small number of Conservative Party MPs by no means reflects the importance of this event. It represented nothing less than the sundering of Afrikaner unity, a rent in a fabric of intimately interwoven cultural, religious, financial and political strands which Nationalist leaders from Gen Hertzog to Verwoerd had laboured to produce. Evidence that this claim is not exaggerated was provided last year by the defection of Treurnicht and his followers from the Broederbond and the formation of the rival Afrikaner Volkswag. There have also been bitter battles within the FAK for control of this cultural umbrella body's executive.

Botha and his backers themselves recognised the enormity of what had happened and set about frantically wooing the English-speaking bourgeoisie. This bore fruit in the White referendum of November 2, 1983, which gave Botha a "yes"-vote of 66.3% in favour of his new constitution. Analysis of these results shows clearly that, despite the Progressive Federal Party's opposition to the new constitution. English-speaking voters had given what was, perhaps, the largest endorsement ever of a Nationalist policy. In Durban and the Natal coastal region 123,783 or 73.6% of the voters said "yes". In Cape Town and the South-West Cape, 221,511 or 75.6% did the same, while in the Johannesburg-Vereeniging complex, the constitution

was endorsed by 194,396 or 69.4% of the voters. The one region where a decisive "no"-vote was recorded was in the CP and HNP stronghold of the Northern Transvaal. (Footnote 2) (Lemon A: "White Voters and Political Change in South Africa" 1981-1983, School of Geography, University of Oxford, 1984, p 34)

What all this tends to show is that, in the face of the destruction of that Afrikaner unity on which the National Party was founded, the Government has been forced to shift its power base, seeking legitimisation and active support for a new style of apartheid from the English bourgeois element in the White class alliance.

That sector of the bourgeois class -- English and Afrikaans-speaking -- who are now the Government's mainstay can be expected to use their influence to try to obtain the conditions of political stability which their business interests require and which they have long been demanding.

The present climate of mass resistance which threatens in the long term to erupt into outright civil war, the fact that the ANC's armed actions have not diminished as a result of the Nkomati pact, the threat of an intensification of these attacks -- all these things are, quite simply, extremely bad for profits. The South African economy has not seen worse days since the 1930's. This year opened with the rand trading at an all-time low of 49.52 United States cents, and a Barclays Bank economist predicts that it may sink far lower before climbing up again -- if it ever does. It is this climate which constitutes the real reason for the increasingly frequent signals from the enemy camp that talks with the ANC and the prospect of legalising it are on the agenda.

On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that the total percentage poll in the referendum was only 75.0% and that 700,000 Whites voted against Botha's constitution. The bulk of these were supporters of the CP and HNP versions of apartheid, although of course many voted "no" from more progressive motives. After the referendum, Treurnicht announced that he regarded the size of the negative vote as a good basis from which to work against the new constitution. Events have proved him correct. In the recent Primrose by-election, the Nationalist majority was slashed to under 1,000 votes -- a swing of 22% in the Treurnichites' favour. On some analyses of the result this would yield the Conservative Party about 40 Transvaal seats if a general election were to be held now.

In the face of such a threat, President Botha will consider and reconsider every concession he makes to his new constituents. It is wrong to think that undoubtedly extraordinary, almost dictatorial, powers the constitution has given the President and his security advisers make it safe for him to ignore altogether the wishes of the White electorate. To do so would be to invite a White civil war and Botha is not about to risk that. The fact that the new constitution is in force may well restrict the activities of the CP and its allies, but it by no means renders them impotent.

This crush of opposing influences explains both the hesitations and the attempts at innovation contained in Botha's opening speech to the allegedly tricameral "Parliament" on January 25, 1985. Of course the speech gave no indication of a preparedness to abandon apartheid, and in fact nothing has been said or done which basically undermines white domination.

Nonetheless, seen from the perspective of the White class alliance, Botha's announcement that he would negotiate property ownership, instead of merely leasehold rights, for those living in the townships who can afford such things, does represent a further step away from the Verwoerdian model of apartheid which has infuriated the Treurnichites and delighted the White "liberals". But even the latter feel some frustration at the hyper-caution of Botha's proposal to set up a non-statutory advisory "forum" to discuss an accommodation whereby Blacks living outside the "homelands" can be co-opted into the new version of the apartheid. The government will in no way be bound by the recommendations of this forum. Who will participate in such a forum? What credibility will it enjoy especially after the atrocities perpetrated during the emergency?

International Links

The class alliance through which Botha must now try to govern a population which is becoming increasingly ungovernable is itself subject to external pressures. Its chief component, the White bourgeoisie has, and has always had, interests which are inextricably bound up with those of international capitalism. It is a fact, too, that apartheid, in some or other guise, has always favoured the interests of the great financial conglomerates. The African subcontinent's vast mineral resources, to say nothing of the as yet unrealised potential of its agriculture and secondary industry, combined with the cheap labour apartheid ensures, made that inevitable. This is why the Reagan Administration and the Thatcher Government have connived at the South African regime's acts of banditry and terrorism on the sub-continent and its illegal occupation of Namibia. But this does not gainsay the fact that foreign capitalists have tended to prefer some versions of special colonialism to others, although their preferences have often been as variable as the instability of the markets they operate and they have not always agreed among themselves as to which form of racism to prefer. But all of them are terrified of the spectre of revolution.

For some years now the national liberation movement has experienced the negative effects of international capitalism's desperate attempts to retrieve the positions it lost to the forces of socialism and anti-imperialism during the 1960's and '70's and to resolve the contradictions flowing from its mode of production. Reagan's policy of "constructive engagement" with the apartheid regime and British Prime Minister Thatcher's reception of Botha last year are manifestations of this. More recently, however, there have been developments which may well indicate that a shift of attitude towards the apartheid regime is taking place, and that the capitalist component in the White South African class alliance is now coming under pressure from its international associates to produce a version of apartheid which would be not only better for business but also

easier to defend in international forums. The clearest indications of this are the campaign for disinvestment in the United States, the US Congress vote for sanctions, the UN call for voluntary sanctions, the anti-apartheid moves of France, Holland, New Zealand etc.

With billions of dollars at stake, leading figures among the White bourgeoisie in South Africa realise that they cannot rely on other foreign investors or on South African companies to fill the vacuum a widespread pull-out would create. They are aware too that the anti-South African campaign is snowballing out of control. These anxieties are being transmitted to White politicians in Government and Opposition. The degree of change they will generate in a new system, deeply (and with reason) uncertain of itself, is difficult to estimate. What is certain is that they will bring about some movement, if not away from the essentials of apartheid and special colonialism, at least towards modifications in the mode of its economic and political application. The billions of dollars which foreign corporations have in fixed investments in South Africa, not to mention what they offer in terms of technological and managerial skills, make the prospect of economic disengagement the most serious foreign policy issue immediately facing the apartheid regime.

It is the combination of all these factors which has led the regime, at the prompting of the White class alliance, to develop a two-pronged strategy towards the opposition at home and abroad. It is the old strategy of the carrot and the stick. The carrot is "reform", by which the regime hopes not only to disarm its critics abroad but also to win over to its side certain elements from the resistance at home. Centrepiece of this strategy is the bid to destroy the ANC. This again takes two forms. One is the intensification of persecution, with a multiplication of township massacres, treason trials and the branding of the most vociferous and active opponents as "communists" and "terrorists". The other side of the coin is the offer to talk to, and possibly even legalise, the ANC if it abjures violence; to release all political prisoners if they are prepared to sign on the dotted line.

Clearly a legal ANC, forswearing violence and revolution, would suit the White class alliance far better than an illegal one. Even the purblind politicians of the White establishment must realise that the banning of the ANC in 1960 has failed, as has the banning of the South African Communist Party in 1950. Despite a quarter-century of illegality and a repression of Hitlerite dimensions, the ANC is today more alive and influential among all communities than in the days of the Defiance Campaign. The question facing the White Establishment and its foreign allies is not whether the ANC should be legalised and negotiated with, but how and when this should happen, and how best to weaken, divide and strip the ANC of its principles in the interim. Realising that the illegality of the ANC is a relic of the Verwoerdian past, the more sophisticated of the enemy's agents in the intelligence bureaucracy have already set about planning means of neutralising it, ways of trying to segregate "communists" from "Africanists", Black from White, Coloured from Indian, ways of trying to foment discontent and mutiny among the combatants of Umkhonto we Sizwe.

Resistance Grows

The answer to the regime was given by the ANC's consultative conference in June, reflecting the growing unity among the forces of resistance throughout the country. The escalating confrontation and violence in South Africa was not of our seeking but has been forced on us by the intensification of repression. The ANC and the SACP adopted the methods of armed struggle as part of their revolutionary strategy, not because they were hypnotised by slogans about revolutions coming from the barrel of a gun, but because they wanted peace, non-racialism and an equal share for all in the country's prosperity, and because the illegality thrust upon them left them no other way of mobilising the masses to bring about the changes which were essential to achieve these objectives. To lay down weapons too soon and for the wrong reasons can be as dangerous to the cause of peace and liberation as taking them up too early or holding on to them too long. The winning of legality now and the release of our leaders would constitute a tremendous, unprecedented victory -- but if it were bought at the cost of our unity or our principles it would be a victory transformed into defeat.

What we have to hang on to now is the realisation that it is our resistance, our initiative and strength which have reduced the ranks of our enemy to disunity and confusion. The offers he is making, as well as the ferocity of his attacks, flow from his weakness and the disunity in the ranks of the White class alliance for which Botha speaks and acts. Never has the pessimism amongst White racists been so profound.

In devising a strategy to meet the situation we need to keep in mind two of Lenin's best known utterances. The first is his dictum in *What is to be Done* that "Without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement." (Footnote 3) (Lenin, V.I.: "Collected Works", vol 5, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1961, p. 369) The second is his warning in the third of the *Letters From Afar* "We would be committing a great mistake if we attempted to force the complex, urgent, rapidly developing practical tasks of the revolution into the Procrustean bed of narrowly conceived 'theory' instead of regarding theory primarily as a guide to action." (Footnote 4) (Lenin, V.I.: "Collected Works", vol 23, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1964, p.330)

What balancing these two demands implies is not that theory should be diluted by practical activity. Rather what is required is a deepening and creative enrichment of our theoretical understanding, so that our theoretical positions will not emerge as a set of rigid precepts, but precisely as reliable guides to practice. That is the challenge the new configuration in the enemy's ranks sets us.

Report of the Central Committee of the CPSA, January 1950

The orientation of the national movements on the basis of the workers and peasants is to be brought about by relating the struggle against racial discrimination to the struggle against capitalism, by showing that the colour bar is primarily a technique of exploitation for private profit, by emphasising the unity of interest that exists between the workers of all races, and by ensuring the dominant role of the class conscious workers in the national organisations.

SOUTH AFRICA

BRIEFS

CAPE TEACHERS VIEW EXAM RESULTS--Cape Town, 2 Jan (SAPA)--It came as "no surprise" that the coloured senior certificate pass-rate slumped to 64.4 percent this year, the Cape Teachers Professional Association (CTPA) said. Conditions of "severe unrest" which characterised the Cape schools were responsible for the disappointing downturn in the results, The CTPA executive committee said in a statement. Figures released by the Department of Education and Culture yesterday showed that more than 3,000 fewer pupils wrote the exams. Only 7,115 of pupils passed, bringing the pass-rate down by 8.1 percent to 64.4 percent compared to last year's 72.5 percent. "We accept, however, that the poor results are not necessarily a reflection of educational inadequacy on the part of pupils, but rather of the severe rejection of the present education system." The CTPA also saw it as "extremely unfortunate" that a number of candidates who applied for permission to write supplementary exams in February were turned down by the department. [Text] [Johannesburg SAPA in English 1208 GMT 2 Jan 86] /8309

CSO: 3400/812

SOUTH AFRICA

NO RECOVERY FORESEEN FOR PROPERTY MARKET

Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 27 Dec 85 p 2

Article by Jane Strachan: "Pessimism in Property Market"

Text THE property market is unlikely to see meaningful recovery in any sector during 1986.

It follows a year in which low commercial and industrial rentals have meant disenchanting yields, new development has been minimal and residential prices continued to slide.

Looking ahead, general consensus on the major factors underpinning the market is still pessimistic and although the reduced interest rates and other measures may give cause for long-term hope, next year's prospects are not exciting.

On the commercial and industrial front the current oversupply is sure to remain for most of next year, which means the property investment industry will continue to operate in a tenants' market.

Les Weil, executive chairman of the J H Isaacs group, notes that Johannesburg office rentals stood at about R15/m² (net) in 1983. Taking inflation into account, they should have been at R24/m² by now, but instead tenants can get deals at about half that figure.

Richard Ellis executive director Alastair Barclay suggests that the property-letting market is unlikely to achieve any sort of equilibrium for at least 18 months to two years.

However, he sees early indications of a more positive attitude towards property investments.

Investors should start making realistic decisions for the longer-term investment, he says, based on improved perceptions of the political and economic situation.

The virtual standstill in new projects, brought about largely by rentals no longer being viable

in relation to building costs, should continue.

Ironically, as Weil comments, it's realistic to build in these times if there is the backing of institutional strength.

Weil and Barclay agree that building costs will eventually soar, probably in 1987, and possibly as much as 40% to 50%, as builders seek to improve their depleted capital resources.

The residential market could show the non-residential sector its heels in 1986.

This view is supported by Property Economist's Neville Berkowitz who, while generally unenthusiastic about prospects for next year, sees this area performing better than the rest.

He is looking particularly at the cheaper end of the home building market and still expresses concern for activity over the R120 000 mark.

The National Association of Home Builders finds some consolation in the fact that since the second half of this year official statistics indicate an improvement in the planned home building programme, both in terms of the number of units for which plans have been approved and their value.

According to the association's figures, the industry's planned programme for the first 10 months of this year declined by more than 40% compared with 1984, if the inflation factor is included.

Most observers realise, though, that the market is at the mercy of state action and Botha's speech at the opening of Parliament is keenly awaited.

SOUTH AFRICA

CLOTHING PRICE INCREASE FORECAST

Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 27 Dec 85 p 2

Article by Lawrence Bedford: "20% Clothing Price Increase Forecast"

Text ROCKETING clothing prices predicted for next year are expected to leave many of us threadbare.

Increases of from 20% to 40% are forecast, depending on imported content of the garment.

"If they're totally local, the increase will be nearer 20%," says Frank Wells, chairman of the Textile & Clothing Advisory Council (TCAC).

Wells, MD of Edgars Stores' retail services division, adds: "Manufacturers have to realise sales will drop if prices increase." Increases apart, shop boycotts this month will dictate the face of the sector in 1986.

While effective boycotts spell bargains galore in January, for the retailer they add up to unprofitable sales. Wells says retailers have ordered only 80% of their requirements for Winter 1986 (April to June).

Reduced imports apart, the other difference for 1986 is that the amount of new retail space coming on stream is negligible.

Textile Federation executive director Stan Shlagman expects import replacement to continue up to a point, but fears inflation will narrow the gap between domestic production costs and imports.

National Clothing Federation (NCF) president Mike Getz says

SA is paying a full price for ignoring the basic rules that determine meaningful growth in a developing society.

Getz says it is to be hoped that the present preoccupation with urbanisation and deregulation is not another retreat from the harsh reality SA has brought upon itself. He says government appears unable to impose necessary disciplines, but chooses rather to tax more and more jobs out of existence.

Prospects for 1986 depend on confidence and demand, linked to a return of more stable political and economic conditions, adds Getz.

Of his own industry, he says: "Exports must receive priority. There is considerable unused capacity now that could well be kept busy with exports. However, intending exporters will need a more meaningful signal from government that its intentions are to encourage exports."

He says the best way it could do this is to announce that immediate and urgent consideration is to be given to the problems of raw material costs to SA manufacturers.

Getz says manufacturers in pursuit of foreign business can become both effective ambassadors as well as messengers of reality from abroad.

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SOUTH AFRICA

VALUE OF BUILDING PLANS DROPS

Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 27 Dec 85 p 3

Article by Andre Van Zyl: "Value of Plans Drops to R4,012bn"

Text FOR the first time in recent years, the value of buildings completed is catching up to the value of building plans passed as financial expectations drop, latest figures released by Central Statistical Services show.

The value of building plans passed for the period October to December 1985 dropped 19.4% to R4,012bn from the figure for the same period last year, while the value of buildings completed rose 7% to R3,200bn at current prices.



Discounted to 1980 prices, the value of plans passed show a drop of 20.4% to R2,292bn, while the value of buildings completed show

a fall of 0.1% to R1,842bn.

The tendency is most noticeable in residential building, where contracts completed are barely being matched by new plans. Plans passed dropped 33.1% to R1,577bn at current prices and buildings completed fell by 8.3% to R1,564bn.

The value of non-residential plans passed dropped by 16% to R1,221bn, while non-residential buildings completed rose 30.2% to R831.4m.

Similarly, alterations and additions planned rose by only 3.9%, but projects completed rose by 24.5% to R804.5m.



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SOUTH AFRICA

DOMESTIC ELECTRICITY COST TO RISE BY JULY

Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES (Business) in English 29 Dec 85 p 1

Article by Amrit Manga: "Domestic Electricity Cost up 26% by July"

Text

DOMESTIC consumers could be paying up to 26% more than the current price for electricity by July.

This is almost 10 percentage points more than the average increase of 15.5% for the whole of next year that Escom announced earlier this month.

An Escom spokesman says that although the average increase for 1986 will be about 15.5%, consumers will pay 21% more a unit from July 1986 than in December this year.

In addition, most municipalities will add on average another 5% in April.

Consumers will have to make the first extra payment in January when municipalities raise tariffs to recover Escom's first 10% increase.

Germiston's city electrical engineer, Grawie Nortje, says consumers in his municipality will pay slightly less than the 10% increase that Escom will charge it in January.

Current rate a unit 4.45c. It will be raised from January to 4.8c, which is about 0.098c less than a 10% increase.

Mr Nortje says: "The increase is based on a formula geared to recover Escom's increases only.

"Any increases above the Escom rate can only be promulgated in April when estimates of cost rises, like sala-

ries, maintenance and material costs, etc, are taken into account."

Maximum

Johannesburg, which sells electricity to consumers at a domestic rate of 5.544c a unit will raise its price to 5.8866c — a little more than 6%. Johannesburg normally lifts its rates by only half the Escom increases.

Escom rates for households in Sandton are much higher than in Germiston and Johannesburg.

For the first 300 units used, Escom charges 9.40c a unit. The rate drops to 5.38c for more than 300 units.

Escom will also increase its maximum demand charge by about 3%. It is related to the capital Escom must invest to ensure that it has the generating capacity to meet the maximum needs of a customer.

But the demand charge will not affect small users soon. An Escom spokesman says the demand charge will be introduced for both small urban and rural users to encourage economical use of electricity.

But the spokesman is optimistic that tariff increases are unlikely to follow this year's pattern in the years beyond 1986 because of the more than R2.4-billion saving in the 1986-89 capital expenditure budget.

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SOUTH AFRICA

'ROCKETING' POTATO PRICES REPORTED

Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 31 Dec 85 p 3

Article by Alan Peat: "Potato Prices Rocket but They Could Tumble Soon"

Text

POTATOES have hurtled into the luxury bracket in the past couple of weeks as a shortage has sharply forced up prices.

The happy days of the record crop at the beginning of 1984 benefited buyers then as prices dropped as low as R2 a 15kg pocket.

The glut continued until September but prices have risen rapidly since then.

The national average is now between R16 and R18 a pocket for large potatoes.

The reasons, the Potato Board told *Business Day*, were a combination of market conditions and climatic factors.

"As prices dropped and continued to hold down, some farmers started to change to alternative crops," said a board spokesman.

"Also, unfortunate weather conditions have reduced the most recent market supplies from the northern Transvaal and the Sandveld area in the western Cape."

The total plantings in the northern Transvaal for this season dropped from last season's 7 030 ha to 5 200 ha.

In the Sandveld, it went from 3 300 ha to 2 300 ha.

The crops from each area were 9,6-million tons and 3,2-million tons respectively for this season, down from 12,1-million and 5,1-million for last year.

These two areas have been the country's main suppliers until now, with the eastern Transvaal due to start shortly on a comparable scale.

"But the recent heavy rain has hindered the start of their early harvest," said director of Johannesburg markets Peter Venter.

"We shall have to wait until the eastern OFS starts to supply at the start of February till things improve."

The Potato Board added that the Eastern Transvaal — an important supply area from December to May — had also had a 10% drop in area planted and the early crop was damaged by the drought.

"But," said the spokesman, "with the eastern OFS and the western Cape round about Ceres starting to supply we should see the benefit of a better supply/demand position from February."

Supermarkets have been struggling to maintain quality in their offerings, according to Pick 'n Pay's Richard Cohen.

"There has just been no quality produce on the markets," he said.

"And even seconds have been priced at as much as R15-R16 a pocket. But prices should drop early in the new year."

The recent shock of R20 price tags in the Durban market was, according to the potato experts, only a one-off hiccup.

It was the result, they speculated in remarks to *Business Day*, of a major quality supplier marketing his crop at a time when worthwhile buys were just not available.

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SOUTH AFRICA

EAST CAPE RAIL USE EXCEEDS NATIONAL TREND

Port Elizabeth WEEKEND POST in English 21 Dec 85 p 1

Text GROWING raw material exports have boosted the Eastern Cape's streamlined rail traffic by 9% this year, beating the national trend of declining usage.

This has been disclosed by Mr George Engelbrecht, Cape Midlands Regional Manager of SA Transport Services (SATS), in his review of 1985.

He said the "exceedingly adverse economic conditions" were having a detrimental effect on the SATS.

"Traffic is decreasing continuously, with the result that the financial situation is deteriorating to such an extent that it is anticipated that the 1985-86 financial year will be concluded with a considerable deficit, unlike 1984-85 when a small surplus was realised," he said of the national situation.

But he added the good news on the local scene by disclosing:

"In contrast with the picture for the Republic as a whole, there has been an increase of 9% in rail traffic conveyed on the Cape Midland Region to date this year.

"This is largely due to an increase in export traffic, mainly steel and coal exported through Port Elizabeth Harbour. This increased by 500 000 tons and 600 000 tons respectively and helped to stimulate activities in the harbour."

Mr Engelbrecht said that to combat the economic sit-

uation, the region had concentrated on an intensive campaign to improve productivity by reducing expenditure and increasing revenue.

"Considerable success was achieved:

"● It was possible to restrict our operating expenditure to almost 3% below the inflation rate.

"● Personnel strength was reduced by a further 609 employees from the beginning of the year by not replacing those who left the service.

"● A scheme was introduced whereby personnel are rewarded for proposals that will lead to an improvement in productivity."

Turning to prospects for 1986, Mr Engelbrecht said traffic in the region was expected to increase in line with the "slow upswing" in the economy.

"The bulk conveyance of raw materials, such as manganese ore, steel and coal, should maintain the present levels.

"Harbour activities are expected to remain export orientated, with a moderate increase in imports."

Ending his review on an optimistic note, Mr Engelbrecht said: "The discovery of gas at Mossel Bay, with its consequent industrial development, is good news for this region and planning of the relevant infrastructure will commence as soon as more factual details are made known."

SOUTH AFRICA

'ULTRA-RELIABLE' RADIO SYSTEMS PRODUCED

Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 27 Dec 85 p 7

Unsigned article: "Fuchs Makes 'Ultra-Reliable' Radio Systems"

Text

FUCHS Electronics, a Reutech company, is claiming a tenfold improvement in internationally-accepted minimum reliability standards for present generation high frequency (HF) military radio systems.

In terms of new performance standards developed by the company, all batches from the production line are tested continuously until they have proved that they meet the required reliability level.

Testing entails segmented and cyclic subjection to vibration, shock, thermal stress, water immersion, humidity and temperature extremes. Exposure to these conditions takes place for an extended period under operational conditions.

"From our testing procedures it has become clear that reliability must be designed in — not tested in," says director and GM Jim Alder.

"Over the past 18 months our company embarked on a reliability growth programme in conjunction with Armscor and the SADF," says Alder.

"It required new design analysis techniques, the introduction of reliability engineering and setting additional quality and process controls.

"In addition, test methods and reli-

ability demonstration evaluation based on MIL STD 781C were developed."

Alder attributes the success of the reliability improvement programme to the fundamental design expertise of staff working in the company's three R & D departments.

One department specialises in communications products mainly directed at the military, which has particularly exacting performance standards.

A second concentrates on high technology techniques to solve signal processing problems.

The third is involved in special projects where the main emphasis is on very high frequency doppler radar type applications.

These three departments employ more than 60 engineers and technicians, many of whom hold PhD and MSc degrees.

The equipment that Fuchs says consistently meets the new reliability standards are the Rapier series — a high-reliability version of the B25H, and B26H and C28H frequency agile HF military radio systems — and the Lancer series, the Rapier's export version, equipped with microprocessor keypad control and LCD display.

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SOUTH AFRICA

SABS PAVES WAY FOR ELECTRONICS EXPORTS

Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 27 Dec 85 p 7

Unsigned article: "SABS Boost for Electronics Exports"

Text

THE South African Bureau of Standards (SABS) has paved the way for the export of locally-manufactured electronic components by joining the Quality Assessment System for Electronic Components of the International Electrotechnical Commission (IECQ).

According to the international quality assessment system, importers of electronic components will enjoy a greater assurance on the quality of the components, while certified exporters will benefit because one of the IECQ principles is that there shall be no unfair discrimination against certificate holders.

The main object of IECQ is to facilitate international trade in electronic components of assessed quality. The idea is to have components conforming with the requirements of an

applicable IECQ specification, released in a participating country equally acceptable in all other participating countries without the need for further testing.

IECQ reduces the need for users to perform vendor assessments; brings about greater assurances on the quality of components and greater possibility of world-wide multiple-sourcing of components; has the effect that smaller user companies can eliminate costs of approval testing of components; gives maximum assurance to the purchaser; and makes overseas markets more readily available to local products, to name a few of the benefits of the system.

Where IECQ specifications exist the SABS can arrange for interested manufacturers to have their components certified in terms of this system.

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SOUTH AFRICA

RAINS BRING PROMISE OF LARGER MAIZE CROP

Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES (Business) in English 29 Dec 85 p 1

Article by Don Robertson: "Rains Promise 7m to 8m tons of Mealies"

Text

WIDESPREAD rains in the Transvaal and Free State have brought the promise of a larger maize crop than last year.

All planting has been done in the Free State, and rains of the past two weeks have allowed most farmers in the Western and North-Western Transvaal to get their crops into the ground.

Although adequate rainfall over the next two months is vital, a potential crop of between 8-million and 9-million tons is forecast.

Last season's harvest was 7-million tons.

In the previous season maize had to be imported. A good crop in the current season will eliminate the need for costly imports, especially as the rand has been crippled.

A good current crop would restore South Africa as an exporter of maize. SA consumption is about 6.5-million tons.

Kobus Becker, managing director of

Triomf Fertilizer, says that good rains have fallen in the Lichtenburg and Mafikeng areas and about 85% of the area has been planted.

This late planting should result in a larger area under cultivation than last year.

The encouraging forecast is confirmed by Pat McGee, national sales manager at Sasol Fertilizer, who says that adequate rains in the North-Western Transvaal and North-Western Free State should boost the crop well above last year's figure.

The potential crop, he says, could be as high as 11-million tons, but will depend on good rainfall in the next few weeks.

The Eastern Transvaal received good rains last month and a bumper crop is expected.

The record SA crop of 14.1-million tons was achieved in 1982 when 4.5-million hectares were planted.

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SOUTH AFRICA

BRIEFS

FRENCH BANK PROFITS--French Bank of SA has had a fantastic trading year. Sources close to the bank say it achieved an embarrassment of riches in the year to December and the biggest problem may now be to hide some of the amazing profits in hidden reserves. One well-placed source said taxed profit could be as high as R15 million compared with R2.9 million in 1984, "but they are unlikely to declare that much". In the half-year to June, taxed profit rose 183% to R2.5 million. Since then things had continued to improve. [By David Carte] [Excerpt] [Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 29 Dec 85 pp 1, 3] /12851

BARCLAY'S ASSAY DEPARTMENT--Barclays National Bank has bought an ARL 8420 X-ray fluorescence spectrometer from Arlabs for its assay and analytical chemistry department in Johannesburg. The department's manager, Eric Fuchs, who visited Applied Research Laboratories headquarters in Switzerland to evaluate the spectrometer prior to ordering it, said that the 8420 will be used for the analysis of gold and silver destined for the jewellery trade, as well as bullion and coins. Barclays is the only bank in SA with an assay department. [Text] [Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 27 Dec 85 p 7] /12851

CONTAINER TRADE--Inland American and Canadian markets have been opened up for South African exporters following changes in container sea links with Atlantic ports. Local traders can now ship full container loads into the US midwest through the port of Montreal. Mr Hans Oosterhuis, trade manager for Christensen Canadian African Lines at Nedlloyd Agencies in Durban says: "Routing via Montreal, South African exporters have a direct service to the cities of Chicago, Milwaukee, Detroit as well as Canadian inland destinations." An important factor in the CCAL service is that the line's sister ships Thor 1 and Thorscope, which operate on this trade run, are ice-strengthened. This allows them to sail in and out of Montreal throughout the year, thus ensuring South African traders a monthly schedule without disruption during winter. [Text] [Cape Town WEEKEND ARGUS in English 21 Dec 85 p 3] /12851

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